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ABSTRACT 
Pascal's theology of grace, which he claimed to be the 
pure doctrine of St. Augustine and the orthodox teaching of 
the Catholic Church, has been variously labelled Augustinian, 
Thomist, humanist or a Jansenist heresy. In this thesis an 
attempt is made to determine the exact nature of that theology. 
Key themes and assumptions which emerge from a study of 
Pascal's major writings directly concerned with his theology 
of grace, and from the shorter works which have influenced 
its formulation and expression, are appraised in the light 
of the basic presuppositions of the Augustinian doctrine and 
the religious experience which is their true warrant and 
psychological ground. 
The conclusion which issues from this examination is that 
Pascal in fact subscribed to two conflicting sets of presup-
positions, the one held at the conscious level of thought, 
and the other unconsciously assumed. At the conscious level 
he defends passionately the Augustinian doctrine of grace, 
reflecting a view of God and of grace based wholly upon non-
rational grounds. Clearly, the fundamental Augustinian dis-
tinction between nature and grace underpins both method and 
matter in each of the works studied. This theology is also 
found to be identical, on all counts, with that of Port-Royal, 
Jansen, Thomas Aquinas and the orthodox teaching of the 
Catholic Church. 
The inconsistencies and irrationalities in Pascal's works 
on grace witness, however, to unconsciously held assumptions 
which directly contradict those of Augustine, and correspond 
rather with the assumptions held by the Jesuits. If the 
doctrinal disagreements between Pascal and his Jesuit 
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opponents are transposed to the level of psychological 
insight, it is suggested that a view of grace can be worked 
out which encompasses both Augustinian and Scholastic 
traditions of Christian thought. 
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INTRODUCTION 
General Introduction 
The aim of this thesis is an examination of Pascal's 
conception of divine grace in those of his works which deal 
with it specifically or inferentially. Discussion of three 
aspects of the question is attempted: the degree of equival-
ence of his doctrine with that of Augustine, Jansen and the 
Catholic Church; the modifying influence of his mathematical 
mode of thought upon its expression; and to what extent the 
psychological ground upon which it rests is responsible for 
inconsistencies not only within the doctrine itself, but 
also between doctrinal assumptions and those unconsciously 
held by Pascal. 
A summary of the presuppositions of the Augustinian 
doctrine, especially the pivotal distinction between nature 
and grace upon which the whole edifice rests, is designed to 
provide a reference base for future discussion. Similarly, 
a short analysis of the Augustinian doctrine, especially with 
respect to Original Sin and the Fall, as the attempted 
rationalization of the non-rational intuitions of a particu-
lar type of religious experience, is intended to point up 
the psychological source of inconsistencies and irration-
alities and to explain Pascal's uncritical acceptance of that 
doctrine. Selected shorter works are discussed which deal 
in greater depth with key themes and conclusions particularly 
relevant to the three main works, all developing and under-
scoring the basic premise of divine omnipotence and human 
powerlessness. Especially important is the expansion of the 
Augustinian distinction into an inflexible mathematical 
formula in the doctrine of the three orders, making absolute 
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the inaccessibility of God through the natural world or 
human reason without the aid of divine grace. The adoption 
by Pascal of the Platonism of Augustine, especially in the 
imagery used to depict the condition of unredeemed humanity, 
can be seen to effect a further hardening of the division 
between man and God by accentuating both human worthlessness 
and divine transcendence. 
The Ecrits sur la Grace constitute a full statement and 
defence of the orthodoxy of the Port-Royal theological stance 
and particularly of efficacious grace as the sole instrument 
of election. The work must be viewed in relation to its 
historical context, as part of the on-going struggle between 
Western and Eastern Traditions of Christendom, unequivocally 
reaffirming the primacy of divine revelation in the face of 
the increasing influence of a permissive and accommodating 
Jesuit rational theology, apparently sanctioned by the Council 
of Trent. The predominantly polemical tone of the Provinciales 
accords with the purpose of the work, namely, an appeal to 
French society to sanction the claims of divine grace over 
those of reason as sole authority in moral theology. This 
view of grace as constituting the only means of leading a 
truly moral Christian life necessarily highlights the 
Augustinian concept of the Church and the world as mutually 
exclusive societies, and the implications of this for a Church 
in which Jesuit rational moral theology threatened, in Pascal's 
view, its stability and integrity. Similarly, and perhaps 
paradoxically, the primacy of grace in divine revelation as 
the only source of conversion, mediated in the Tradition and 
Sacraments of the Church, is central to the whole of the 
Pensees, determining both the apologetic framework and the 
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need for the abdication of reason and uncritical acceptance 
of dogma as the first vital step in the search for the gift 
of faith. 
Finally, in order to underline the deficiencies in 
Pascal's views, an attempt is made to propose a view of grace 
which acknowledges the insights of both rational and non-
rational strains of the Christian Tradition, reconciling 
human responsibility and divine omnipotence. 
The Term "Grace" in Christian Thought l 
Whilst the early Christian Church affirmed both the 
necessity of divine grace and a true freedom of will in man 
upon which the acceptance of that grace depends, the mode of 
its operation and the ~egree of human freedom have been very 
differently conceived by the Eastern and Western Traditions 
of Christendom. The Eastern conception of grace, rooted in 
Greek philosophy, began from the premise of an essentially 
sound human nature, weakened but not crippled by the Fall, 
with a true freedom and ability to choose the good, and with 
moral evil attributable to ignorance rather than deliberate 
rebellion against God. The function of grace was limited to 
strengthening the will and illuminating the intellect by 
external means, particularly the example and teaching of 
Christ. Pelagius, who represented the extreme of this view, 
was perceived by the early Church as fundamentally irreligious 
in denying both the need for a supernatural grace or depend-
ence upon God and the efficacy of Christ's sacrifice, and his 
teaching was duly condemned in favour of that of Augustine. 
At the opposite pole, the Western notion of grace, 
influenced by the authoritarian structure and legal system of 
the Roman Empire, started out from a consciousness of the 
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overriding divine omnipotence, the universality of sin and 
the corruption and powerlessness of the human will. Upon 
such a view of man and God Augustine developed his doctrine 
of grace, as an irresistible divine power, merited only by 
the death of Christ and arbitrarily bestowed upon the elect 
to liberate and inwardly renew the will. Man remains entirely 
passive and freedom of will in the ordinary sense is effect-
ively denied. As H.F. Stewart succinctly states, "The Grace 
which God gives to the elect predisposes the will to seek 
Him prior to any motion on man's part, influences the will 
which it has thus predisposed, and enables it to co-operate 
in the work of salvation. That is to say, in theological 
language of a later period, it is 'prevenient', 'operant' and 
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'co-operant'" . 
Augustine distinguishes two distinct types of grace, both 
wholly unmerited and gratuitous gifts of God. The first is 
the supernatural help (adiutorium sine quo non) granted to 
Adam at creation, subject to the choice of his will and 
sufficient to allow him to persevere in righteousness and 
maintain the harmony of his nature, and of which he was 
necessarily deprived by the Fall. The second is the special 
grace, wholly efficacious and infallible, required by Adam in 
the post-Fall state, to heal the corruption of the will and 
perform the good. Whilst, in Augustine, all virtuous acts 
whether of pagans or Christians are the result of a divine 
grace, only those performed under the power of this sanctify-
ing grace merit salvation. The attainment of eternal life oi 
final perseverance, however, depends upon a further gift which 
ensures that a state of grace coincides with death. Sanctify-
ing grace, which operates by way of an attraction (delectatio) 
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to the will, is made efficacious by its congruity to the will 
of the recipient. The justified not predestined to glory 
simply lapse into the "massa damnata" by the bestowal of an 
incongruous grace. Although Augustine does not himself make 
such a distinction, he is the real author of the later dis-
tinction between "prevenient" and "co-operant", and 
"sufficent" and "efficacious" (i.e. incongruous and congruous) 
grace. 
The Thomist theology of grace is simply a restatement of 
the Augustinian doctrine, modified, as a result of the 
influence of Aristotle and an increasing emphasis upon human 
merit and freedom, by the introduction of the concept of God 
as First Cause, the source from which all things spring, rather 
than the goal to which they are bent. Thomists affirmed the 
absolute necessity of both prevenient grace without prevision 
of merit and sanctifying grace, but add to the distinctions 
already implied by Augustine, those of "habitual" and "actual". 
The first is an indwelling gift predisposing the will to obtain 
the eternal good, and the second a motion of the soul by God 
which inspires and performs the good. God's antecedent and 
consequent will is the basis for the distinction in later 
Thomists between "sufficient" and "efficacious" grace which 
plays an important part in the Provinciales. 
The doctrines of Luther and Calvin develop to its logical 
conclusion the determinism implicit in Augustinianism. Grace 
replaces the will of those predestined at creation to eternal 
life, and no attempt is made to save the divine justice or to 
find a place for human merit. Everything is predetermined by 
the divine will: election and reprobation, the Fall and the 
birth and death of Christ. Salvation is effected by the 
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imputation of Christ's merit to the works of the elect who 
remain in a state of corruption throughout their lives, but 
who, unlike their Augustinian counterparts are assured of 
final perseverance. 
Semi-Pelagianism represented an attempt to mediate between 
the two traditions by affirming both the universal necessity 
of grace and a true freedom of choice in man. Revived in the 
teaching of Duns Scotus, it was given a further fillip by the 
ambivalent deliverances of the Council of Trent favouring both 
Scotists and Thomists, and reappeared in the teaching of the 
Jesuit theologian Molina. The interpretation of Lessius 
however, espoused by seventeenth century Jesuits, brought 
Molinism very close to the naturalism of Pelagius. Prevenient 
grace was deemed necessary but subject to acceptance by the 
human will, thereby overthrowing the notions ofirresist-
ibility and predestination in Augustine and affirming a univer-
sal salvific will in God. It also necessarily abolished the 
Augustinian distinction between "sufficient" and "efficacious" 
grace, the "sufficient" grace promoted by Jesuit humanism 
offering man all the divine help needed to perform a meritor-
ious action. "Sufficient" grace is rendered "efficacious" 
therefore simply by man's own effort, with God contributing 
only a simultaneous concord and salvation dependent not on 
the arbitrary choice of divine omnipotence but on that of a 
completely autonomous human will. 
The battle engaged between the claims of nature and grace 
in seventeenth century France, in the rational theology of 
Jesuit humanism and the revived Augustinianism of the 
Jansenists, constituted a renewal, then, of the on-going con-
troversy between Eastern and Western theologies of grace 
initiated by Pelagius and Augustine in the fifth century. 
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NOTES 
INTRODUCTION 
1. Reference material for this section: H.F. Stewart's 
introduction to Pascal, Blaise, Les Lettres Provinciales 
(Manchester, University Press, 1920), pp.XV-XX; 
N.P. Williams, The Grace of God (London, Hodder & 
Stoughton, 1966), pp.25-114; J. Miel, Pascal and 
Theology (Baltimore and London, The Johns Hopkins Press, 
19 6 9), pp. 1- 6 3 • 
2. Stewart, Les Lettres Provinciales, p. XVII. 
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CHAPTER I 
DOCTRINAL PRESUPPOSITIONS. 1 
The development of the Christian doctrine of grace, 
resting on the key doctrines of the Fall and Original Sin is, 
as N.P. Williams observes, associated with the name of 
Augustine, and those doctrines sanctioned in the Canons of 
the Council of Trent, the Thirty Nine Articles, the 
Institutio of Calvin, and the Augsburg Confession, are in 
his view "so many modified and competing versions of 
Augustinianism,,:2 The ideas of Original Sin and Grace had 
developed quite independently in Jewish thought and it was 
by st. Paul rather than by Christ, that they were given 
authority in the New Testament and transmitted to modern 
Christianity. The study, under the tutelage of Ambrose, of 
st. Paul's writing on predestination and grace, and of 
certain of the Western Fathers, confirmed by the spiritual 
insights of his conversion experience, led Augustine to com-
bine these concepts and elaborate them into "a vast intel-
lectual scheme,,3 since known as the Christian doctrine of 
grace. A.V.G. Allen points out that, though anticipated in 
the work of Tertullian, Ambrosiaster and Augustine's mentor 
Ambrose, the doctrine of Original Sin as expounded by 
Augustine was not only unknown to Greek thought but an innova-
tion in Western Christendom. 4 The doctrine was fully 
developed in De Diversis quaestionibus ad Simplicianum begun 
in 396, well before the Pelagian controversy, the latter 
sparked off, in fact, by Pelagian objections to its implicit 
expression in the Confessions of 400. 5 As Miel further 
indicates, the harshness of the Augustinian doctrine cannot 
11 
therefore be excused on the grounds that Augustine was forced 
to harden his views by the constraints of the controversy, 
a claim made by those in the Middle Ages who wished to temper 
his doctrine. 
The Fall and Original Sin: Pre-Fall Adam 
The initial premise of Augustine's system consists in 
the doctrine of the Fall, a strictly literal interpretation 
of the Adam and Eve story. The first Christian theologian 
to devote serious attention to the state of Adam before the 
Fall, Augustine paints a glowing picture of human nature in 
the paradisal state, carrying "to its highest pitch the grow-, 
ing tendency to attribute original righteousness and perfec-
tion to the first man,,~6 Created mortal, Adam nevertheless 
enjoyed a conditional or possible immortality which carried 
with it immunity from the physical ills of life as it is now 
known, together with surpassing intellectual gifts. He 
possessed original innocence so that his nature was without 
vice or essential weakn~ss, capable not only of perceiving 
the good, but also of performing it with ease. Reason and 
will were in equilibrium and exercised perfect control over 
his actions and bodily passions. 
Since Adam was created for an end which was divine in 
its nature and origin, he was given a special divine assist-
ance or "sufficient" grace without which his will was 
absolutely incapable of acting righteously or persevering 
in so doing and attaining the supernatural end, the enjoyment 
of God, for which he was destined at creation. Adam's free-, 
dom consisted, therefore, not in an inability to sin but in 
the ability not to sin if he so willed. The condition of 
achieving this goal was continued union with God through the 
sUbjection of his will in acknowledgement of a radical 
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dependence upon Him. As Abercrombie observes, "the right 
activity of man is all summed up in conversion to the God 
who made him, that he may become, from God, and by God, just, 
pious, wise, and happy". 7 The grace given to Adam which 
facilitated participation in the good, or God, was therefore 
as light to whole eyes, by the aid of which he may see. Had 
Adam fulfilled the condition of its reception, he would have 
attained immortality among the blessed in heaven, without 
enduring the suffering and death of a mortal existence. 
In the opinion of N.P. Williams,8 Augustine never made 
up his mind decisively whether this "donum superadditum" of 
Adam should be distinguished from the "pura naturalia" as 
found in the Schoolmen, or identified with them as in the 
Reformers and by implication, Jansen - a question of some 
importance in the eyes of certain critics of the Augustinus. 9 
Clearly, as Gilson10 emphasises, Augustine considered every 
grace including existence itself to be a wholly gratuitous 
gift of God, the crucial question for him being the recovery 
of that special divine assistance required by Adam, in view 
of his finitude, for the enjoyment of eternal life. 
Post-Fall Adam 
Though trifling in appearance, the first sin was par-
ticularly heinous in the view of Augustine, since it did not 
result from the difficulty of the precepts laid down by God 
or any inherent weakness or frailty in Adam's will which had 
no particular bias towards evil. It constituted a deliberate 
and unnecessary transgression of the divine command, of the 
greatest possible importance for the history of the human 
race, for as such it included in itself all possible forms 
of sin - pride, sacrilege, spiritual fornication, infidelity, 
theft, covetousness and suicide. The chief ground of Adam's 
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sin, however, was pride, the desire for self-determination 
and independence from God as his true principle, an act of 
perversity arising from his creatureliness which made such 
an aversion possible. In retribution for this act of 
rebellion Adam was abandoned by God in the love of creatures 
and the result of this self-imposed separation was the loss 
of all those privileges to which such a union had entitled 
him, - supernatural grace, immortality, impassibility, inward 
and outward harmony - becoming thereby the slave of concu-
piscence, ignorance and everlasting death of body and soul. 
Augustine distinguishes two aspects of Original Sin: 
the "vitium" or hereditary moral disease from which man 
suffers; and the "reatus" or inherited legal liability to 
which he is subject as punishment. He defined the first as 
"the unbridled and inordinate tyranny of concupiscence ... 
the tendency that impels man to turn from the supreme and 
immutable good, which is God, in order to find his satisfac-
tion and comfort in that which is mutable and less than God, 
that is, in creatures".ll Augustine saw the reproductive 
instinct in man, in his view the most violent and least 
amenable to reason, as the greatest symptom of concupiscence 
which he tended, as a consequence, to equate with sexual 
passion. This identification provided a sufficient explana-
tion for the transmission of concupiscence, in which punish-
ment for the first sin principally consisted. Not simply 
in virtue of its physical descent from Adam, but because of 
its seminal identity with him (since the whole human race 
was in the loins of Adam when he sinned), this sin and the 
guilt attaching to it are imputed to all humanity. 
A further consequence of the Fall and man's enslavement 
to concupiscence is the loss of the freedom enjoyed by Adam, 
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of being able to avoid sin and persevere in the good. In 
fact, fallen man is under a necessity of sinning since he 
begins life where Adam left off, free to sin but incapable 
of acting righteously without a radical conversion to God. 
His will, now controlled by the passions is no longer free 
to follow the judgement of reason but locked into love of 
creatures. As Abercrombie observes, "the creature may be 
free to empty itself, but it can never be filled except by 
the hand of the Creator". 12 
Though scarred and vitiated as a result of Adam's sin, 
human nature does, in Augustine, fall short of "total 
depravity," the inference drawn by Calvin and Luther from 
his doctrine. Restrained perhaps by his Platonic view of 
all being as a participation in the being of God, Augustine 
insisted that a trace of the divine image remained in Adam 
to bear witness to what was lost, evident in man's greatest 
attribute reason, by means of which concupiscence imitates 
God in the creation of earthly peace and order. Although 
darkened by the Fall, the mind is still capable of knowing 
truth and loving goodness, and even in fallen man there are 
natural virtues and good works. Though useless for salvation 
since they do not result from a special supernatural grace, 
all are nevertheless gifts of God and attributable to the 
general concursus sustaining the being of all creatures and 
the operations of nature. 
Original Guilt and Predestination 
The legal aspect of Original Sin consists in the imputa-, 
tion of the infinite guilt incurred by the wilful trans-
gression of Adam to the whole of humanity who, by "seminal 
identity", participated in and were co-responsible for his 
perverse choice, and in virtue of which henceforth became 
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a "massa damnata", justly doomed. to eternal damnation. By 
reason of original sin alone all the unbaptised, even 
guiltless infants, were destined to suffer the pains of hell, 
the latter, however, in a somewhat mitigated form. Since 
all were guilty, God was not obliged to redeem anyone but 
his kindness (gratia) impelled Him to elect from all 
eternity certain individuals from the massa damnata to bring 
to baptism and faith in Christ, leaving the remainder subject 
to a decree, not so much of reprobation as of preterition, 
a distinction, as N.P. Williams indicates, without a 
difference. 13 
Augustine insisted that there was nothing unfair about 
this apparently arbitrary and unjust arrangement, excusing 
it by reference to an "occult justice" in God, transcendent 
and incomprehensible to men. At the same time, however, he 
maintained that all men have the possibility of being among 
the elect if they so wish. It is God's will that they 
should be saved, though of necessity only the elect, whose 
number is hidden in the inscrutable mystery of the godhead, 
do actually will their salvation. Augustine was forced to 
defend this assertion of an arbitrary and infallible pre-
destination.in the face of the apparently unequivocal proof 
of a universal salvific will in God in the text, "whose will 
it is that all men should find salvation and come to know 
the truth" (1 Timothy 2, 4). His somewhat far-fetched 
attempts to explain away the meaning of "all", interpreting 
it to mean that God wills the salvation of all the elect, 
among whom men of all types and races are represented, were 
14 later taken up and used by Pascal. 
It is by the bestowal or withdrawal of this grace by 
the manipulation of its foreseen acceptability, in the divine 
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ordering of human lives, that the decree of predestination 
is effected and the elect, despite temporary lapses to induce 
humility, die in a state of grace and are brought to eternal 
life. Predestination is therefore of two kinds: to faith, 
baptism and membership of the Church in this life; or to 
salvation in the life to come through the gift of final per-
severance. h . 1 A 15 1 d 'b In t e Ecrlts sur a Grace Pasca escrl es 
the three groups into which mankind is thus divided: the 
bulk of humanity damned in virtue of Original Sin; those 
temporarily plucked from this group by the grace of justi-
fication; and "the Divine favourites,,16 permanently elected 
and predestined to glory. 
The Grace of Redemption 
In Augustine's view it was impossible for man to rise 
from the mire of concupiscence without the gift of a special 
"efficacious" grace to heal the corrupt will of fallen man 
and restore the divine image which was lost by the Fall. 
The source of this grace is the adoption of a creature by 
God in virtue of the merits of Jesus Christ. Through 
baptism recipients of the grace of election receive remission 
of sins and the grace of justification. Augustine, as 
N.P. Williams explains,17 understood "iustificare" as "to 
make just" rather than "to account or hold just", so that 
the former meaning in St. Paul came to be enlarged to include 
not only God's favour of preliminary absolution to the elect 
but also the "power", "gift" or "help" which he infuses into 
their souls to develop their moral and spiritual perfection. 
In addition to the "prevenient" grace by which God 
excites in the soul the desire to will the good, "sanctifying" 
grace provides the divine power which is absolutely necessary 
for all Christians in order for them to perform any salutary 
good work whatsoever. 
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The whole of Augustine's view of grace, 
as Abercrombie observes, is summed up in the text, "Without 
me ye can do nothing".18 For Augustine "grace, and grace 
alone, made the exercise of the Christian life possible; 
grace, in his view, does more than enable a man to do good 
works; it 'gets them done,,,.19 
Occasionally Augustine follows the Pauline view of grace 
and equates it with the Holy Spirit which he frequently 
called "the finger of God". Elsewhere it is a gift of the 
Holy Spirit, and this differentiation later developed into 
the conception of grace as an impersonal force emitted by 
God. For Augustine, grace is always the grace of Christ, 
reflecting the centrality of Christ's death and suffering 
in his view of the Atonement. As Hastings Rashdall observes,20 
the whole theology of Augustine is concerned with redemption 
and all else is subordinated to it, resting, as in St. Paul, 
upon the twin pillars of Adam and Christ. By the fall of 
the first the whole of humanity was delivered into the 
Devil's power, and their redemption was effected solely by 
the death of the second, who, vicariously suffering the 
punishment due to man, gave his blood to the Devil as a 
ransom for the release of the elect. 
Although the word "irresistible" does not occur in the 
writings of Augustine in relation to grace, other terms such 
as "insuperabiliter" furnish ample evidence that human wills 
are incapable of withstanding the will of God. 21 This con-
trol is exercised both by interior illumination of and action 
upon the soul, and the providential arrangement of the 
exterior circumstances which contribute to the shaping of 
our actions so that "All things work together for good to 
them that love God" (Rom.8, 28). To the elect, every circum-
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stance of his earthly existence is an occasion of grace, a 
means of salvation, which he cannot resist or prevent. The 
essential fatalism inherent in such a system, seen in the 
submissive acceptance of all events and circumstances as 
22 from God and reflected in the writing of Pascal, was not 
denied by Augustine himself. 
There is no struggling against a force which 
represents all the might of omnipotence, directed 
by all the intellectual resources of omniscience. 
God is in the position of a chess-player, gifted 
with telepathic and hypnotic power of an infinitely 
high degree, who not merely foresees all the other 
player's moves, but actually himself makes them, 
acting through the other's mind and brain, and who 
consequently has won the game before it has even 
begun.23 
Grace and Freedom 
Determined either by an infallible grace or by concu-
piscence the will of man can scarcely be said to enjoy a 
true freedom in the ordinarily accepted sense. Yet Augustine 
independently affirmed the reality both of an irresistible 
grace and of free will. N.P. Williams cites the somewhat 
paradoxical exhortation of Augustine, delivered in a sermon 
on the text "No man can come to me, except the Father which 
hath sent me draw him", which reflects this ambivalence -
"Art thou not yet drawn? pray that thou mayest be".24 
The problem of reconciling grace with freedom of choice 
. . 25 
simply did not exist for Augustlne. He was concerned 
rather with the problem of liberty, i.e. whether it is in 
our power to will and therefore execute a good choice, since 
the act of willing is never, in his view, divorced from the 
action itself. The difference between the man who has grace 
and the man who does not lies, not in the possession or lack 
of free choice, but in its efficacy. Augustine believed 
that he had reconciled the two sides of the dichotomy of 
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free will and an absolute predestination in the theory of 
the IIdelectatio ll • The will, he claimed, always chooses 
freely in response to a motive, the attraction of some good 
perceived in its object. Indeed, the will consists essen-
tia11y in love or delight, the inner weight which draws it 
to one end rather than another, the movement in which 
liberty finds expression. Knowing the response which each 
soul would freely make to every motive presented to it, 
grace operates in the elect by way of an infallible attrac-
tion, restoring the love of God or charity of which Adam's 
will was once capable, and emancipating it from sin land, 
temptation into the liberty of the children of God. 'rhose 
excluded from salvation may hear the call of grace but, 
having received only a "sufficient II grace, they find the 
delight of concupiscence more powerful and unfailingly 
choose sin. 
The will under grace therefore retains its free choice 
and gains liberty, for grace enables free choice to act. 
As N.P. Williams succinctly states, "We are free to do what 
we like, but we are not free to like what we ought to like ll • 26 
The Augustinian system, he concludes, "implies the negation 
of free will in any except a highly recondite and unnatural 
f ,, 27 sense 0 the term. , arguing that, "!inorder-to preserve a 
nominal freedom in man he is driven to make use of shifts 
and expedients which, with all due respect to his mighty 
intellect, it is difficult to regard as more than mere verbal 
jugglery".28 The inconsistencies and equivocation found in 
the writings of Pascal on grace can therefore be directly 
attributed to the attempt by Augustine to preserve man's 
responsibility for sin and God's sole causality in the per-
formance of the good through the gift of divine grace. 
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Merit 
The conception of merit as a source of election or 
spiritual credit is, as the Reformers acknowledged, contra-
dictory to the very idea of a wholly gratuitous grace and 
is particularly irreconcilable with one defined as irresist-
ible, but by the fourth century such a notion was already 
built into Scripture and the tradition of the Church. 29 The 
essential determinism of Augustine's doctrine and insistence 
upon predestination "ante praevisa merita", made merit a 
possibility only as the result of good works produced by the 
elect under grace. Since the merit in virtue of which they 
receive eternal life is thus the gift of God, it can be con-
sidered only nominal in Augustine. 
30 Knowledge of God 
The influence upon Augustine of the Platonic Theory of 
Ideas which led him to see goodness as a participation in 
God, and therefore restored in fallen man only by His gift 
of Himself, also led him to view God as the universal of all 
particular truths. He saw the intellect as occupying a mid-
way position between sensory knowledge upon which it passes 
judgement, and the given truths or principles in accordance 
with which these judgements are made, and to which the 
intellect necessarily assents. In his view, the knowledge 
of such truths which are necessary, immutable and eternal, 
cannot themselves be the product either of the senses or 
human reason, since these are contingent and changeable, but 
are perceived under the influence of a special illuminative . 
action of God which he compares to the sun's light in regard 
to vision. While, by the use of reason working on sense 
data, man can come to understand the nature of material 
things, the divine illumination enables him to see their 
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relation to the eternal realities. 
Augustine's own experience convinced him that reason 
is unable to bring us knowledge of God and beatitude by its 
resources alone. This deficiency in reason he believed 
explicable only in terms of Original Sin and capable of 
restoration only by its Creator. The first step in the 
ascent of the mind to God is therefore not a matter of 
rational demonstration but of faith, defined by Gilson as 
"both an adherence of the mind to supernatural truth and a 
humble surrender of the whole man to the grace of Christ".31 
The reward of faith is an intuitive knowledge of God found 
in Revelation or in the natural world, or placed directly 
in the soul and only fully completed in the next life. This 
does not imply the total rejection of natural theology found 
in Pascal, for Augustine believed that the universe afforded 
I . d f d . h 32 amp e eVl ence 0 Go as ltS aut or. 
The Christian Life 33 
For Augustine knowledge and happiness were synonymous, 
so that knowledge of God must necessarily lead to the enjoy-
ment of Him who is eternal. Characteristic of the Christian 
life is the particular attitude to the things of the material 
world adopted by those living under the rule of charity. 
Augustine held that we "enjoy" whatever we think of as an 
end in itself and "use" what we regard only as the means to 
an end. Since this is possible solely through the saving 
blood of Christ it is only within his Body, the Church, 
which mediates, in its sacraments and teaching, the grace 
of conversion and absolution, that the Christian life can 
be realized. This consists in an imitation of the suffering 
of Christ both as a penance for sin and as a source of 
redemption and union with him. Whilst grace recreates in 
22 
the elect the image of God, life nevertheless remains a 
constant struggle between the flesh and the spirit, for as 
long as man is in a tainted body his soul can obey God's 
law, but the flesh remains under the power of concupiscence 
from which it is released only at death. 
Emile Mersch describes Augustine's psychological con-
ception of the Mystical Body, formulated against the 
Donatists and the Pelagians and establishing the Western 
view of the Atonement as consisting only in the death and 
suffering of Christ, who in his continued passion incorpor-
ates men into himself and unites them with God in his Body, 
the Church. 
En cet homme unique Ie Sauveur continue sa 
passion, comme il y prolongue sa priere, et Ie 
sang de l'agonie ne cesse de couler par les 
plaies des martyrs. 
Mais ces tourments demeurent ceux du Christ. 
Seulement, en passant dans la chretiente, ils 
prennent une sorte d'extension catholique. 
A ce tresor commun, nous versons chacun ce que 
nous devons, et, d'apres nos forces, nous 
apportons tous notre part. La mesure de la 
passion ne sera pleine que quand Ie monde sera 
fini. 
La douleur, pour les chretiens, n'est pas un 
accident: elle est devoir de profession. Vivre, 
pour eux, c'est mourir a une vie anterieure; 
vivre, c'est s'inserer dans un Sauveur qui veut 
continuer en eux ses douleurs expiatrices et sa 
lutte contre Ie peche. Lui-meme a ete en horreur 
aumonde, parce qu'il lui etait contraire; il 
faut donc que son corps aussi subisse persecution 
et mepris. 34 
On this view the Church, as A.V.G. Allen claims,35 takes the 
place of Christ as the way of Redemption, since it is the 
deposit of divinely given supernatural truth in Revelation. 
The Eucharist is a continuation of the sacrifice of the 
Cross and as such is the source of the life and unity of 
the Church since it is the very substance of the Saviour. 
The whole of humanity is consequently divided into two 
mutually exclusive societies: the city of God consisting 
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of the justified under the rule-of grace or charity; and 
the earthly city under the domination of concupiscence or 
the Devil. For both the world is the instrument of God's 
predestinatory will: the former through grace rejecting 
its pleasures and viewing every aspect of the earthly life 
as a means of sanctification and the attainment of beatitude; 
the latter, deprived of the divine illumination, enjoying 
material things as ends in themselves, and thereby forfeit-
ing eternal life and meriting damnation. 
The slender Biblical foundation upon which the enormous 
edifice of Augustine's doctrine was based comprises, as 
N P '11' 36, d' f' f t t f h' h th .. Wl lams ln lcates, lve proo - ex sow lC ree 
were mistranslations, together with an alleged consensus 
of Tradition consisting of citations from a selection of 
Western Fathers, the practice of baptism, and the physical 
and mental misery of the actual state of man - all pointing 
in Augustine's view to the presence in man of a profound 
h d 't 'It 37 ere 1 ary gUl . 
PSYCHOLOGICAL GROUND 
All Christian theories of grace, in the opinion of 
N.P. Williams,38 are so many "rationalizations" of differing 
experiences of grace, and the writer elsewhere indicates that 
such an experience is the true warrant for the premises from 
which each is nominally deduced. 39 The psychological ground 
for the Augustinian theology of grace, and especially the 
doctrines of the Fall and Original Sin, undoubtedly lies in 
the experience and temperament of the specifically "twice-
born,,40 religious personality, of which William James 41 con-
sidered Augustine a classic example. James outlines the 
essential elements of the twice-born temperament: a natural 
pessimism and intensity of feeling; an extreme sensitivity 
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to suffering and evil both within the self and in the world 
and mankind generaLly~ and an ever-present consciousness 
of mortality and consequent evaluation of natural pleasures 
and even natural virtue as worthless, vain and transitory 
42 
since they are inevitably cancelled out by death. Since 
evil is perceived to be so radical and ingrained that it 
cannot possibly be overcome by the power of the natural will, 
a profound sense of failure, sinfulness and despair of ever 
attaining lasting happiness is the characteristic attitude 
of such a type. The psychological basis of the twice-born 
character resides therefore, according to James, in "a 
certain discordancy or heterogeneity in the native tempera-
ment of the subject, an incompletely unified moral and intel-
lectual constitution".43 The discord consists in the con-
flict between an innate longing for enduring happiness and 
the felt sinfulness and weakness of will which appear to 
preclude the possibility of such an ideal ever being 
l ' d 44 rea lze . 
In his Confessions Augustine records the yearning for 
God and the consciousness of sin and moral weakness which 
divide him, and which are explicable to him only in terms of 
a nature vitiated by original sin. 
Myself when I was deliberating upon serving the 
Lord my God now, as I had long purposed, it was 
I who willed, I who nilled, I, I myself. I 
neither willed entirely, nor nilled entirely. 
Therefore was I at strife with myself, and rent 
asunder by myself. And this rent befel me 
against my will, and yet indicated, not the 
presence of another mind, but the punishment of 
my own. Therefore it was no more ~ that wrought 
it, but sin that dwelt in IDg; the punishment of 
a sin more freely committed, in that I was a son 
of Adam. 45 
N.P. Williams points out that a theology based upon such an 
experience of moral impotence and human misery will always 
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appeal to "Augustine's psychological kinsfolk",46 such· as 
St. Paul, Luther, Newman and by implication, Pascal. In the 
Apologia Pro vita Sua, where a profound pessimism is evident 
in his description of the hiatus between the promise and 
actual condition of man's being, Newman gives substance to 
this claim. 
And so I argue about the world; - if there be a God, 
since there is a God, the human race is implicated 
in some terrible aboriginal calamity. It is out of 
joint with the purposes of its Creator. This is a 
fact, a fact as true as the fact of its existence; 
and thus the doctrine of what is theologically 
called original sin becomes to me almost as certain 
as that the world exists, and as the existence of 
God. 47 
In the face of a universe totally devoid of meaning or 
any comforting trace of God, such a "sick soul,,48 can feel 
only panic and terror. He requires above all an authoritarian 
religion of redemption and deliverance, for a human nature 
thus vitiated and powerless clearly requires a supernatural 
remedy to effect the renunciation of all that is temporal 
and a conversion to the higher good. For such a religious 
type, "There are two lives, the natural and the spiritual, 
and we must lose the one before we can participate in the 
other".49 In his dramatic conversion, Augustine (and Pascal) 
clearly discovered the psychological truth that it is only 
as the will is surrendered and the struggle abandoned that 
unification of will and ideal is possible, for, as James 
writes, "We cannot create a belief ... when our perception 
. I .. ,,50 
actlve y assures us of ltS Opposlte . Augustine interpreted 
the experience as demonstrating conclusively that the true 
good lS possible only as the will is empowered by the gift of 
a supernatural "efficacious" grace, given in response to com-
plete submission to God in humility and repentance, the latter 
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itself a grace and perceived as the fruit of his mother's 
51 prayers. Sincere repentance, humility and renunciation, 
on this view, are both the condition of the assurance and 
joy of election and the result of the gift of grace. 
The temperament of the twice-born character can, there-
fore, be seen as crucial in the interpretation of his 
religious experience. As Rudolph Otto so convincingly 
demonstrates in The Idea of the Holy52, an analysis of such 
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experience, especially in the more mystical types , reveals 
the a priori non-rational insights of which the basic pre-
suppositions of doctrine are the inadequate rational 
expression, inevitably stressing the rational attributes of 
God at the expense of the "numinous,,54 content. His inter-
pretation of the intuitive apprehension of the numen as 
"mysterium tremendum et fascinans", the felt awe or reverence 
in the face of the mystery and transcendent majesty of an 
absent God, combined with the felt bliss in the assurance of 
His love and mercy, would appear to explain the essentially 
paradoxical character of Augustine's belief. 
In his short work Sur la Conversion du pecheur55 , 
Pascal records these intuitive apprehensions concerning the 
nature of God, the world and man, together with the responses 
they evoke, as they arise in the conversion experience. The 
Augustinian doctrine must clearly always appeal to all such 
twice-born types who have the same a priori knowledge which 
is its ground and guarantee. 
The more daunting quality of the numinous consciousness 
includes the felt mysteriousness or "wholly other" character 
of God, inducing the belief "that God transcends all reason, 
in the sense that He is beyond the powers of our conceiving, 
not merely beyond our powers of comprehension,,56, calling 
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for the rejection of reason as a possible means of access 
to knowledge of God. A qualitative difference is perceived 
to exist between natural and supernatural categories of 
1 t ' 57 eva ua lon , a discontinuity hardened and codified by 
Pascal in his doctrine of the three orders. God is neces-
sarily a "Deus ~bsconditus" whose nature cannot be under-
stood conceptually, but who can be "known" only intuitively. 
Otto believes that the mysteriousness and inaccessibility of 
the numen is expressed in the absoluteness of all rational 
attributes applied to God (love, knowledge, goodness, mercy 
and justice), which, though derived from social ideals, 
1 h d f d d ' 58 a toget er excee our power 0 un erstan lng . 
The "aweful aspect" (tremendum) of the deity, as author 
and sustainer of all existence, evoking the response of 
religious humility, is rationalized in ideas of omnipotence, 
, , d l' 11 59 Justlce an mora Wl All human willing, all human 
experience and all events (good or evil), must be attributed 
to the divine will and all apparent injustices explained by 
reference to an "occult" justice in God. When the omni-
potence of God is thus extended to place God outside the 
moral law, it necessarily destroys the moral goodness of 
God 60 . 
Otto describes "creature-feeling,,61 or religious 
humility as the response elicited by the felt unapproach-
ability and overpoweringness of God. This feeling of depend-
ence, impotence and nothingness which demands the annihila-
tion of self is not a moral depreciation however, but rather: 
a disvaluation of the self in respect to existence, together 
with a corresponding judgement of appreciation of the numen. 
The conviction of radical sinfulness and unworthiness, of 
despair of ever transcending them and the felt need for 
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redemption accompany this self-disvaluation. The depreciation 
of the "flesh" in st. Paul, the identification of original sin 
with concupiscence in Augustine and Pascal's evaluation of 
the natural world as worthless and perishing and rejection of 
all human affections witness to the reality of "creature-
feeling" . 
Directly opposed to the intimidating aspect of the 
numinous consciousness is the element of attractiveness 
(fascinans) found in the "joy" of salvation or the experience 
of beatitude which can be known only in a living experience 
of God 62 . Such an experience of union is perceived by the 
sinner as an undeserved mercy and from it arises the convic-
tion of God's love and mercy - all, in fact, that is meant 
by the term "grace". The person of Christ, the divinely 
appointed means of atonement, is perceived as the sole source 
of this union for the Christian 63 , for only by his blood is 
the sinner cleansed and made fit for the presence of God. 
His Body is therefore the refuge to which man must cling to 
, t' f d' 64 ensure a contlnua lon 0 grace an JOY • 
The response of the creature granted participation in 
the true reality of God is the total surrender of heart and 
mind, even a fatalistic abandonment of self-responsibility. 
An analysis of the characteristic practical consequences of 
conversion in the lives of twice-born Christians by William 
65 James reveals a marked correspondence with the requirements 
listed by Pascal in his correspondence. Submission and 
humility are manifested in the voluntary withdrawal from and 
renunciation of the world in asceticism, poverty, charity, 
purity, the rejection of family ties and other distractions, 
and the acceptance of suffering and penance to purge sin and 
escape punishment in the next life. The mixture of fear and 
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joy experienced by the elect reflects the dual response to the 
66 presence of the numen 
The doctrine of Predestination arises, in the view of 
Otto, from the experience of individual election, a religious 
intuition of having been chosen and preordained unto salvation, 
and especially of God as its sole and absolute cause. The 
recipient feels that "grace was imparted to him, grasped him, 
impelled, and led him"67. Any suggestion that_can by his 
own reason and moral. effort can merit grace is therefore 
inconceivable in view of this all-embracing efficacy of 
God 68 . 
Otto underlines the danger inherent in the formulation 
of theological concepts from non-rational insights which 
ought to serve only as ideograms of the divine nature. 
C.A. campbel1 69 endorses the implication of Otto's thesis, 
namely that the function of theology is to suggest, not por-
tray the corresponding moment in the numinous. The affirma-
tion of the dual character of the numen, for example, in His 
omnipotence and justice on the one hand, and love and mercy 
on the other, gives rise to inconsistencies and absurdities 
which are quite inexplicable to the rational, non-mystical 
individual concerned only with the moral aspects of the 
religious life. The obvious absurdity of simultaneously 
asserting the reality of free will and the omnipotence of 
God, or the blatant injustice in the abandonment of those 
left in the "massa damnata" by a God who is Justice itself, 
illustrate this fact. 
otto concluded that such intuitive knowledge of God 
cannot be adequately communicated or taught by rational means 
but is a matter of feeling 70 and must be aroused from the 
spirit of man, a point recognized and underlined by Pascal 
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in De l'Art de Pesuader, and of prime importance for the 
understanding of the apologetic method of the Pensees. The 
source of religious growth in man is described as an a priori 
capacity in man for the supernatural which, when aroused, 
becomes an impulsion to seek God 71 . Almond 72 describes this 
uni versal predisposi·tion as "a faculty of recepti vi ty and a 
principle of judgement and acknowledgement" which recognizes 
and acknowledges the sacred, an action attributed by 
Augustine to "prevenient" grace. 
Clearly, the twice-born type represents but one aspect 
of a religious consciousness which covers a broad spectrum 
from the rational humanism of Pelagius, optimistically affirm-
ing a God-given reason and freedom in man as sufficient for 
the good, to the irrational determinism of Luther and Calvin, 
for whom both will and reason were impotent. A.V.G. Allen 
suggests that Augustine lived out in his own experience the 
dominant moods of his time and that his mission was "to per-
sonate the crisis through which the church and the world of 
h ' t' , ,,73 1S 1me were pass1ng Under the influence of such 
Fathers as Tertullian and Ambrose, Western Christiandom was 
clearly moving towards a theology tailored to the perceptions 
of the twice-born soul and when given definitive form by 
Augustine, that theology established the sharp divisions 
between man and God, the secular and the religious, and the 
Church and the world, which were to persist until the Reforma-
tion. 
Augustine found in the Platonism74 of Apuleus a vehicle 
perfectly suited to the expression in dogmatic form of the 
non-rational insights of his particular religious experience. 
As the universal of all goodness, power, knowledge and reality, 
God transcends reason, while the natural counterparts or 
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"shadows" of these attributes have the illusory, transitory 
and worthless character attributed to them by the "creature-
feeling" in the face of the holy. Aristotle was to perform 
a similar function for the more rational and moral, if less 
religious temper of Renaissance humanism in the rational 
theology of the Scholastics. The revival of Augustinianism 
in the sixteenth and seventeenth century, culminating in the 
Jansenist movement, merely reflected the resistance of twice-
born Christians to the modification by the Catholic Church 
of Augustinian theology and the adoption of religious 
practices suited to the more rational temperament. Otto 
observes, 
The battle here joined between so-called "Platonism" 
and "Aristotelianism", and in general the long per-
sistent protest against the scholastics, is itself 
in large part nothing but the struggle between the 
rational and the non-rational elements in the 
Christian religion; And the same antithesis is 
clearly operative as'a factor in Luther's protest 
against Aristotle and the "theologi moderni".75 
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CHAPTER II 
SHORTER WORKS 
Reason and Revelation 
The genesis or development of certain themes and con-
cepts directly related to Pascal's theology of grace are 
to be found in his correspondence and shorter writings. 
Especially important among these are the basic notions 
which led to the formulation in the pensees 1 of the 
doctrine of the three orders. In the Preface. Sur le 
Traite du Vide 2 , Pascal explains the very explicit distinc-
tion beween the roles of reason and authority in the fields 
of natural and supernatural truth which underpin the whole 
of his scientific and religious writing. In direct oppos-
ition to the current trend in the physical sciences he 
deplores the exaggerated veneration for antiquity, whose 
findings are revered as infallible principles. 
Le respect que l'on porte a l'antiquite etant 
aujourd'hui a tel point, dans~es mati~res o~ 
il doit avoir moins de force, que l'on se fait 
des oracles de toutes ses pensees, et des 
myst~res meme de ses obscuritesi que lion ne 
peut plus avancer de nouveautes sans peril, et 
que .le texte d'un auteur suffit pour detruire 
les plus fortes raisons .•. 3 . 
Whilst, with Descartes 4 , Pascal readily accepted this 
innovative approach to authority in science, he was unwil-
ling to extend it to the field of religion, upholding 
rather the Jansenist view that theology is a matter of 
memory. In the Augustinus Jansen devotes the Proemial Book: 
of the second volume to this fundamental Augustinian dis-
tinction which constituted a reversal of Scholastic 
5 
rational theology. Clearly the dramatic conversion which 
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resulted from Augustine's surrender to the injunction of 
St. pau1 6 confirmed for him the primacy of faith over 
7 
reason as a path to God. Allen suggests that submission 
to the authority of the Church in Revelation resolved for 
Augustine the long-standing intellectual conflicts of his 
search for the truth by falling back upon "external 
authority as the only mode of silencing the reason and 
satisfying the conscience ll8 • Whatever the cause, the dis-
tinction, especially in its final and rigid formulation, is 
of crucial importance both for Pascal's theology of grace 
and for his moral theology, since it implies the rejection 
of all natural theology and precludes the scrutiny of the 
context of belief by reason and the function of conscience 
as criterion of true morality. Above all, it establishes 
the unbridgeable gulf between man and God which renders all 
human effort vain and grace absolutely necessary for the 
performance of the good. 
In the view of Pascal and of Port-Royal the extent of 
respect for authority must be assessed in accordance with 
the source of knowledge, and Pascal therefore divides the 
sciences into two distinct categories: those which depend 
on memory alone, and those which depend upon reason. 
In the case of the former, subjects such as history, 
geography, jurisprudence, languages and theology, based 
upon recorded fact, books are the only source of knowledge. 
Here, Pascal believes, it is vital that reason submit to 
authority, the only source of enlightenment; and this is 
particularly true in theology, where divinely inspired 
books furnish reason with the facts in matters which surpass 
its powers of comprehension, where the inspiration of grace 
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elevates reason to participate in supernatural truth inaces-
sible simply by its own powers. 
C'est l'autorite seule qui nous en peut eclaircir. 
Mais ou cette autorite a la principale force, 
c'est dans la theologie, parce qu'elle y est 
inseparable de la verite, et que nous ne la 
connaissons que par-elle: de sorte que pour 
donner la certitude enti~re des mati~res les 
plus incomprehensibles a la raison, il suffit de 
les faire voir dans les livres sacres(corrune pour 
montrer l'incertitude des choses les pius vrai-
semblables, il faut seulement faire voir qu'elles 
n'y sont pas comprises); parce que ses principes 
sont au-dessus de la nature et de la raison, et 
que, l'esprit de l'homme etant trop faible pour 
y arriver par ses propres efforts, il ne peut 
parvenir aces hautes intelligences s'il n'y est 
porte par une force toute-puissante et surnaturel-
le 9 . 
10 As Laporte indicates, reason is "trop faible" in this 
domain only inasmuch as it is related to the will, which 
since the Fall, is turned by concupiscence to the love of 
self and of created goods, and cannot, therefore, attain to 
knowledge of God. 
No such blindness affects reason in the field of the 
natural sciences such as geometry, arithmetic, music, 
physics and medicine. Reason is sufficient here and 
authority unnecessary, for truth is self-evident to the 
senses and proportionate to the reach of the mind, which 
has complete freedom to extend continually and endlessly 
the scope of its productivity and experimentation. 
Mais corrune les sujets de cette sorte sont 
proportionnes a la portee de l'esprit, il 
trouve une liberte toute enti~re de s'y 
etendre: sa fecondite inepuisable produit 
continuellement, et ses inventions peuvent 
etre tout ensemble sans fin et sans inter-
ruption ... ll 
Subject as they are to reasoning and experiment, these 
sciences must be continually augmented to become perfect, 
and just as the ancients added to the knowledge of those 
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before them, so each generation must build upon the work of 
the last, gradually expanding the sum of natural knowledge. 
It was the controversy over the vacuum, in which the 
Jesuit, Pere Noel, and other traditionalists challenged 
Pascal's rejection of the authority of the ancients, which 
elicited such an explicit statement of Pascal's view. He 
believed that in the spheres of science and theology, 
reverence for authority was being perverted by such men, 
and he especially deplored those who relied upon reason 
instead of the authority of the Scriptures and the Fathers 
in theology. In his attack upon the casuistry of the 
Jesuits in the Provinciales, it is their innovative 
approach to moral principles and disregard of the law of 
12 the Gospels, which, for him, constitute a heresy . Con-
versely, in the physical sciences, where Pascal believes 
reasoning and experimentation are the only principles, and 
the role of reason is to recognize facts and submit to 
reality, authority is revered and innovation frowned upon. 
It is by the sense data from such experimentation that the 
secrets of nature are being revealed, the ancients forming 
a stepping-stone to a greater knowledge of the universe. 
Such excessive respect for authority is, in fact, an 
affront to human reason, putting it on a level with animal 
instinct whose responses are programmed by nature to remain 
, h' f 1 'b d I' , 13 Wlt ln care u ly prescrl e lmlts • 
Man, however, is made for infinity and his whole life, 
and that of mankind generally, constitutes a continual 
striving towards the attainment of natural truth. Laporte 
describes the mark of -this capacity in man as "l'insatiable 
elan qui Ie fait tendre perpetuellement a se depasser lui-
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meme, et 'l'eleve' sans relache au dela de tout ce qui est 
fini?,,14 just as each man learns not only from his own 
experience, but also from that of his predecessors, and 
advances from day to day, so mankind can be regarded as a 
single individual, advancing from age to age as the universe 
15 grows older . The philosophers of antiquity, such as 
Aristotle, therefore lived in the childhood of mankind, and 
antiquity resides rather with men of the present age. 
Whilst the former can be admired for the conclusions they 
drew from their limited experience, these must nevertheless 
be regarded only as opinions and not as final truth. Certi-
tudes in science must, for Pascal, always be regarded as 
partial, relative and provisional, and, although with 
Descartes he saw the science of nature as mechanistic 
physics, he could not agree with the latter on the status 
of conclusions. As Laporte points out, "Descartes pretend 
pour la science A une certitude globale qui serait aussi 
une certitude absolue,,16, seeking, in the view of 
Chevalier l7 , to reconstruct reality instead of submitting to 
it. 
In the Lettre A Pere Noel (1647), defending this new 
physics and the possibility of the existence of a vacuum, 
Pascal cites a universal rule for the recognition of truth 
in science, namely, that only those things either so self-
evident to the senses and reason that they can be affirmed 
as principles, or those deduced from them, can be considered 
as true. We can pass decisive jUdgements only on things 
based on one of these two conditions and everything else 
must be left in a state of indecision, provisionally 
labelled "vision", "idee", or "belle pensee" until compel-
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ling evidence renders them capable of affirmation18 . 
Both in science and religion, then, reason must submit 
to the facts: in the realm of natural phenomena to those 
provided by sense experience and self-evident principles; 
but in theology only to those given directly by God in 
Revelation. 
Et nous r~servons pour les myst~res de la foi, 
que Ie Saint-Esprit a lui-meme r~v~l~s, cette 
soumission d'esprit qui'porte notre croyance a 
des myst~res cach~s aux sens et a la raison" 19 
Krailsheimer 20 rightly suggests that this ultimate criterion 
of all Pascal's scientific work, namely, submission to the 
facts however inconvenient, rather than abstract principles, 
persisted as a characteristic element of all his later work 
on religion. This is very evident in the Ecrits sur la 
Grace and the Pens~es, where Pascal first places before the 
reader the facts of the human condition as incontrovertible 
proof of the authenticity of the Scriptures, and of the 
Fathers as divinely inspired. 
The division of all knowledge into three categories: 
sense data, logical or mathematical principles derived from 
the intellect, revealed truth which resulted from the sub-
mission of reason; is given full expression in the 
eighteenth provinciale~ where Pascal challenges the Jesuit 
Annat to produce evidence of the presence of the Five 
Propositions in the Augustinus. 
D'ou apprendrons-nous donc la v~rit~ des faits? 
Ce sera des yeux, mon P~re, qui en sont les 
l~gitimes juges, comme la raison l'est des 
choses naturelles et intelligibles, et la foi 
des choses surnaturelles et r~vel~es2l. 
Pascal's insistence upon the absolute discontinuity 
existing between the three orders of body, mind and charity 
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is expressed in sever~l of his shorter works. In his letter 
to the Queen of Sweden (1652)22, dedicating to her his 
calculating machine, he makes a very precise distinction 
in kind and degree between the orders of "corps" and 
"esprit ". Suggesting that the Queen has, in fact, attained 
the highest rank in both orders, he nevertheless defines 
them as heterogenous and ascending, the highest degree in 
-the one amounting to no more than an image of that in the 
other. 
Les memes degres se rencontrent entre les genles 
qu'entre les conditions; et Ie pouvoir des ~ois 
sur les sujets nlest, ce me semble, qu'une image 
du pouvoir des esprits sur les esprits qui leur 
sont inferieurs, sur lesquels ils exercent Ie 
droit de persuader, qui est parmi eux ce que 
Ie droit de commander est dans Ie gouvernement 
politique. Ce second empire me para it meme d'un 
ordre d'autant plus eleve, que les esprits sont 
d'un ordre plus eleve que les corps, et d'autant 
plus equitable, qu'il ne peut etre departi et 
conserve que par Ie merite, au lieu que l'autr23 peut l'etre par la naissance ou par la fortune . 
As Chevalier24 points out, Pascal had not yet attained to 
the order of charity, the certitude and supremacy of whose 
reality was accorded him at the time of his second conver-
sion. 
In De liEsprit Geometrique and De l'Art de Persuader 
Pascal explores the functions of mind and heart by which 
man acquires natural and supernatural truth. Here reason 
is humbled, the method of mathematical and logical demonstra-
tion of "I'esprit de geometrie" falling far short of the 
intui ti ve method of ill' espri t de finesse", which penetrates 
to the heart of a matter "d'une vue", with an immediacy 
which belongs to judgement or sentiment. The disproportion 
which Pascal reveals between the finite mind of man and 
natural truth, whose principles are given by nature and 
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cannot be defined, underlines the even greater disproportion 
between man and God, remedied only by a greater gift, that 
of divine grace which inclines the heart to knowledge and 
love of God. Fragment L298, B283 sets down the essential 
difference beween the orders of mind and heart. 
Le coeur a son ordre; l'esprit a le sien, qui 
est par principe et demonstration, le coeur en 
a un autre. On ne prouve pas qulon doit etre 
aime, en exposant d'ordre les causes de l'amour; 
cela serait ridicule. 
l ' . , , . 25 P 1 t 1 . In De Esprlt Geometrlque asca se s out to exp aln 
the geometric method, in his view the perfect vehicle for 
demonstrating truths already discovered and discerning them 
from falsehood, for it gives full scope to man's rational 
powers while setting strict limitations on their range, "car 
26 
ce qui passe la geometrie nous surpasse" An even higher 
method, Pascal explains, would consist in defining all terms 
and proving all propositions, but this would lead the mind 
in a retrogression ending in "mots primitifs", terms or 
axioms which are given by nature and before which the mind 
must stop. Geometry seeks, therefore, to define all terms 
wherever possible, to avoid ambiguity, and ·to prove propos-
it ions which are not self-evident; but the things with 
which it is principally concerned, such as space, time, 
number and motion, simply cannot be defined or proved. 
Their extreme clarity, however, makes this lack of proof a 
sign of excellence for the intellect apprehends with cer-
tainty and immediacy their meaning, nature and properties. 
Pascal differentiates here between the two quite distinct 
operations in the intellectual order 27 the intuitive 
apprehension of natural principles by the "coeur" or 
"instinct", and the essentially discursive function of 
44 
h ' h h" It' t' 28 reason w lC uses suc prlnclp es 0 prove proposl lons . 
From a discussion of the nature and interrelatedness 
of such concepts, Pascal proceeds to reflect upon the 
properties common to all things, and, in particular, the 
two infini~ which open the mind to the greatest wonders 
of nature. He explains at great length in this work that 
reason, though finite, can demonstrate the existence of 
infinity in the domain of motion, number, space and time 
without understanding either its nature or properties, for, 
like these concepts, it is "given" truth which the mind 
t 'b tId ' A J R ' 29, d' canno concelve u on y a mlre. s . USSler ln lcates, 
Pascal is concerned to expose as erroneous a presupposition, 
common especially among sceptics, that concepts such as 
infinity must be rejected as impossible because they are 
incomprehensible and cannot be apprehended directly by the 
mind. He affirms that their existence can, in fact, be 
concluded by way of double negation, and proposes a method 
of determining the truth of such propositions, namely, to 
suspend judgement and examine the opposite. If this is 
manifestly false, one can affirm the first, however incom-
prehensible it may be and thus arrive indirectly at truth. 
C'est une maladie naturelle a l'homme de croire 
qu'il possede la verite directement; et de la 
vient qulil est toujours dispose a nier tout ce 
qui lui est incomprehensible; au lieu qu'en 
effet il ne connait naturellement que Ie mensonge, 
et qulil ne doit prendre pour veritables que les 
choses dont Ie contraire lui parait faux. 
Et c'est pourquoi, toutes les fois qu'une propos-
ition est inconcevable, il faut en suspendre Ie 
jugement et ne pas la nier a cette marque, mais 
en examiner Ie contrairei et si on Ie trouve 
manifestement faux, on peut hardiment affirmer 
la premiere, tout incomprehensible qu'elle est 30 . 
I h ' 1 h' 36 t h b n a passage w lC1 Brunsc Vlcg sugges s may ave een 
added after his retreat at Port-Royal, Pascal applies his 
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conclusions on the infinities to the field of theological 
truth, suggesting that the disproportion of man in nature, 
set between two infinities of space, time, number and move-
ment which are beyond his powers of comprehension, should 
lead to an even more profound reflection on his "juste prix". 
Mais ceux qui verront clairement ces verites 
pourront admirer la grandeur et la puissance de 
la nature dans cette double infinite qui nous 
environne de toutes parts, et apprendre par 
cette consideration merveilleuse a se conna!tre 
eux-memes, en se regardant places entre une 
infinite et un neant d'etendue, entre une 
infinite et un neant de nombre, entre une 
infinite et un neant de mouvement, entre une 
infinite et un neant de temps. Sur quoi on peut 
apprendre a s'estimer a son juste prix, et 
former des reflexions qui valent mieux que tout 
Ie reste de la geometrie 32 
Pascal's ambivalence about the competence of reason, which 
is a characteristic feature of the whole of his writing on 
grace, is here very apparent. He clearly believes that 
without the illu.mination of grace natural reason is able to 
transcend its finitude and, by an act of judgement, evalu-
ate man's "juste prix". But this passage also points up 
the non-rational grounds of Pascal's belief, namely, his 
extremely pessimistic view of human nature and his idea of 
God as transcendent and "wholly other". Both of these are 
assumed by him to be the inevitable outcome of any reflec-
tion about human nature and destiny. 
This theme is fully explored in the Pensees (fragment 
L199, B72), where Pascal relates it to the apologetic 
purpose by shocking the reader into a recognition of his 
true state, "Borne[s] en tout genre". He describes man as 
"un milieu entre rien et tout", infinitely far from under-
standing these extremes which "se touchent et se reunissent 
a force de s'etre eloignees, et se retrouvent en Dieu, et 
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en Dieu seulement". Failure to contemplate these infinities 
has led man to believe that there is a proportion between 
him and nature, and acc9rdingly he treats as ultimate those 
things which seem so to his senses, like an indivisible 
point, which is, in fact, infinitely divisible. In the 
perspective of these infinities, all finites are equal, 
moreover, so that, as Davidson aptly states "our approach 
to God, like our approach to nature, ends in a dispropor-
t . ,,33 lon . 
In the "Pari" fragment Pascal draws out the full theo-
logical implications of the conclusions reached in De 
l'Esprit Geometrique by distinguishing three orders of 
knowing, which are attributed to the discursive reason, 
intellectual intuition and grace. 
Nous connaissons qu'il y a un infini, et ignorons 
sa nature ... 
... Nous connaissons donc l'existence et la nature du 
fini parce que nous sommes finis et etendus comme 
lui. Nous connaissons l'existence de l'infini et 
ignorons sa nature, parce qu'il a etendue comme 
nous, mais non pas des bornes comme nous. Mais 
nous ne connaissons ni l'existence ni la nature 
de Dieu, parce qu'il n'a ni etendue ni bornes ... 
... S'il y a un Dieu, il est infiniment incomprehen-
sible, puisque n'ayant ni parties ni bornes, il 
n'a nul rapport a nous. Nous sommes donc 
incapables de connaitre ni ce qu'il est, ni s'il 
est37l . 
Only grace can overcome this disproportion and unite man to 
God, "Si on vous unit aDieu, c'est par grace, non par 
nature,,35. 
Similarly, Pascal applies to theology his method for 
determining indirectly the truth of a proposition by proving 
the opposite false, claiming that only the facts of Chris-
tian Revelation, however incomprehensible, can explain the 
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enigma of the human condition. In fragment L809, B230 
Pascal cites four antinomies concerning the existence of God, 
the soul, the world and original sin, all equally incompre-
hensible, but nevertheless capable of resolution. As he 
explains in fragment L149, B430, "Tout ce qui est incompr~-
hensible ne laisse pas d'etre. Le nombre infini,un espace 
infini ~gal au fini". Just as human reason accepts infinity 
in the mathematical sphere, without knowing its nature, so, 
given the facts of Revelation, it is reaso~ableto affirm 
God and the doctrine of Original Sin. Nothing could be 
more shocking to reason, or more contrary to human justice, 
but on the grounds that it makes man less incomprehensible 
to himself than he would otherwise be, it ought to be 
accepted by reason. 
Certainement rien ne nous heurte plus rudement 
que cette doctrine. Et cependant sans ce 
mystere, Ie plus incompr~hensible de tous, nous 
sornrnes incompr~hensibles a nous-memes. Le 
notd de notre condition prend ses replis et ses 
tours dans cet abime. De sorte que l'hornrne est 
plus inconcevable sans ce mystere que ce mystere 
n'est inconcevable a l'hornrne 36 . 
As Chevalier aptly remarks, "Ici, Pascal pousse trop loin 
37 les choses" ,for many may with justification, refuse to 
accept the mystery of original sin as the only possible 
explanation of the human condition. For Pascal, however, 
no explanation, save that of Revelation, existed as an 
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optlon 
De l'Art de Persuader 
In this short work Pascal discusses the mechanics of 
belief. The evidence of his own conversion clearly con-
firmed the insight of Augustine that belief can result only 
from the action of prevenient grace, arousing the capacity 
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in man for the intuitive apprehension of God. The subject 
is therefore of particular relevance to the effectiveness of 
an apology which seeks to serve as the agent of just such a 
divine activity. Pascal analyses the way in which assent 
to a proposition is produced, pointing out that geometrical 
demonstration is addressed only to the mind, and persuasion 
must engage the other principal faculty by which the soul 
receives opinions, namely, the will. Although men claim 
that reason is the judge of the will's choice, Pascal 
affirms that "tout ce qulil y a d'hommes sont presque 
toujours importes a croire non par la preuve, mais par 
In the domain of natural knowledge, truth 
is received into the soul by way of the reason, acting 
independently of the will, in logical demonstrations and 
experiment, and by the heart, acting as an intellectual 
instinct which apprehends natural principles "d'une vue". 
However, in the order of supernatural and, therefore, moral 
truths, where love and knowledge are linked, the will is the 
faculty of belief40 . Ruled by concupiscence since the Fall, 
and no longer under the control of reason, the corrupt will 
ties men to the "sales attachements" of the world which 
blind them to the truth. Only God can instil divine truths 
directly into the souls of men, by presenting the will with 
a more powerful, "douceur toute celeste", which draws it 
away from love of creatures, to love and knowledge of God . 
... Dieu ne verse ses lumieres dans les esprits 
qu'apres avoir dompte la rebellion de la volonte 
par une douceur toute celeste qui la charme et 
qui l'entraine 41 . 
42 The heart here, as in the doctrine of the three orders , 
clearly belongs both to the intellectual and supernatural 
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latter only through this action of grace upon the will. 
In the domain of natural truths within the reach of 
man, the mind and heart are the doors by which entry to the 
soul is effected. The preeminently intellectual forces 
which influence assent are the self-evident principles 
known to everyone, and maxims adopted by certain people, 
which with time acquire the power of natural principles. 
Those which motivate the will to belief, however, are the 
natural aspirations, common to all men, like the desire for 
happiness, and the particular pleasures in which this 
happiness is perceived to reside. Effective persuasion 
depends, therefore, upon simultaneously satisfying both 
organs of belief, for, however enlightened the mind, the 
heart ("cette arne imp~rieuse") follows the shameful choice 
of the corrupt will. The appeal is, therefore, to self-
interest, for, in Pascal's view, it is necessary to have an 
intimate knowledge both of the principles and pleasures of 
the subject, a method rendered "plus difficile, plus 
subtile, plus utile et plus admirable"44, by their great 
diversity. 
Mais celles qui ont cette liaison tout ensemble, 
et avec les v~rit~s avou~es, et avecles d~sirs 
du coeur, sont si sures de leur effet, qu'il n'y 
a rien qui Ie soit davant age dans la nature 45 . 
The rules which Pascal proposes for acquiring assent 
are essentially those of geometry and, indeed, of traditional 
h t . 46 r e or1C : to define all terms which are introduced, and 
prove everything by mentally sUbstituting definitions for 
the things defined. Pascal makes effective use of the 
second rule in the Provinciales to expose, in the second 
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letter, the deceitfulness of the Thomists and Jesuits in 
supposedly sharing a "sufficient grace", and in the fourth 
letter the impotence of "grace actuelle". 
Mon Pere, ce mot de grace actuelle me brouille; 
je niy suis pas accoutume: si vous aviez la 
bonte de me dire la me me chose sans vous servir 
de ce terme, vous m'obligeriez infiniment 47 . 
In De l'Art de Persuader, as elsewhere in his work, 
Pascal denies the possibility of attaining to supernatural 
truth unless grace first heals the will and reason humbly 
submits. 
Je ne parle pas ici des verites divines, que je 
n'aurais garde de faire tomber sous llart de 
persuader, car elles sont infiniment au-dessus 
de la nature: Dieu seul peut les mettre dans 
li ame , et par la maniere qulil lui plait48 . 
Yet the method outlined in this treatise clearly made a 
contribution to the overall modus operandi of the Pensees, 
albeit, in Pascal's view, as the mere instrument of grace. 
49 As Laporte points out, the Apology had a double preoccupa-
tion: to use the most convincing arguments, selecting only 
those most likely to be found acceptable by the reader; and 
to touch the heart, so that the reader would want religion 
to be true, by adopting a style whose aim is to avoid the 
boredom of a linear argument. Such a style sets out to 
"echauffer,,50 by frequent digression and converging proofs. 
Laporte concludes "Ainsi ... se combineront liordre geome-
trique et l'ordre du coeur en une methode inspiree de 
l iE ' 1 d ' 1 d' , ,,51 vangl e, e salnt Pau ,et e salnt Augustln . 
Laporte rejects the view of Chevalier and Strowski, 
however, that this method of convergent probabilities leads 
the heart to combine them and obtain certitude, affirming 
unequivocally that it is in flagrant opposition to the 
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fundamental beliefs which inspired the Pensees. "C'est bien 
Ie coeur qui nous y f$it acceder, c'est Ie coeur qui op~re 
'Ie passage d'un ordre a un autre'; mais Ie coeur, en tant 
qu'eclaire d'une lumi~re divine, en tant que touche du 
sentiment surnaturel de la foi,,52. Jeanne Russier concurs 
with this view that Pascal himself believed the purpose of 
the Apology was not to create faith in his readers but to 
dispose them to ask it of God and offer themselves by humili-
ations for its reception. She writes "Nous avons vu en quoi 
me me son effort pour rendre la verite aimable est beaucoup 
mains une application de l'art d'agreer qu'une occasion 
offerte a la grace de Dieu seule capable d'echauffer,,53. 
Yet, the Apology is clearly aimed at a specific group, 
the cultivated and worldly, with whom Pascal was intimately 
associated and whose pleasures and philosophical beliefs he 
knew well. 54 This is most evident in the "Pari" fragment 
where his appeal is tailored specifically to minds familiar 
with the mathematics of chance, and to wills bent upon 
experiencing the highest pleasures, urging them to wager on 
the existence of God and to adopt a lifestyle of austerity 
and charity, both of which should furnish an eternity of 
happiness. As Jeanne Russier states, 
Le pari nous offre en quelque sorte l'expression 
mathematique d'une intuition dont Pascal a 
transcrit ailleurs l'expression mystique et 
personnelle: "Eternellement en joie, pour un 
jour d'exercice sur la terre". Et de cette 
recherche de Dieu, a laquelle l'apologiste invite 
Ie libertin, on peut redire ce qu'affirme Ie 
Myst~re de Jesus: "Tu ne me chercherais pas, si 
tu ne m'avais trouve,,55. 
Pascal's insistence on the absolute gratuitousness of the 
gift of grace also derived from his own experience of certi-
tude, which necessarily precluded a transposition to the 
supernatural order by means of natural reason or a will 
under the domination of concupiscence. Yet, in simul-
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taneously urging a reorientation of the will, which would 
clearly be the result of natural choice based upon an appeal 
to self-interest, while affirming that such an act can result 
solely from the action of divine grace, Pascal is affirming, 
if unconsciously not only the efficacity of "l'Art de 
Persuader", but that the human will is both free and deter-
mined; and determined, moreover, in this instance, by a 
stratagem which sparcely accords with the divine nature. 
Entretien avec M. de Saci 
In the Entretien avec M. de Saci, Pascal adopts the 
dialectical style characteristic of the Pensees and Ecrits 
sur la Grace to demonstrate the inadequacy of reason in 
explaining and furnishing a remedy for the enigma of the 
human condition. The reader is invited to acknowledge, 
presumably in the light of natural reason, the supremacy of 
divine grace in furnishing both answer and cure in the 
revealed doctrines of Original Sin and the Fall, which are 
claimed to encompass all partial truths of rational systems. 
Like Augustine in the fifth century Pascal rejects the 
current philosophical systems of Stoicism and Scepticism, 
renascent in seventeenth century France, whose rationalizing 
influence, he believes, inevitably led to deism or atheism. 
Founded upon pride in the ability of reason, these systems 
deny the corruption of human nature and the need for divine 
grace, and thereby eliminate the redemptive role of Christ 
himself 56 . The work takes the form of a recorded conversa-
tion between Pascal and M. de Saci, the spiritual director 
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appointed to him when he retired to Port-Royal after his 
second conversation in 1654. In his analysis of the work, 
Gouhier suggests that Pascal prepared texts on Epictetus 
d M t ' , th ' t ' t ' I 57 , an on algne Wl a Vlew 0 wrl lng an apo ogy , enV1S-
aging such an undertaking as his particular contribution to 
the Christian faith, and that Fontaine, in fact, almost 
certainly merely copied a text entirely written by the hand 
of Pascal for submission to his spiritual director. As 
Gouhier remarks, "L'intention de Pascal se reflete dans 
I b ' , d d ' ,,,58 es 0 ]ectlons e M. e Sacy comme en un mlrOlr . 
M. de Saci, then, serves as a testing ground for the 
approval of such a work by Port-Royal, to whom such philoso-
phers were anathema, and in their view responsible for the 
nominal faith and lax morality of the worldly seventeenth 
century French society, and for the heresy of the Jesuits 
whom they believed to have rejected the Gospel law in favour 
of rational moral priniples based only upon self-interest59 . 
, 
Gouhier shows, however, that Pascal is not, in fact, 
proposing an apology on the level of philosophy, where 
reason operates the passage from agnosticism to theological 
truth. He concludes, as do Laporte and Russier, that 
Pascal's true purpose was to prepare the reader for conver-
sion by creating favourable conditions for the reception of 
divine grace: "I'apolog~tique se sert de la philosophie 
pour une fin ~trangere a la philosophie: abattre l'orgueil 
et secouer la paresse, c'est-a-dire entretenir un ~tat 
d'humilit~ et un d~sir de recherche qui sont les premieres 
d 't' d I ' ,,60 con l-lons e a converSlon . 
The subject of the discussion is the value or danger 
for the Christian of reading the works of Epictetus and 
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Montaigne, principal proponents of the Stoic and Sceptic 
schools of philosophy, "les deux plus grands dE§fenseurs des 
deux plus c~l~bres sectes du monde, et les seules conformes 
'I ' ,,61 d G h' 't t" t" a a ralson ,an, as ou ler pOln s ou, marquan alnSl 
les deux poles entre lesquels osci1le la philosophie" 62 . 
Each promotes a half-truth about the nature of man, and that 
in turn suggests that the union of these could result in a 
third philosophy, encompassing the whole truth. Pascal 
demonstrates, however, that this would lead rather to their 
mutual destruction, and that the antithesis must be resolved 
at the higher level of Revelation. 
He opens the exchange by praising, in line with current 
humanist thinking, the virtues of Epictetus, who, he claims, 
saw very clearly how men ought to behave. 
Epict~te, lui dit-il, est un des philosophes du 
monde qui aient mieux connu les devoirs de 
l'homme. II veut, avant toutes choses, qu'il 
regarde Dieu comme son principal objet; qu'il 
soit persuad~ qu'il gouverne tout avec justice; 
qu'il se soumette a lui de bon coeur, et qu'il 
Ie suive volontairement en tout, comme ne faisant 
rien qu'avec une tr~s grande sagesse: qU'ainsi 
cette disposition arretera toutes les plaintes 
et tous les murmures, et pr~parera son esprit a 
souffrir paisiblement tous les ~v~nements les 
plus facheux 63 . 
Despite this high degree of enlightenment, however, Pascal 
points out that Epictetus failed to take account of man's 
very obvious frailty and impotence, in asserting that God 
had given him the means to fulfil his obligations and that 
happiness and perfection are to be sought through the will 
and the mind 64 . Epictetus claimed that these functions, 
unlike our circumstances, are not predetermined but free, 
and by means of them man can "parfaitement connattre Dieu, 
l'aimer, lui ob~ir, lui plaire, se gu~rir de tous ses vices, 
acquerir toutes les vertus, se rendre saint ainsi et 
compagnon de Dieu ,,65 . Pascal condemns these "principes 
d'une superbe diabolique", which lead men into even more 
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serious errors: that the soul is part of the divine sub-
stance; and that pain and death aTe not evils so that 
suicide can be considered a permissible alternative to 
persecution. 
Montaigne, by contrast, a professing Catholic, living 
in a Christian society, bases his principles on the one 
supposition that man is devoid of all divine revelation and 
that God is entirely absent from his creation. He places 
all things in universal doubt, making this the principle 
of his works and deriding all certainties, not in order to 
establish the contrary, but intent only upon proving the 
vanity of most widely accepted principles and opinions. 
II met toutes choses dans un doute universel et 
si general, que ce doute s'emporte soi-meme, 
c'est-a-dire s'il doute, et doutant meme de 
cette derniere supposition, son incertitude 
roule sur elle-meme dans un cercle perpetuel et 
sans repos; s'opposant egalement a ceux qui 
assurent que tout est incertain et a ceux qui 
assurent que tout ne l'est pas, parce qu'il ne 
veut rien assurer 66 • 
With unbiased eclecticism Montaigne questions the value and 
necessity of laws; the validity of the heretics' claim to 
a true interpretation of Scripture; and man's denial of 
the existence of an infinite God, when he cannot even 
understand or explain the infinities, or the principles and 
concepts of the natural order. He even goes so far as to 
state that, as faith is the guarantor of such truths, the 
existence of God must necessarily be in doubt. In Pascal's 
view, Montaigne attacks the ability of reason by itself so 
vigorously that he reduces it to the level of the beasts, 
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where it can only humbly contemplate its own weakness. 
Far from rejoicing in such an abasement of reason, Pascal 
deplores the unlimited degree to which it is humbled, since, 
in his view, the recognition of its limitations should have 
led to acceptance of the Christian ethic 67 . He accuses 
Montaigne of abdicating in the face of such uncertainty, 
because, having observed man's failure to find the true 
good through reason, Montaigne chooses the easy path, 
mal<ing the "moi" the axis of existence instead of God and 
his laws, with conformity to custom dictating his outward 
rule of conduct, but self-interest, convenience and comfort 
the true mainspring of his ethic 68 . 
M. de Saci voices the objections of Port-Royal when he 
questions the need to resort to such philosophers, when one 
has only to cite St. Augustine himself, who has already 
travelled the path of both Stoics and Sceptics, a path from 
which he was delivered by divine grace. While there is no 
danger for Pascal in reading such works since, "Dieu a 
repandu dans votre coeur d'autres douceurs et d'autres 
attraits que ceux que vous trouviez dans Montaigne", they 
are "viandes dangereuses" for those not similarly delivered 
who might be seduced into stopping short at the natural 
systems of men whose intellect has been placed at the 
service of the Devil by encouraging, through the one, pride, 
and, through the other, sloth. 
However, as Gouhier points out, Pascal did not propose 
in his projected apology a demonstration at the philosoph-
ical level, or an accord between the insights of reason and 
faith: "parce qu'il a conscience de presenter une apologe-
tique nouvelle ou la persuasion est vraiment autre chose 
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que demonstration, ou l'apologetique est essentiellement 
69 
autre chose que l'art de rendre la philosophie attrayante" . 
The purpose of Pascal's apology would rather be to expose 
the inadequacies of rational doctrines in the light of the 
full Christian Revelation. 
Such inadequacies are of value, therefore, since they 
can be brought into harmony with theological truths, each 
explaining one of the two states of man, before and after 
the Fall. The Stoics see some traces of original greatness 
and, ignoring corruption view nature as healthy and in no 
need of a Redeemer, which leads to pride. The Sceptics, 
on the other hand, conscious of man's present misery and 
unaware of his original dignity, regard nature as infirm 
and beyond repair, which in turn drives them to despair of 
achieving true goodness, and into moral laxity. A perfect 
morality should result from combining the two but would, 
Pascal affirms, end in their mutual destruction. Since the 
one establishes certainty and man's greatness and the other 
doubt and man's weakness, they undermine each other's truth 
as well as each other's falsity, making way for the higher 
truth of the Gospel. 
De sorte qu'ils ne peuvent subsister seuls a 
cause de leurs defauts, ni s'unir a cause de 
leurs oppositions, et qu'ainsi ils se brisent 
et s'aneantissent pour faire place a la verite 
de l'Evangile 70 . 
The Christian Gospel unites these oppositions "par un 
art tout divin", combining only what is true in each, and 
thus fashioning elements that are incompatible in human 
doctrines into "une sagesse veritablement celeste". 
Philosophers err in attributing both infirmity and greatness 
to human nature, while the faith teaches that only man's 
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weakness belongs to his nature, while his strength is the 
gift of grace. Pascal interprets this union of two natures 
by grace as a figure and effect of the union by God of two 
natures, human and divine, in Christ. 
Voila l'union etonnante et nouvelle que Dieu 
seul pouvait enseigner, et que lui seul pouvait 
faire, et qui n'est qu'une image et qu'un effet 
de l'union ineffable de deux natures dans la 
seule personne d'un Hornrne-Dieu 7l . 
Theology, Pascal concludes, is at the heart of all 
truth since it embraces all truths found in rational 
opinions, reconciling them at the level of the supernatural. 
His projected apologetic stratagem is, therefore, to use the 
insights of both philosophers to induce the state of 
humility, and the desire for the truth which are the pre-
requisites of conversion. Epictetus will disturb the calm 
of those who seek the truth in external things, forcing 
them to recognize that they will find only error and grief 
unless they yield themselves completely to God. Montaigne, 
on the other hand, confounds the pride of those who believe 
that true justice and unshakeable scientific truths can 
result from rational reflection. M. de Saci likens Pascal 
to those doctors who, "par la maniere adroite de preparer 
les plus grands poisons, en savent tirer les plus grands 
remedes,,72, for, if read together, each offsets the evil of 
the other. As Chevalier73 states, in the Entretien avec 
M. de Saci Pascal has effectively sketched out the introduc-
tory passage (Grandeur/Misere de l'Hornrne) of the Pensees, 
and established the style of dialectical reasoning, in 
which two opposed theses are reconciled by the introduction 
of a third factor, and which is the main thrust of the 
74 
work . In all such antinomies it is the grace of Christ, 
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who bridged the gap between natural and supernatural, which 
is the unifying agent. Thus, in the Apology, the weakness 
and grandeur of man are reconciled by the gift of grace; 
in the Ecrits sur la Grace, the opposed heresies, each 
partially true, of Molinism and Calvinism are fused in the 
authentic, revealed truth as interpreted by Augustine; 
while, in the Provinciales the apparently unbridgeable gap 
between "Juifs charnels" and the Blessed is closed by the 
real presence of Christ in the Eucharist. 
These four short treatises, then, reveal the genesis 
of Pascal's theory of knowledge, expressed in the doctrine 
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of the three orders ,where heart, intellect and senses 
constitute a hierarchy of orders differing both in kind and 
degree. The Preface. Sur le Traite du Vide makes the 
important differentiation between the roles of reason and 
authority in the fields of natural and supernatural truth. 
In mathematics and the physical sciences reason must not 
submit to authority but is free to extend the sum of 
natural truth proportionate to its reach and to build upon 
or reverse earlier opinions, in accordance with the 
evidence of sense data. In theology, however, reason has no 
competence and must submit to the authority of Revelation, 
the corpus of divine truth where memory prevails. Pascal 
also alludes here to the "given" instinctive knowledge of 
animals, who lack the ability of the human intelligence to 
expand its range, placing such instinctive knowledge at an 
ever lower level, presumably that of "corps". 
De l'Esprit Geometrique determines the limits of reason 
in the sphere of natural knowledge and describes the two 
ways in which this is acquired: by the intuitive apprehen-
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sion of basic concepts which, because of their inherent 
clarity, are grasped "d'une vue" by a function of reason 
remaining from man's pre-Fall state 76 and by the logical 
demonstration of truths starting from such principles. In 
what Davidson des.cribes as "his own half-mathematical, half-
religious" mode of expression 77 , Pascal uses the incompre-
hensibility of the two infinities, the existence of which can 
be grasped by reason only indirectly, to point up the 
enormous disproportion existing not only between man and the 
finite world, but between man and an infinite God. Geometry 
is, in fact, regarded as so inferior in kind and degree to 
theology that, in a letter to Fermat, Pascal dismisses it as 
only a "metier,,78. 
In De l'Art de Persuader, Pascal deals with the mechan-
ism of assent which has such important implications for his 
apology. Logical demonstration, the mode of discursive 
reason, is inadequate to secure conversion since both the 
heart and the mind are involved in belief. The heart, 
already defined as the organ of felt, immediate knowledge in 
Geometry - an intellectual instinct belonging to the order 
of mind - becomes, when raised by grace to the order of 
charity, the function in man for the reception of direct, 
intuitive knowledge of God 79 . In this capacity the heart is 
identical to the will, for both love and knowledge are 
inevitably linked80 . As Pascal underlines in the Entretien 
avec M. de Saci, the will ruled by concupiscence and 
centred upon self follows moral principles devised by reason 
to promote self-interest and creaturely comfort, rationalizing 
the will's choice to preserve "amour-propre", unless grace 
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draws it by a stronger attraction to love and knowledge of 
God. Pascal follows Augustine in believing that the will is 
only free when it is released from the bondage of concupis-
cence by God and enabled to choose the good. Elsewhere he 
reveals an acute consciousness of the continuous need for 
grace in order that reason should not thus consent to the 
will's sinful desires. In a letter to the Perier (1651) 
he writes: 
Saint Augustin nous apprend qulil y a dans chaque 
homme un serpent, une Eve et un Adam. Le serpent 
sont les sens et notre nature; l'Eve est 
l'appetit concupiscible, et l'Adam est la raison. 
La nature nous tente continuellement, l'appetit 
concupiscible desire souvent; mais Ie peche 
n'est pas acheve, si la raison ne consent. Lais-
sons donc agir ce serpent et cette Eve, si nous 
ne pourons l'empecheri mais prions Dieu que 
sa grace forti fie tellement notre Adam qu'il 
demeure victorieux; et que Jesus-Christ en soit 
vainqueur, et qulil regne eternellement en nous 81 
Similarly in the ninth of the Priere pour demander a Dieu Ie 
bon usage des maladies, he prays: 
Faites-moi la grace, Seigneur, de reformer rna 
raison corrompue, et de conformer mes sentiments 
aux votres 82 . 
De l'Art de Persuader therefore stresses the importance, 
in acquiring the assent of a corrupt will, of "agrement" as 
the necessary complement of logical demonstration. Both 
reasoned arguments and an understanding of the psychology 
of the reader play an important role in preparing him for a 
conversion experience which must, itself be wholly the work 
of God. Davidson writes, 
The projected sequence of the Apology, insofar as 
the large blocks of apologetic substance are con-
cerned, derives in fact from the reader, from the 
person to be persuaded rather than from the argu-
ment purely and simply. The mechanism of assent 
and the stages implied by it set the moral plot. 
There is a beginning, middle, and end, each 
corresponding to a mental and moral state: 
indifference, search, and active waiting for 
divine inspiration83 . 
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Reason is persuaded to accept Revelation, or more particu-
larly the Augustinian doctrine of Original Sin, however 
incomprehensible, in the same way as it does the two 
infinities in the natural order, by rational demonstration 
of its superiority over alternative systems. In the IIPari" 
fragment of the Pensees Pascal depicts the will as persuaded 
by an appeal to self-interest to turn to the good and there-
by find certainty. In his assertion in De l'Art de Persuader 
that a true morality is possible only by the agency of 
divine grace, Pascal anticipates the theme of the Provin-
ciales and points up, by implication, the obvious absurdity 
of the appeal he makes in the Provinciales to the "sens 
commun ll to reject a rational moral theology which, without 
the aid of divine grace, it must inevitably adopt. Since 
the doctrine of the three orders formulated in the Pensees 
precludes the possibility of reason functioning as a moral 
guide in the supernatural sphere, Pascal must always affirm 
that if men are to be converted rational argument and 
persuasion can only be the instruments of grace 84 . Only 
those wills first delivered from concupiscence by grace, 
can in fact respond to Pascal's argument and persuasion. 
In spite of these assertions, however, Pascal quite clearly, 
if unconsciously, accords reason the role of arbiter of 
religious truth, for as C.A. Campbell points out: 
And what can this appeal to reason mean save the 
acceptance of reason as the ultimate court of 
appeal, even in matters of religion, which is 
just what the philosopher claims it to be? 
... 1 cannot persuade myself, therefore, that there 
is any real alternative to acknowledging reason 
as the ultimate arbiter in the field of truth -
religious truth or any other sort of truth -
except silence, a dogged refusal even to begin 
to argue in defence of one's beliefs. It need 
hardly be pointed out that this alternative is 
not one that has much commended itself to the 
leading apostles of anti-reason in the religious 
world of today85. 
"Dieu Cache" 
In Gouhier's commentary upon Pascal's theme of the 
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"Dieu cache", which occupies such an important place in the 
Pensees, and is the subject of the fourth letter to the 
Roannez (October 1656), the writer throws some light upon 
this apparently equivocal attitude of Pascal to the role 
of reason. The purpose of the letter was to report the 
Church's verification of the Miracle of the Holy Thorn, 
which prompted Pascal to reflect upon the secrecy of God 
and the reasons for this secrecy. He propounds the view 
that such a miracle is one of the rare moments when God 
reveals himself to Christians, so that, knowing him with 
greater certainty, their faith is stimulated to more ardent 
service. That Pascal's god-daughter should be the 
recipient of a miraculous healing which occurred during 
the course of his writing of the Provinciales, was inter-
preted as a clear sign of divine favour and encouragement 
by the community of Port-Royal and especially by Pascal 
himself 86 . Faith would have no merit, he writes, if God 
continually revealed himself; but if he were totally 
absent there would be. few believers, a somewhat paradoxical 
statement in view of his theology of grace. 
Mais il se cache ordinairement, et se decouvre 
rarement a ceux qu'il veut engager dans son 
service. Cet etrange secret, dans lequel Dieu 
s'est retire, impenetrable a la vue des hommes, 
est une grande lecon pour nous porter a la 
solitude loin de la vue des hommes 87 . 
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Not only is the role of the community of Port-Royal, as 
defenders of the faith thus confirmed, but also their life-
style, for retreat from the world can itself be seen as an 
imitation of the "Dieu cache". 
Pascal describes the way in which God both concealed 
and revealed Himself during the course of history: until 
the Incarnation under the veil of nature where a few pagans 
"ont reconnu un Dieu invisible par la nature visible,,88; 
then under the veil of human flesh where heretical 
Christians have known and adored God in his humanity; and, 
finally, under the veil of the/Eucharist where only 
Catholics recognize God in the bread. God is still hidden 
in the Scriptures which have both a literal and a mystical 
meaning. The Jews stopped at the literal meaning without 
thinking that another may exist. Similarly they recognize 
only the humanity of Christ; and now the heretics fail to 
recognize in the bread of the Eucharist the real presence of 
Christ. 
Gouhier suggests that this theme of a God who hides and 
reveals himself in a dialogue with men, springs from Pascal's 
own profoundly religious experience of the night of 23rd of 
November 1654, when he received the grace of election. 
"Le Dieu qui se veut cacher est le Dieu de sa joie et de 
sa crainte, le Dieu de sa priere,,89 J. Russier echoes 
Gouhier's view that it is faith which responds to "'l'etrange 
secret' en Dieu", when she writes, "clest l'esprit de Dieu 
present en l'homme qui reconnalt ce meme esprit dans ses 
manifestations historiques ... c'est la grace qui discerne 
la grace,,90 The Apology will be designed as a vehicle of 
self-revelation for the "Dieu cache", as Gouhier explains: 
Quand Pascal ajoute: "Les Chretiens doivent Ie 
reconnaltre en tout", il indique ce que doit 
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faire l'apologetique. Certes, Ie "sens mystique" 
ne cesse d'etre cache que par la volonte de 
celui qui l'a cache: mais, dans les limites de 
la raison et de l'experience humaines, n'est-il 
pas possible de rendre ce sens manifeste sous une 
lumiere qui, s'il plalt aDieu deviendra brulante? 
The Apology "ayant pour mission de decouvrir Ie Dieu partout 
cache,,91, like the miracle will serve as an instrument of 
election. 
The theme of the "Dieu cache" is linked,therefore, in 
Pascal's work with that of predestination, for God's 
hiddenness or self-revelation is the means by which he dis-
cerns the elect from the "reprouves", through the bestowal 
or deprivation of the grace needed to recognize and seek 
Him. Prayer, itself a gift of God, is the means by which 
Christians continue to recognize God in all things. Pascal 
clearly fails to recognize the inherent injustice of a plan 
of redemption, to which he intends his Apology to contribute, 
in which the "endurcis" are inexplicably abandoned and the 
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seeker already saved , drawn from the world to an imitation 
of Christ's suffering which holds the promise of eternal 
beatitude, for, "Les afflictions temporelles couvrent les 
biens eternels ou elles conduisent,,93. The appropriate 
response of the elect to such an arbitrary deliverance is 
understandably infinite thankfulness, and the recognition 
of continuous dependence upon God. 
Prions Dieu de nous Ie faire reconnaltre et servir 
en tout. Rendons-lui des graces infinies de ce 
que s'etant cache en toutes choses pour les autres, 
il s'est decouvert en toutes choses et en tant 
de manieres pour nous ... 94 . 
Conversion 
In Priere pour demander a Dieu Ie bon usage des 
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maladies, Pascal describes the non-rational insights which 
underpin the Augustinian theology of grace, revealing the 
conviction of radical sinfulness and powerlessness which 
ensures that all rational systems must, in his view, fail 
to bring men to an authentic faith in God. He states 
unequivocally the prerequisite for conversion. 
Mais je reconnais, mon Dieu, que mon coeur est 
tellement endurci et plein des idees, des soins, 
des inquietudes et des attachements du monde, que 
la maladie non plus que la sante, ni les discours, 
ni les livres, ni vos Ecritures sacrees, ni votre 
Evangile, ni vos myst~res les plus saints, ni les 
aumones, ni les jeunes, ni les mortifications, ni 
les miracles, ni l'usage des Sacraments, ni Ie 
sacrifice de votre corps, ni tous mes efforts, ni 
ceux de tout Ie monde ensemble, ne peuvent rien 
du tout pour commencer rna conversion, si vous 
n'accompagnez toutes ces choses d'une assistance 
tout extraordinaire de votre grace 95 . 
Only God can wrench the sinner from the world which 
has put its image on him and remake him in the image of 
Christ. The short text Sur la conversion du pecheur, dating 
from the period late in 1653, when, according to Jacqueline, 
Pascal experienced a profound dissatisfaction with the 
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world ,is clearly a detailed account of his own spiritual 
metamorphosis, which culminated in the conversion experience 
f N b 1654 'd 97 1 'd' '1 ' 1 o ovem er . As Davl son a so ln lcates, lt p aln y 
provided a blueprint for the plan of spiritual evolution in 
the Pensees, whereby the reader is progressively drawn, by 
grace, from a state of indifference and pride, to experience 
"ennui" and separation from God, then enlightenment, 
humility and seeking, adoration, annihilation of self, total 
submission, supplication and active renunciation. 
God first inspires the soul with understanding and 
extraordinary insight so that it begins to view temporal 
goods, the "delices" of concupiscence "qui Ie charment", ln 
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which it finds repose, in a new light, thus precipitating 
a state of fear and agitation. "Cette nouvelle lumiere", 
which, in Chevalier's98 view, is the essential character-
istic of conversion, is produced by the action of grace 
healing the will, and with it the reason, so that reason 
can recognize the things of this world as incapable of 
bringing lasting satisfaction. In the secotid letter to 
MIle de Roannez, who had recently embarked upon the Chris-
tian life, Pascal remarks with some sympathy, "II est bien 
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assure qu'on ne se detache jamais sans douleur" ,for, 
torn between the ephemeral nature of worldly pleasures 
which still tempt it, and the reality of the invisible 
good which demands the exercise of piety and detachment 
from the world, the soul experiences bitterness and torment. 
The realization that all those things in which the 
heart has placed its hopes of happiness - pleasures, 
health, authority, honours and personal attachments - are 
indeed perishable, perishing and already perished fills 
the soul with fear since, at death, it must inevitably be 
alone and abandoned. This acute consciousness of man's 
mortality induces in the soul "une sainte confusion" and 
"un etonnement qui lui porte un trouble bien salutaire"lOO, 
which in turn excite "une sainte humilite", the penitence 
which is the prerequisite for knowledge of God, leading 
the soul out of pride and "ennui" in an upward journey in 
search of the true good. This must be as lasting as the 
soul itself, unless deliberately lost by its own consent, 
and such that nothing is more lovable. Knowing by the light 
of grace that it is not to be found "en elle, ni hors 
d'elle, ni devant elle", the soul turns its back upon the 
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mass of men and ascends above the created world to the very 
throne of God where it finds repose. 
The soul has clearly reached that point which is the 
goal of the "Pari" fragment, where, lisa raison aidee des 
lumieres de la grace", it recognizes God as the transcendent 
I 
and immutable good from which it cannot be unwillingly 
separated. Pascal stresses the fact that the soul does not 
experience from the practice of piety pleasures correspond-
ing to those of concupiscence, but rather this certainty 
of election. To seek God is therefore already to possess 
Him "puisque c'est Ie posseder que de Ie desirer, et que Ie 
refuser c'est Ie perdre" lOl , so that the bestowal or 
deprivation of grace clearly constitutes the condition of 
such possession. 
Recognition of the boundless transcendence of God 
prompts the soul to an even more profound humility and 
adoration, which clearly corresponds to the intense 
experience of the numinous, recorded in the Memorial, of 
absolute nothingness before the inconceivable majesty of 
God ("elle se considere cornrne sa vile et inutile creature"), 
of self-abasement (lljuisqu'aux derniers abimes du neant") 
and adoration. Silent adoration, complete submission, 
gratitude and the desire to appease the anger of God for 
past sins, are the response of the soul to the wholly 
gratuitous gift of God's self-revelation, together with 
ardent prayers for continued help and guidance, since only 
God can raise it to Himself. 
Since the Christian cannot in his own right choose 
between good and evil, "conscience" is merely the capacity 
for the reception of divine guidance. 
Seigneur, je sais que je ne sais qu'une chose: 
c'est qu'il est bon de vous suivre, et qu'il est 
mauvais de vous offenser. Apres cela je ne sais 
lequel est le meilleur ou. le pire en toutes 
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choses. Je ne sais lequel m'est profitable de la 
sante ou de la maladie, des biens ou de la pauvrete, 
ni de toutes les choses du monde. C'est un discerne-
ment qui passe la force des hommes et des anges, et 
qui est cache dans les secrets de votre providence 
que j'adore et que je ne veux pas approfondir102 . 
Only by the light of divine grace can "conscience" discern 
the salvific will of God in events and particular goods. 
J'appris que tout ce qui est arrive a quelquechose 
d'admirable, puisque la volonte de Dieu y est 
marquee 103 . 
God is, therefore, both the final end of man and the means 
of perseverance to that end, through the gift of prayer. 
Car comme c'est aDieu qu'elle aspire, elle 
n'aspire encore y arriver que par des moyens qui 
viennent de Dieu meme, parce qulelle veut qulil 
soit lui-meme son chemin, son objet et sa derniere 
finl04. 
Prayers, in turn, lead to action, to the search for 
necessary guidance from others more experienced in the 
Christian life, and to the resolution to conform his will to 
that of God for the rest of his life, imploring him, never-
theless, for the grace to reach this goal. 
Ainsi elle reconnalt qulelle doit adorer Dieu 
comme creature, lui rendre grace comme redevable, 
lui satisfaire comme coupable, le prier comme 
indigente105 . 
Two characteristic elements exemplify this conversion 
as typically that of the "twice-born" soul, aptly described 
by N.P. Williams as "an interior 'bouleversement' which 
appears in consciousness as the hand of God reaching down 
from the clouds to pluc]\: the brand from the burning, the 
favoured sinner from the 'lump of perdition il,106 The first 
is the sudden and dramatic illumination producing a re-
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evaluation of and dissatisfaction with life, both past and 
present, with the "etonnement" aroused by this insight 
underlining the "aveuglement" and "assoupissement,,107 in 
which reason has hitherto been locked by concupiscence, 
unable even to recognize its true end. The second is the 
intense feeling of "creature-consciousness" in an experience 
of the ineffable transcendence of God eliciting the response 
of felt dependence and the need for surrender which in turn 
effects a willed reorientation of life 108 . As Otto109 
further writes the awareness of the numinous has to be 
aroused in man, and Pascal clearly saw himself, in the 
Apology, as the instrument of both an intellectual and 
spiritual awakening, guiding those favoured by God through 
each step of the conversion experience as it is recorded in 
this short text. 
Perseverance 
Pascal's unequivocal insistence that both conversion 
and perseverance result solely from the divine mercy does 
not preclude, however, the attribution of God's abandonment 
of the justified to His justice and to man's deliberate 
choice. In Sur la conversion du pecheur the converted soul 
pleads for grace to persevere, yet Pascal affirms that the 
true good line peut lui @tre ate que par son propre consente-
ment II , 110 and 1I1e refuser c'est Ie perdre ll • In the fifth 
letter to the Roannez he deplores the fate of those II qu i 
tomberont de leur gloire, et qui laisseront prendre A 
d'autres par leur negligence la couronne que Dieu leur avait 
ff t "Ill o er e... . This ambivalent attitude to the role of 
the human will in the act of redemption can be seen, in the 
seventh of these letters, to result in absurd inconsisten-
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cies reminiscent of the I'Double Delaissement des Justes'r in 
the Ecrits sur la Grace 112 , which merely underline the 
irrationality and rigid determinism inherent in the 
Augustinian doctrine of grace. Deprived of the victorious 
attraction of grace, the justified must necessarily succumb 
to the force of concupiscence, yet the reason Pascal 
proposes is their deliberate preference for worldly 
pleasures. 
Car de me me que ceux qui quittent Dieu pour 
retourner au monde ne Ie font que parce qu'ils 
trouvent plus de douceur dans les plaisirs de la 
terre que dans ceux de l'union avec Dieu, et que 
ce charme victorieux les entralne, et les 
faisant rep~Qtir de leur premier choix les rends 
des penitents du diable, ... ,,113 
Fear of abandonment is therefore the dynamic force 
which motivates every action in the Christian life, and can 
be regarded as a divinely ordained instrument to ensure the 
. perseverance of the justified. The sight of others falling 
away, who received grace only for a time, strikes terror 
into the hearts of the elect, reminding them of their 
radical dependence and driving them back to God in prayer l14 
and Pascal concludes the fifth letter, "Bienheureux est 
1 'homme qui est toujours en crainte. ' .. ,,115. In the seventh 
letter Pascal reminds the Roannez that the elect must work 
unceasingly to conserve a baLance between the joy of elec-
tion and the fear of abandonment, so that when one becomes 
dominant, they should incline towards the other to redress 
the imbalance. Broome describes this fear as IIsimply a 
logical element in a religion of hope and love which is 
great enough to contain and transcend it,,116. That inter-
pretation fails to recognize the motivational power of fear 
in Pascal's own life. The asceticism and excessive pre-
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occupation with charitable works of his latter years bear 
witness to an almost obsessive anxiety about salvation, 
which is reflected in Priere pour demander a Dieu Ie bon 
usage des maladies, where there is no assurance of God's 
love and forgiveness, and suffering is seen as a possible 
mark of divine favour. 
Perseverance depends, therefore, upon a continuous 
infusion of grace in response to unceasing prayer, which 
itself is a divine gift dependent upon total submission to 
God and renunciation of the world. In the sixth letter to 
the Roannez, Pascal states that grace is a continual flux 
which Scripture compares to a river, and to the light 
h · h th 11 7 . 1 d t h' h . W 1C e sun 1ncessant y sen s ou , W 1C 1S ever new, 
so that if the sun were to cease shining for an instant, 
all the light which we have received would disappear and 
we would remain in darkness. He is here echoing the view 
expressed in an early letter to Mme Perier (Nov.S, 1648). 
Ainsi la continuation de la justice des fideles 
n'est autre chose que la continuation de 
l'infusion de la grace, et non pas une seule 
grace qui subsiste toujours; et c'est ce 
qui nous apprend parfaitement la dependance 
perpetuelle ou nous sommes de la misericorde 
de Dieu, puisque, s'il en interrompt tant soi 
peu Ie cours, la secheresse s:urvient neces-
sairement l18 . 
Here Pascal insists that the understanding of supernatural 
truth hidden in the Scriptures and revealed only to the 
elect, unlike that of natural truths which need to be 
understood and retained only once, must be continually kept 
alive by the action of grace in the hearts of the faithful. 
Christians should, therefore, never refuse to hear or read 
a discourse on Scripture, for God often avails himself of 
external means to vivify by his spirit what would other-
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wise remain in our memory as "un corps inanime et judaique". 
In a similar way grace continually renews the beatitude of 
the Blessed in Heaven and eternally recreates Christ's 
essence in the substance of the Eucharist. 
The knowledge that perseverance does not result from a 
single grace which lives forever, but from a continuous 
infusion which may cease at any moment, reminds Christians 
of their perpetual dependence. In the interes~ of their 
salvation and repose, they ought, therefore, to live only 
in the present. 
Le present est Ie seul temps qui est veritablement 
a nous, et dont nous devons user selon Dieu. 
C'est la ou nos pensees doivent etre principalement 
comptees .... Notre Seigneur n'a pas voulu que 
notre prevoyance s'etendit plus loin que Ie jour 
ou no us sommes. C'est les bornes qu'il faut 
garder1 et pour notre salut, et pour notre propre reposl 9. 
Moreover, they must continually renew their efforts, using 
one grace to effect the inner purification which is the con-
dition of acquiring the next. 
Ainsi nous devons veiller a purifier sans cesse 
l'interieur, qui se salit toujours de nouvelles 
taches en retenant aussi les anciennes, puisque 
sans Ie renouvellement assidu on n'est pas 
capable de recevoir ce vin nouveau qui ne sera 
po~nt mis en vieux vaisseaux120 . 
The Church as the Body of Christ 
Pascal's insistence upon the total inability of man to 
aspire to a true and saving knowledge of God through reason 
and the natural world, meant that man can know God only 
through the grace of Christ, for only he bridged the gap 
between man and God, between the natural and supernatural 
orders of being121. Since Christ's death and resurrection, 
salvation is, therefore, available only through his Body, 
the Church, which perpetuates his redemptive work and 
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mediates the grace of conversion. The concept of the 
Church as the Body of Christ, composed of all individual 
Christians of whom the Pope is the head, is given particu-
lar emphasis in Pascal's correspondence. In his letter to 
the Periers on the death of his father, he describes it as 
the society of the faithful into which Christ entered from 
the moment of his Incarnation, and which every Christian 
enters at baptism. 
Des Ie moment que nous entrons dans l'Eglise, qui 
est Ie monde des fideles et particulierement des 
elus, ou Jesus-Christ entra des Ie moment de son 
incarnation par un privilege particulier au fils 
unique de Dieu, nous sommes offerts et sanctifies 122 . 
In his suffering, death and ascension into glory, 
Christ became the model for every Christian, whose life 
must also be a perpetual sacrifice made complete only at 
death. 
C'est un des grands principes du christianisme, 
que tout ce qui est arrive a Jesus-Christ doit se 
passer et dans l'ame et dans Ie corps de chaque 
Chretien; ... 123. 
Nous savons que la vie, et la vie des Chretiens, 
est un sacrifice perpetuel ~ui ne peut etre 
acheve que par la mort; ... 24. 
In the Mystere de Jesus, Pascal states that Jesus will be 
in agony until the end of the world, that the Christian life 
must be an imitation of Christ's and a participation in his 
suffering. Suffering is therefore a sign of discipleship, 
for it is the medium through which Christ is united to his 
members, living in them and completing his passion until the 
perfect consummation of His Body. 
Unissez-moi a vous; remplissez-moi de vous et 
de votre Esprit-Saint. Entrez dans mon coeur et 
dans mon arne, pour y porter mes souffrances, et 
pour continuer d'endurer en moi ce qui vous reste 
a souffrir de votre Passion, que vous achevez 
dans vos membres jusqu'a la consommation parfaite 
de votre Corps; afin qu'etant plein de vous ce 
ne soit plus moi qui vive et qui souffre, mais 
que ce soit vous qui viviez etqui souffriez en 
moi, 0 mon Sauveur: et qu'ainsi, ayant quelque 
petite pa:r:-t -avos - souffrances, vous",me re,:nplis-
siez entierementde la .gloire 'qu' el'les ,v.ous ont 
125 . acquise, I) 0_ '. 
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The Church must be regarded, then, as a product of 
history, consisting of the whole company of the elect from 
the time of the Incarnation, and constituting a perpetual 
source of merit and grace of which it is the sole mediator. 
Pascal reminds MIle de Roannez in the sixth letter that 
her conversion can be attributed to this continuous redemp-
tive work to which she must now contribute by her own 
prayers. 
II Y a seize cents ans qu'elle gemit pour vous. 
II est temps de gemir pour elle, ... 126. 
Car c'est l'Eglise qui merite, avec Jesus-Christ 
qui en est inseparable, la conversion de tous 
ceux qui ne sont pas dans la verite; et ce sont 
ensuite ces personnes converties qui secourent 
la mere qui 1es a delivrees 127 . 
Pascal here reaffirms his own loyalty to the Catholic Church 
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and the Pope , from whom separation was, for him, 
unthinkable since it inevitably implied separation from the 
redeeming grace of Christ. 
Le corps n'est plus vivant sans chef, que Ie chef 
sans Ie corps. Quiconque se separe de l'un ou de 
llautre nlest plus du corps, et n'appartient plus 
a Jesus-Christ129 . 
For Pascal, as for Augustine, all human effort, all natural 
virtues and all austerities are useless without the trans-
forming power of grace, and he is ever conscious of his 
absolute dependence upon God to remain within the number of 
the elect. 
Faites-moi la grace, Seigneur, de joindre vos 
consolations ames souffrances, afin que je 
souffre en Chretien. Je ne demande pas d'etre 
exempt des douleurs; car c'est la recompense 
des saints: mais je demande de n'etre pas 
abandonne aux douleurs de la nature sans les 
consolations de votre Esprit; car c'est la 
malediction des Juifs et des Paiens 130 . 
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Pascal here clearly follows Augustine's view of human suffer-
ing, as the punishment imposed by God for sin, which, if 
joined to that of Christ, may become a source of redemp-
t . 131 lon . 
Mais, Seigneur, faltes aussi qulils en soient Ie 
remede, en me faisant considerer, dans les 
douleurs que je sens, celIe que je ne sentais pas 
dans mon &me, quoique toute malade et couverte 
d'ulceres 132 . 
Burnaby points out that Augustine extended the Old Testament 
principle "without the judgement of God no one is slow in 
mind or crippled in body", until the position was reached 
where the whole life of man is a punishment for the first 
sin of Adam, and offered this in his doctrine of Original 
Sin as the only tenable explanation of the fact of human 
ff . 133 . su erlng . 
The Church and the World 
Many of the shorter works reflect the extremely pessi-
mistic assessment of the human condition, to be given such 
emphasis in the first section of the Apology, and which 
leads to an evaluation of the present life as worthless in 
1 · h d f h Id . h 134 re atlon to t e next, an 0 t e wor as a prlson ouse 
in which God justly punishes the transgressions inevitably 
resulting from the first sin of Adam. Pascal's insistence 
in the "Pari" fragment that the indifferent should opt for 
an eternity of happiness in preference to the transitory 
and illusory pleasures of the world is anticipated in his 
view of death, as something to be longed for with hope, as 
the beginning of a truly real existence. 
Ne considerons plus un homme comme ayant cesse de 
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vivre, quoi que la nature suggere; mais comme 
commenQant a vivre, comme la verite l'assure135 . 
Whilst the soul o£ the Christian is raised to new life 
in baptism, the body attains to blessedness only at death136 , 
as the Mystere de Jesus also affirms: "Souffre les chaines 
de la servitude corporelle. Je ne te delivre que de la 
spirituelle , , 1,137 a present In his letter to the Periers, 
Pascal goes on to explain that both love of life and horror 
of death were appropriate only to Adam in his innocence, 
since his life then was wholly pure and death meant 
separating a holy body from a holy soul. Since the Fall, 
however, the Christian has every reason to welcome death, 
which separates and delivers a soul made holy in baptism 
from an impure body_ The root of sin, inseparable from the 
body during life, makes the body worthy only of hate. 
cette malheureuse racine qui en est inseparable 
pendant la vie, fait qu'il n'est pas permis de 
les honorer alors, puisqu'ils sont plut8t dignes 
d'etre hais. Crest pour cela que la mort est 
necessaire, pour mortifier entierement cette 
malheureuse racine, et c'est ce qui la rend 
souhaitable138 • 
In Priere pour demander a Dieu Ie bon usage des 
maladies III, Pascal believed that at the end of his life, 
by the incapacity induced by his illness, he was being 
wrenched by God from all worldly attractions and drawn back 
to Himself. 
The Christian life consists, then, in the destruction 
of the old Adam and the recreation, day by day, of a new life 
, Ch' t h' h 'II b f t d 1 ' t 't 139 ln rlS w lC Wl e per ec-e on y ln e ernl y 
Pascal saw Christ's prediction of the ruin of the Temple, in 
Mark 13, as foretelling what must happen to every member of 
his Church, in whom no passion will remain, just as the 
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entire universe will ultimately be destroyed to make way for 
h d earth140. H th . a new eaven an a new e compares e lnner 
turmoil experienced by those who give themselves to God, 
to a state of civil war which must be suffered throughout 
life. Before they are granted the grace of election, the 
weight of lust anchors men to the earth, so that when God 
draws them upward, this bond is stretched and undergoes 
heavy strain. Suffering results from the resistance of the 
body still shackled by concupiscence and released only by 
death. In the ninth letter to the Roannez Pascal compares 
the violence of this warfare between grace and the evil 
remaining in the Christian, to the suffering of a child 
whom thieves try to wrench from the loving arms of its 
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mother . Though painful, this struggle can, in fact, be 
regarded as peace with God . 
... on peut dire que cette guerre qui parait dure aux 
hommes, est un paix devant Dieu; car c'est cette 
paix que Jesus-Christ a aussi apportee 142 . 
The theme of the Church and the world as mutually 
exclusive societies, central to Pascal's attack on the 
Jesuits in the Provinciales, is also emphasised in the 
letters to the Roannez, written at about the same time. 
Hatred of the present life and renunciation of worldly 
temptations and attachments are therefore obligatory for 
the elect. 
"Qu'il ne faut pas examiner si on a vocation 
pour sortir du monde, mais seulement si on a 
vocation pour y demeurer, comme on ne consul-
terait point si on est appele a sortir d'une 
maison pestiferee ou embrasee"143. 
Natural affections and relationships must be surrendered in 
favour of the truly spiritual bond which joins members of 
Christ's Body. 
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Jesus s'arrache d'avec ses disciples pour entrer 
dans l'agonie; il faut s'arracher de ses llus 
proches et des plus intimes, pour l'imiter 44. 
In his letter to the Periers, Pascal reminds them that they 
had already lost their father when he entered the Church, 
since from then on he belonged to God; and that their 
grief, which springs from natural affections must be 
regarded as a sacrifice for the life of the Church145 . To 
Mme Perier (1648) Pascal affirms that, in fact, only since 
grace joined them in the new world of the spirit, (which 
alone has true reality), can they consider themselves as 
truly related. 
C'est en quoi nous devons admirer que Dieu nous 
ait donne et la figure et la realite de cette 
alliance; car, comme nous avons dit souvent 
entre nous, les choses corporelles ne sont 
qu'une image des spirituelles, et Dieu a 
represente les choses invisibles dans les 
visibles 146 . 
The neo-Platonic influence upon the thought and 
expression of Augustine 147 , which led him to see the things 
of this world as mere shadows of their supernatural counter-
parts, which alone have true reality, is very evident in 
Pascal's conception of the world and the Church as irrecon-
cilably opposed. He reminds us that in the early days of 
the Church this essential distinction was recognized. 
On connaissait alors par ce procede une distinction 
essentielle du monde avec l'Eglise. 
On considerait alors Ie monde et l'Eglise comme 
deux contraires, comme deux ennemis irreconciliables 
dont l'un persecute l'autre sans discontinua-
tion ... 14B. 
As Pascal stresses in the Pensees, the world exists only 
f . I • d 149 h or the exerClse of God s mercy or JU gement as t e 
instrument of his predestinatory will. Here the "reprouves", 
to whom the "Dieu cache" does not reveal himself, in virtue 
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of their inherited culpability, miserably await death, 
enslaved by concupiscence which blinds them to God. 
Pascal cites the authority of Augustine: "Sur quoi saint 
Augustin dit que c'est un effet de sa justice qu'il ne 
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soit point connu du monde . 
Redemption consists, as Pascal demonstrates in Sur la 
conversion du pecheur, in the healing of this blindness by 
grace which enlightens the intellect so that the illusory 
and transitory nature of worldly goods is revealed and they 
are recognized as pointers to man's true good, God. For 
the elect, then, to whom God shows mercy, the world is a 
151 training ground for heaven , for evidence of God's com-
passionate will can be perceived in all events and afflic-
tions, which serve as divine instructions for securing 
release from imprisonment and servitude. 
C'est pourquoi nous devons bien menager l'avantage 
que la bonte de Dieu nous donne de nous laisser 
toujours devant les yeux une image des biens que 
nous avons perdus, et de nous environner dans la 
captivite me me ou sa justice nous a reduits, de 
tant d'objets qui nous servent d'une lecon con-
tinuellement presentee 
De sorte que nous devons nous considerer comme des 
criminels dans une prison toute remplie des images 
de leur liberateur et des instructions necessaires 
pour sortir de la servitude; mais il faut avouer 
qu'on ne peut apercevoir ces saints caracteres 
sans une lumiere surnaturelle; car comme toutes 
choses parlent de Dieu a ceux qui Ie connaissent, 
et qu'elles Ie decouvrent a tous ceux qui l'aiment, 
ces memes choses Ie cachent a tous ceux qui ne Ie 
connaissent pas 1S2 . 
Pascal returns here to the Augustinian theme of "use" 
and "enjoyment" of worldly goods, linked with the Platonic 
view of the world as a mere image of reality, and to the 
equivocal attitude to the question of grace and freedom 
characteristic of his mentor. "Une lumiere surnaturelle" 
is the absolute prerequisite for the perception of these 
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goods as mere images, yet those who, "par un aveuglement 
brutal", remain attached to them, are, in Pascal's view, 
guilty of sacrilege and idolatry, since they accord to the 
creature the honour due only to God as their sole and true 
principle - the most heinous of crimes and worthy of God's 
vengeance. 153 Yet, in the third letter to the Roannez , he 
states categorically that men do not choose to be faithful 
to God as to an earthly king, who must show gratitude for 
their loyalty, but are made faithful and should be there-
fore infinitely obliged to Him if a continuation of grace 
allows them to remain in His service. In the fifth of his 
prayers, Pascal describes the fate of the worldly and of 
the elect, which is apparently the result of deliberate 
choice . 
... Comme les uns periront avec les objets perissables 
auxquels ils se sont attaches, les autres subsis-
teront eternellement dans l'objet eternel et 
subsistant par soi-meme auquel ils se sont 
etroitement unis. 
Yet in the next prayer all is attributed unconditionally to 
God. 
Achevez, 0 mon Dieu, les bons mouvements que vous 
me donnez. Soyez-en la fin cornme vous en etes Ie 
principe. Couronnez vos propres dons; car je 
reconnais que ce sont vos dons 154 . 
Pascal clearly sees no contradiction between the two 
apparently irreconcilable aspects of the divine nature: 
the absolutely gratuitous quality of God's mercy to His 
elect and the arbitrary and unjust character of His justice 
towards the damned, whom Pascal roundly slates as impious 
idolaters. 
In a letter to Mrne Perier (1648)155, Pascal writes that 
those enabled to perceive the images of God in the natural 
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world, must use them in order to avoid sin and possess God. 
The essence of sin, he explains in the third letter to the 
Roannez, consists in a failure to follow the revealed will 
of God. 
Car enfin, la raison pour laquelle les peches sont 
peches, c'est seulement parce qu'ils sont con-
traires a la volonte de Dieu: et ainsi l'essence 
du peche consistant a avoir une volonte oppose 
a celIe que nous connaissons en Dieu, il est 
visible, ce me semble, que quand il nous dec ouvre 
sa volonte par les evenements, ce serait un peche 
de ne sly pas accommoder 156 . 
In the Mystere de Jesus, Pascal indicates that it is in the 
exigencies and events of daily life that these pointers are 
to be found and must be followed. 
Si Dieu nous donnait des maltres de sa main, 0 
qu'il leur faudrait obeir de bon coeur. La 
necessite et les evenements en sont infaillible-
ment157 . 
Such an attitude would seem to require a fatalistic and 
uncomplaining acceptance of all circumstances as bearing the 
mark of God's will. He tells the Periers that the death of 
their father and, indeed, all events, must be viewed in 
this light, as "de tout temps prevu et preordonne en Dieu;,,158 
and develops this thought further in a letter to Florin 
Perier (1657)159, by affirming that resistance to adverse 
circumstances constitutes a denial of the omnipotence of 
God, since such obstacles are clearly permitted by Him to 
impede their progress. The toleration of such hindrances 
can, in fact, be interpreted as a clear indication that we 
are motivated by grace and in tune with God's will. 
The illumination of grace provides the Christian with 
a new perspective so that he can view both prosperity and 
affliction with equanimity as the result of God's compassion. 
Miracles can be appreciated only by the elect, as a measure 
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of the glory prepared in the next life160 . Honours confer-
red upon those chosen to serve God have a reality of which 
Idl h 1 h · 161 d hI' wor y onours are on y t e lmage , an t e conso atlon 
of grace in affliction provides far greater pleasures than 
those of the world . 
... on ne quitterait jamais les plaisirs du monde pour 
embrasser la croix de J~sus-Christ, s1 on ne 
trouvait plus de douceur dans Ie m~pris, dans la 
pauvret~, dans Ie d~nuement et dans Ie rebut des 
hommes, que dans les d~lices du p~ch~162. 
Both suffering and pleasure are thus necessary components of 
sanctliication and Pascal prays that he may experience Doth, 
"car c'est Ie v~ritable ~tat du Christianisme,,163. The 
elect occupy a position between the Jews and pagans, who 
suffer without the consolation of grace, and the saints, who 
are exempt from all suffering_Just as man and God were 
united in the humanity and divinity of the "Homme-Dieu", 
so, through grace, the Christian shares Christ's divinity, 
and Pascal sees 'the Christian life as compounded of these 
opposed states. Thus grace brings to the elect the presence 
of Christ in the bread of the Eucharist, consolation in 
bodily suffering and the joy of the Blessed, mingled with 
d f h . h' . h . . h 164 sa ness or t e Sln w lC remalns ln t em . 
Clearly Pascal's conception of the Church as the 
Mystical Body of Christ is a faithful and detailed replica-
tion of the Augustinian doctrine already outlined165 . 
Emile Mersch insists that, in their revival of this doctrine 
in seventeenth century France, the Jansenists enhanced the 
annihilation of self and the passivity of the elect under 
the rule of grace, lise vider de soi pour etre en capacit~ 
et en capacit~ pure de J~sus, se d~fier de soi pour subir 
pleinement l'influence de J~susIl166. In Mersch's view two 
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consequences follow from this adherence to Christ as sole 
source of all virtue: firstly a pessimistic depreciation 
of human nature generally, even that of Christ, demanding 
an austere renunciation of self in rigorism and asceticism; 
and secondly, the emphatic assertion of the hiddenness of 
God, veiled especially beneath the substance of the "Homme-
Dieu" in the sacrifice of the Mass, through y.,rhich alone 
access to God is possible. 
Dans l'oeuvre du salut, a les [the Jansenists] 
entendre, la part de l'homme est de s'abstenir, 
de se retirer, de ne rien faire: tout amour 
humain, toute spontaneite naturelle, toute 
affection pour la creature, toute joie et toute 
expansion, toute recherche de bonheur personnel, 
toute initiative meme sont peches, ou du moins 
decheances ou maladresses, comme autant d'empie-
tements sur le domaine universel de Dieu167 . 
Mersch attributes this attitude to the structure of French 
society under the absolute monarchy of Louis XIV: "les 
respects et les effacements des courtesans devant les 
majestes humaines donnent une image commode pour representer 
l'attitude a prendre devant le roi des rOis,,168. These 
fundamental assumptions of the Augustinian doctrine would, 
however, seem to have their genesis and warrant in the 
experience of "creatureliness" or self-depreciation in the 
face of the transcendent, omnipotent God, which, as Otto 
demonstrated, are the essential characteristics of all such 
"twice-born" religious experience. 
Conclusion 
An analysis of Pascal's correspondence and shorter 
works reveals two factors which can be seen to coalesce in 
the Pensees, and which are predominant in determining the 
framework and expression of his theology of grace. The 
numinous elSment in Pascal's own conversion in November, 
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1654, recorded in the Memorial and amplified in Sur la 
conversion du pecheur, consisting in a profound experience 
of the absolute "otherness" and transcendence of God, 
clearly set the seal of approval upon the view latent in 
Augustinianism, that all rational theology constitutes an 
attack upon the omnipotence and sole causality of God. 
It furnished Pascal with conclusive proof that reason 
cannot give religious certainty which comes only from a 
living awareness of God. The importance of the theme of 
the "Dieu cache" in his work bears witness to his belief in 
the wholly gratuitous character of the divine self-revelation. 
The mathematical perspective which he applied to the field 
of theological truth, and which is most evident in the 
doctrine of the three orders, emphasises, in the absolute 
discontinuity between the orders, the inaccessibility and 
transcendence of God. The conclusions of Preface. Sur Ie 
Traite du Vide and De l'esprit Geometrique reinforce this 
disproportion between man and God, in a logical extension 
of that demonstrated between man and the natural world. 
These works establish: the limits of natural reason in the 
sphere of natural knowledge where it can only work upon 
given principles or self-evident facts; the heart as the 
capacity in man for the intuitive reception of such truth; 
and the infinities in number, space, time and motion as 
incomprehensible but nevertheless existing, and which 
reason must therefore accept. In analysing the mechanics 
of assent, De l'Art de Persuader demonstrates the relation-
ship between reason and the will in the acquisition of 
belief, supporting the Augustinian view that reason can only 
choose the good if the will is first healed, since reason 
86 
follows and rationalizes the will's choice. The Entretien 
avec M. de Saci points up the inadequacies of reason in the 
rational doctrines of philosophy, which fail to recognize 
the corruption of the will and the need for grace to empower 
it if it is to choose the good. 
Yet, in the Comparaison des Chretiens des premiers 
temps avec ceux d'aujourd'hui, Pascal underscores the 
primacy of reason in the conversion experience for then its 
assent to the content of Revelation is what precipitates 
the necessary renunciation of the world. Pascal objects to 
infant baptism on the grounds that this consent is clearly 
impossible before the age of reason, when, as moral con-
sciousness and arbiter of religious truth, reason can recog-
nize Christian principles as superior to those of the world. 
Similarly, in the Factum pour les cures de Paris, when Pascal 
defends the law of the Gospel as an absolute against which 
all acts should be measured and which the Jesuit casuists 
threaten to annihilate, he again points to such a moral con-
sciousness in man. It is in the light of this that he sets 
the Jesuit moral principles below even those of infidels and 
savages, who are outside both the natural and supernatural 
law. 
Ce qu'il y a de plus pernicieux dans ces nouvelles 
morales, est qu'elles ne vont pas seulement a 
corrompre les moeurs, mais a corrompre la regIe 
des moeurs, ce qui est d'une importance tout 
autrement considerable 169 . 
The dialectical style adopted in the Entretien avec M. 
de Saci, which points to Revelation as alone providing man 
with an explanation of, and remedy for, the human condition, 
anticipates an even more important role accorded to it in the 
Pensees, that of establishing the supremacy of Christ as sole 
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mediator between man and God, and in whom alone the natural 
and supernatural orders of being are united. By implication, 
Christ's Body, the Church, in whose members he continues his 
redemptive suffering, alone mediates to the elect the grace 
of conversion and perseverance, so that, for Pascal, separa-
tion from it inevitably implied damnation. In the Compa-
raison des Chretiens des premiers temps avec ceux d'aujourd' 
hui, he stresses the uniqueness of the Church's role as the 
instrument of the illumination in which conversion essen-
tially consists. Detachment from the world is thus obliga-
tory for the Christian, for whom the world constitutes a 
training ground for heaven, as the instrument of God's 
predestinatory will. From the perspective of the super-
natural order to which they are elevated by grace, the elect 
perceive worldly attachments, goods and pleasures as transient 
and lacking true reality, as images by which God enables them 
to rise to Him. As Chevalier observes, "le chretien parfait, 
illumine par le soleil invisible, apercoit l'ordre derriere 
le desordre, la fin derriere le mecanisme, la cause premiere 
d .~ 1 d "170 errlere es causes secon es... . 
Pascal's correspondence portrays the Christian life as 
one of striving, suffering and submission. Suffering is 
indispensable, not only as a source of grace by continuing 
the redemptive work of the Church, but also as a means of 
inner purification, so that the life of the elect is a con-
tinual penitence for the sins of the flesh from which they 
are delivered only by death. The fear of abandonment by 
God, clearly a dominant influence on the thought and conduct 
of Pascal from the time of his second conversion until the 
end of his life, when, in the Priere pour demander aDieu 
88 
Ie bon usage des maladies, it assu~es obsessive proportions, 
coerces the elect into both action and submission. Thus, 
whilst Pascal urges the Christian to make good use of each 
grace to avoid sin and merit the next, in this way contin-
ually striving towards sanctification, he also stresses the 
passivity required of the Christian in accepting all events 
and circumstances as evidence of God's will, acknowledging 
even the faith which responds to the revelation of the "Dieu 
cache" as a divine gift. "Nous assistons, en notre atre, 
aux mouvements qu'un autre y cause victorieusement, et la 
grace laisse notre activite naturelle aussi etroitement 
repliee en son insignifiant neant qu'elle mame est parci-
. , 11171 
monleusement octroyee • 
Yet Pascal affirms that the true good can only be lost 
with man's consent, and he accuses those who fall away of 
deliberately committing sacrilege and idolatry. The two 
delectations which, in the Ecrits sur la Grace, are the 
instruments of the divine will, are presented here as the 
free choice of the "endurcis" or "elect". As with Augustine, 
the non-rational apprehensions of Pascal's conversion 
experience, the felt certainty of deliverance which makes 
all salvation appear a sheer gift of God, and the feeling 
of unworthiness demanding renunciation and purification for 
a continuation of that gift, all issue in inconsistencies 
and irrationalities in his theology of grace. It is not 
surprising, therefore, that the most profoundly spiritual 
of his shorter works, Priere pour demander aDieu le bon 
usage des maladies, best illustrates the ambivalence. 
Oh qu'heureux sont ceux qui avec une liberte 
entiere et une pente invincible de leur volonte 
aiment parfaitement et librement ce qu'ils sont 
obliges d'aimer necessairement!172. 
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CHAPTER III 
ECRITS SUR LA GRACE 
Background 
The question of grace in the works of Pascal is given 
explicit and detailed treatment in the Ecrits sur la Grace, 
where Pascal's intention is clearly to demonstrate con-
clusively that the Augustinian teaching on Grace and Pre-
destination is not only the true doctrine of the Church, 
but also unequivocally endorsed as such by Scripture, the 
Fathers and the Councils of the Church l . Bremond 2 suggests 
that it was written expressly to reassure the nuns and 
friends of Port-Royal who, because of the identification of 
their teaching with that of Jansen, through their associa-
tion with St.-Cyran, were greatly disturbed by accusations 
of Calvinism levelled at them by the Jesuits in respect of 
the five condemned propositions. The long-standing debate 
between Molinists and Thomists on the question of grace, 
temporarily silenced in 1607 by Paul V, when a truce was 
declared and both parties permitted to teach their own view 
as legitimate doctrine, flared up again with the publication 
in 1640 of Jansen's Augustinus, quite openly directed at the 
Jesuits, and purporting to be the pure Augustinian teaching 
of the Church on grace. 
The Augustinus 3 was the blueprint for the movement of 
spiritual renewal masterminded by Jansen and St.-Cyran, and 
already introduced by the latter to the nuns of Port-Royal, 
with its emphasis upon a conscious relationship, through 
prayer and devotion, with the person of Christ as the centre 
of the religious life, and on the need for a more personal 
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assurance of grace, and for reaffirming, in a life of 
humility and service, a true relation between religion and 
morality4. This constituted within the Church a part of 
the wider movement of the Reformation, in its attack upon 
a mechanistic view of grace and sanctification by means of 
instruction and external observances mediated by the Church, 
rather than by a conversion of the heart to God. 
The Jesuits, on the other hand, believed that in his 
work, Molina was entirely faithful to the teaching of 
Augustine, and that in his conception of the "scientia 
media" he had explained and reconciled the co-existence of 
freewill and absolute predestination affirmed as realities 
by Augustine, thus allowing some scope for self-determina-
tion and moral effortS. The need to accommodate the 
Christian doctrine to the exigencies of their missionary 
work at home and abroad led the Jesuits to try to temper 
the pessimistic and deterministic bias of the Augustinian 
doctrine. It is clearly the more radical interpretation of 
Molina taught by Lessius and condemned by the Faculty of 
Louvain in 1587 6 , with which Pascal is particularly con-
cerned, for it goes beyond a mere congruism and affirms a 
predestination in prevision of the acceptance of grace, not 
only for the beginning of faith, but also for perseverance, 
on the grounds that efficacious grace destroyed frrewill. 
For Jansen and the Augustinians of Port-Royal this merely 
represented a renewal of the Semi-Pelagian heresy since, in 
their view, it made the efficacity of grace depend upon the 
consent of the human will, thus detracting from the majesty 
and mystery of God. 
The Jesuits responded to the publishing of the Augustinus 
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by claiming that it was a distortion of the teaching of 
Augustine, and accused Jansen of Calvinism, with specific 
instances listed in the five condemned propositions, a move 
which Port-Royal interpreted as a veiled attempt to under-
mine further the authentic Augustinian doctrine of the 
Church. With the death of Jansen in 1638, it fell to Port-
7 Royal to defend a work which, Delumeau suggests, the nuns 
themselves had probably never read. Laporte states that 
the chief concern of the theologians of Port-Royal was to 
distance their own doctrine from both Calvinism and Molinism, 
since they were only too conscious that these constituted 
"les extremites logiques par rapport auxquelles se situe sa 
propre position,,8. The deliberations of the Council of 
Trent, moreover, would appear to have done nothing to resolve 
the problem, for under pressure from both Jesuits and 
Thomists, that Council affirmed both the freedom of the will 
and efficacious grace and, in effect, endorsed both doc-
trines 9 . The apologetic purpose of the Ecrits would seem 
to consist specifically in the exposition and defence of a 
traditional Augustinian stance, thus reassuring the nuns 
and friends of Port-Royal that, in their devotion to 
Augustine, and in their reverence for the Scriptures and the 
authority of the Church, they were, in fact, more orthodox 
than the Jesuits, with their "nouveaux dogmes", who would 
condemn them. In their reassertion of the primitive 
Augustinian doctrine, the difficulty facing Port-Royal was 
that the Jesuit view of the will had gained general accept-
ance and was widely regarded as orthodox, so that it is the 
Augustinian doctrine of grace which now in fact appeared 
, , 'h d ' t' I t' 10 lnnovatlve, as It a In Augus lne sown lme . 
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Reason and Revelation 
Both method and matter in the Ecrits sur la Grace are 
underpinned by the basic Augustinian distinction between 
nature and grace, reason and revelation. 
The method which Pascal adopts is that set down in the 
Traite du Vide 11 , where Pascal posits the only criterion 
by which the truth of theological statements may be judged, 
namely, the tradition of the Church, and, in a secondary and 
limited role, the use of reason. In Pascal's view, the only 
reliable guide in dealing with truths belonging to the super-
natural order, which must of necessity derive from a super-
natural source, is to be found in the sacred writings of the 
Fathers, in Scripture and in the Councils and Prayers of the 
Church. 
La regIe que nous prendrons pour cet effet sera 
la tradition successive de cette doctrine depuis 
Jesus-Christ jusqu'a nous . 
... Ainsi nous nous fonderons sur la pierre inebranlable 
de l'Evangile et des saintes Ecritures: mais nous 
ne l'expliquerons pas suivant notre esprit propre, 
mais suivant celui des anciens Peres, des Papes, 
des Conciles, des prieres de l'Eglise12 . 
Although reason is considered inadequate to deal with the 
truths of a higher, supernatural order, it is nevertheless 
believed to perform a valuable function in clarifying the 
interpretation of certain passages, where the meaning may be 
13 
ambiguous, and misinterpreted by "les uns et les autres" 
to lend a false authority to their teachings. Reason will 
also, Pascal claims, allow him to give such a sound, rational 
basis to the Augustinian doctrine that it will be wholly 
acceptable to the "sens commun" of the reader. 
Et quoique Ie sens commun ne doive pas entrer en 
concurrence avec une matiere de foi, nous ne 
laisserons pas de repondre aux objections des uns 
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et des autres. Et enfin nous ferons voir combien 
cette doctrine est con forme au sens commun meme 14 
Method 
15 In the introduction to the text, Lafuma cites Nicole's 
belief that in the Ecrits, Pascal wished to temper the 
rigidity of the Augustinian doctrine, rendering it usi 
plausible", that it would have a wider acceptance. He would 
'f hId th 1" h M' 1 16 appear, ln act, to ave exp ore to e lmlt, w at le 
aptly calls "the possibilities of verbal equivocation", in 
his efforts to prove the logical acceptability of his own 
stance. Nevertheless the often lengthy, repetitious and 
convoluted arguments in the Ecrits do serve to underline 
Pascal's own position with regard to the role played by 
grace in the work of Redemption. 
The method is that of Augustine, an analysis of which is 
17 to be found in De l'Art de Persuader , namely, an appeal 
to the facts of experience to establish the nature of the 
problem; the presentation of the solution in Christian 
Revelation, to which an act of commitment is sought by the 
agency of grace; and finally rational argument to convince 
the mind. 
The debate is briefly established as focusing upon the 
question of whether Predestination is determined by the 
divine or human will. 
From the outset Pascal adoptsthesubtle dialectical 
,style of the Pensees, favoured by the theologians of Port-
Royal and already tested in the Entretien avec M. de saci 18 ,: 
first setting the Augustinian doctrine firmly between the 
extremes of Molinism and Calvinism, the one claiming that 
salvation is the work only of man, and the other that it is 
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the work only of God. Pascal's thesis in the Ecrits is, 
that in Augustine's teaching on Grace, we have a synthesis 
of these partial truths, and that in this synthesis consists 
the complete and authentic doctrine of the Church on the 
question of Grace. 
The reader is then progressively drawn by a series of 
logically demonstrated conclusions to an acceptance of the 
doctrine as the only one possible on traditional, rational 
and moral grounds, and thence to an assumption that it is, 
in fact, the Church's true teaching, the two heresies of 
Calvinism and Molinism serving only to underline its 
authenticity. Having assumed a position of orthodoxy, Pascal 
proceeds to give it the stamp of ecclesiastical authority, 
adducing proofs from Scripture and certain Fathers of the 
Church, and in the second Ecrit underlining the degree of 
conformity shown by Molinism and Calvinism with the Church's 
(Augustine's) doctrine. Clearly Pascal's intention in these 
two Ecrits is to distance the theology of Port-Royal as much 
as possible from that of Calvin. It would also seem likely 
that, by adopting a more kindly attitude towards the 
Molinists,and underlining their continued submission to the 
Church, compared to the disaffection of the Calvinists, 
Ppscal hopes to evoke in the reader a sympathetic attitude 
to the faithful of Port-Royal in view of their own avowed 
19 loyalty . 
In the third and fourth Ecrits Pascal resorts to the 
extensive rational argument which occupies the major portion 
of the work, to interpret and clarify the proposition in 
Sessio VI C.XI of the Council of Trent, claimed by the 
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Molinists to uphold their own doctrine, and he proceeds to 
defend on theological and linguistic grounds the Augustinian 
interpretation. 
Que les commandements ne sont pas impossibles aux 
justes. 
Grace and Predestination 
The question of grace, for Pascal, is inextricably 
linked with that of predestination, and in the opening lines 
of the first Ecrit he sets down the basic assumptions of 
the Augustinian doctrine concerning the character and moti-
vation of God with respect to salvation, which will be 
defended as orthodox in the Ecrits. For Pascal, as for 
Augustine 20 , observation of the human condition affords con-
clusive proof that some men are saved and others damned, 
and that this is due both to the will of God and to the will 
of man, underlining here man's free cooperation with God in 
the process of Redemption, and man's total accountability 
for the sins by which he freely merits; damnation, antecedent 
to any willing on God's part. 
II est donc evident que la volonte de Dieu et 
celIe de l'homme concourent au salut et a la 
damnation de ceux qui sont sauves ou damnes. 
Et il n'y a point de question en toutes ces 
choses 2l . 
There is, then a concurrence of wills between God and 
man in relation to salvation and damnation, and Pascal poses 
the question which is central to the whole of the work, 
namely, that of determining which is "dominante et maitresse 
de l'autre", and which must, therefore, shoulder the ultimat~ 
responsibility in the matter. 
II est question de savoir si la volonte de l'homme 
est la cause de la volonte de Dieu, ou la volonte 
de Dieu la cause de la volonte de l'homme. Et 
celIe qui sera dominante et maltresse de l'autre 
sera consideree comme unique en quelque sorte: 
non pas qu'elle Ie soit, mais parce qu'elle 
enferme le concours de la volonte suivante. 
Et l'action sera rapportee a cette volonte 
premiere et non a l'autre 22 . 
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Clearly, to preserve God's omnipotence, He must be given a 
dominant role in determining the final destiny of His 
creation, but, in order to save His goodness and justice, 
He cannot be seen to will their damnation. 
Before entering upon a detailed discussion of the 
alternative solutions offered by the Calvinists and 
Molinists, Pascal illustrates this concurrence of wills 
with a selection of Augustine's own proof-texts, chiefly 
from St. Paul. Pascal's appeal to the authority of either 
Scripture or Tradition is clearly slanted to those passages 
which support his theological bias. In spite of accusations 
levelled at Molinists and Calvinists of selectivity in their 
23 
choice of proof-texts , Pascal himself is plainly guilty of 
the same crime, in spite of Cailliet's impassioned defence 
of the "objectivity, the integrity, and the erudition of 
P l ' h ,,24 asca s researc ... . '11' 25, d' As N.P. Wl lams ln lcates, 
Augustine's doctrine was a hardening of St. Paul's teaching 
and it is inevitably to him that Pascal looks as principal 
Scriptural authority. In his exegesis of the apparently 
paradoxical words of st. Paul, "Je vis, non pas moi, mais 
Jesus-Christ vit en moi,,26 [Gal.II, 20], he defines the 
relationship between the wills of God and man, underlining 
the radical dependence of man upon God and the necessity 
for grace in the performance of good works. 
J'ai travaille, non pas moi, mais la grace de 
Jesus-Christ qui est avec moi [1 Cor., XV, 10] . 
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In a mysterious synthesis of the divine and human wills 
Christ lives in St. Paul and performs good actions, by 
preparing the will so that it chooses the good, yet allowing 
the free cooperation of the human will so that it may thereby 
merit salvation. God, however, must be regarded as origin 
and source . 
... mais la grace de Dieu a ete celIe dont on peut 
dire qu'elle a travaille, puisqu'elle a ete 
l'origine et la source de son travail 28 . 
Pascal thus illustrates the modus operandi of the will of 
God in the process of Redemption, which satisfies the two 
basic requirements at the heart of the Augustinian doctrine: 
the preservation of the image of God as omnipotent, dust 
and loving; and the reality of the contribution made by 
the free will of man. Clearly, in Augustine's reconcilia-
tion of these apparently irreconcilable factors, Pascal 
found a satisfying explanation of the facts of the human 
situation in the light of his own experience 29 
Having stated the basic principles of the Augustinian 
teaching, Pascal examines and compares the three answers 
currently offered to the question at the heart of the problem 
of Predestination, namely, the will of God for man with 
respect to salvation. 
Si ce qu'il y a des hommes sauves et damnes 
procede de ce que Dieu Ie veut ou de ce que les 
hommes [Ie] veulent30 . 
Calvinists 
The first opinion is that of the Calvinists who assert 
that God, creating man with an absolute will to save some 
and damn others, without prevision of merit in order to 
execute His will, caused Adam, and in him all men, to sin. 
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God sent Christ to earn the grace of redemption only for 
those predestined to salvation, while those destined for 
damnation were abandoned by God and deprived of grace through-
out their lives. Pascal underlines how this appalling heresy, 
the arbitrary predestination of the elect to salvation and 
of the reprobate to hell, and the powerlessness of both to 
resist the inevitable impUlsion to good or evil, not only 
offends the ordinary conception of justice, but is also in-
compatible with the idea of God as merciful and just. 
Voila l'opinion epouvantable de ces heretiques r injurieuse aDieu et insupportable aux hommes 3 
Molinists 
The Molinists, on the other hand, revolted by such a 
harsh doctrine, and in an effort to right the damage done to 
God's image, have overreacted and gone to the opposite 
extreme. They believe that God had a conditional will to 
save all men at creation; that Christ was born to redeem 
all without exception; and, furthermore, that it depends 
upon the will of man, and not of God, whether the grace 
offered to all is accepted or rejected. Predestination is 
in accordance with prevision of the good or bad use made of 
these graces by the free viII, so that God has no absolute 
will to save or damn any of his creation. 
The Molinists err, in Pascal's view, in exaggerating 
32 the power of human reason ("Elle flatte Ie sens commun") , 
attributing to it a competence in the supernatural order 
which makes man the sole author of his own salvation, at the 
same time excluding any willing on the part of God and thus 
denying His omnipotence. 
Between the two immoderate extremes of these heresies, 
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Pascal claims, lies the restraint and reasonableness of the 
teaching of Augustine, the key to which is to be found in 
the Augustinian view of human nature before and after the 
fall of Adam, and the response which each of these states 
elicited from God. The error of the Molinists and Calvin-
ists springs from their failure to distinguish these two 
states. Created "saine, sans tache, juste et droite, 
sortant des mains de Dieu, duquel rien ne peut partir que 
pur, saint et parfait", human nature became, by the first 
sin and revolt of Adam, "souillee, abominable et detestable 
aux yeux de Dieu"33. Pascal underlines the moral con-
straints imposed upon God by his 1"ustice, with respect to 
these two states of human nature. God could not damn man 
in the state of innocence or refuse him the grace sufficient 
for salvation, but He could justly damn the whole of man-
kind in the state of corruption. 
In the state of innocence, then, God had a general 
and conditional will to save all men, provided that they 
themselves willed it by the right use of their free\'lill 
aided by sufficient grace, which enabled them, but did not 
infallibly determine them to persevere in the good. Adam, 
however, by his own freewill and without any impulsion from 
God, which was quite unthinkable in Pascal's view, made 
bad use of this grace and revolted against God, thereby 
corrupting and infecting the whole of mankind, so that he 
became the just object of the indignation and anger of 
God. Although all men were guilty and worthy of damnation, 
God, by a wholly gratuitous act of mercy, willed to save a 
part of this mass, leaving the remainder, by an act of 
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preterition rather than actual reprobation, in their damna-
tion, where he could with justice have left the whole mass, 
in prevision of the sins they would commit, or at the least, 
because of the guilt inherited by participation in the 
first sin, because of their seminal identity with Adam. 
God is thus absolved by Pascal from the injustice inherent 
in the Calvinist scheme by the distinction made between 
IIfaire li and "permettre Il34 , since He did not actually will 
the damnation of mankind, but allowed Adam to do so. 
God sent Christ, therefore, to save absolutely and by 
very efficacious means only those chosen and predestined 
from this mass, who alone would merit salvation by Christ's 
death, the rest simply remaining in the mass of perdition. 
Some of the latter, however, though not of the number of 
the elect, were granted a limited grace to participate in 
the redemptive work of Christ by leading others to salvation, 
but inevitably rejoining those destined for universal 
perdition, since they have not received the efficacious 
graces necessary to persevere. With a singular lack of 
regard for ordinary justice the blame for their failure is 
placed firmly at their own door. 
Que c'est lafaute de ces personnes de ce qu'ils 
ne perseverent pas; qu'ils Ie pourraient, s'ils 
Ie voulaient, mais que n'etant pas du nombre des 
elus, Dieu ne leur donne pas ces graces efficaces 
sans lesquelles ils ne Ie veulent jamais en 
effet 35 . 
In the Augustinian scheme three distinct groups of men 
result, therefore, from the distribution of divine graces, 
by the agency of which God effectively works out His purpose 
. . fl' 36 h h for manklnd ln the economy 0 sa vatlon : t ose w 0 never 
come to the faith; those who come but do not persevere and 
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die in a state of mortal sin; and, lastly, those who 
persevere in charity until their death, thus attaining 
salvation. The fate of each group is determined by the 
bestowal or withholding of grace in accordance with the 
Divine will. 
Jesus-Christ nla point eu de volonte absolue 
que les premiers regussent aucune grace par sa 
mort, puisqu'ils n'en ont point en effet regu. 
II a voulu racheter les seconds; il leur a donne 
des graces qui les eussent conduit au salut, 
s'ils en eussent bien use, mais il ne leur a pas 
voulu donner cette grace singuliere de la 
perseverance, sans laquelle on n'enuse jamais 
bien. 
Mais, pour les derniers, Jesus-Christ a voulu 
absolument leur salut, et il les y conduit par 
des moyens certains et infaillibles"37. 
The existence of this intermediate group in the 
Augustinian scheme of Predestination, introduces an element 
of uncertainty which was particularly responsible for the 
mixture of fear and joy with which, Pascal later insists, 
the justified must view their own election. Paradoxical 
as it may appear, in view of the complete finality of the 
divine decree, Pascal states that all men are, nevertheless, 
obliged to believe that they are of the small number of the 
elect, although their belief must always lack complete certi-
tude and be tinged with fear, since the final discernment 
of the elect must always remain an impenetrable secret of 
God. Similarly, no one must judge others, however impious, 
to be outside election as long as they are living, and must 
attempt to make a positive contribution towards their salva-
tion. Pascal succinctly summarizes the Augustinian teaching 
on Predestination. 
Voila leur sentiment, suivant lequel on voit 
que Dieu a une volonte absolue de sauver ceux 
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qui sont sauves, et une volonte conditionelle et 
par prevision de damner les damnes; et que Ie 
salut provient de la volonte de Dieu, et la 
damnation de la volonte des hornrnes 38 . 
He then moves on immediately to an assumption that that 
teaching is, in fact, the true doctrine of the Chu~.ch, dis-
missing other views as aberrations of human reason, 
Voila Ie sentiment des disciples de saint Augustin, 
ou plutot celui des Peres et de toute la tradition 
et par consequent de l'Eglise, les autres ne 
devant etre consideres que cornrne des egarements 
de l'esprit humain39 . 
From this standpoint of assumed orthodoxy he assesses 
the attitude of the Church towards these different groups. 
A degree of tolerance, Pascal affirms, is possible towards 
the Molinists who, remaining within the Church ("ses 
enfants"), are open to correction through the authority of 
the Fathers, but a stronger line of reasoning must be 
adopted towards the Calvinists, who have placed themselves 
beyond this authority. Pascal adds that from the outset 
the Christian Church has been exposed to injury from "des 
ennemis contraires", who have advanced contrary claims for 
the absolute divinity or humanity of Christ. If left to 
themselves such opposing claimants will destroy each other, 
but meanwhile they serve a useful function in establishing 
the true doctrine. 
Elle se console en ce que ces erreurs contraires 
etablissent sa verite; qu'il suffit de les 
abandonner a eux-memes pour les detruire, et que 
les armes que ces divers ennemis employent contre 
elle ne lui peuvent nuire, et ne peuvent que les 
ruiner 40 . 
In the second part of the first Ecrit Pascal summarizes 
the views of the three doctrines with respect to the question 
of Predestination. 
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Ainsi, les Molinistes pretendent que la predesti-
nation et la reprobation sont par la prevision 
des merites et des peches des hommes. Les 
Calvinistes pretendent que la predestination et 
la reprobation sont par la volon~~ absolue de 
Dieu. Et l'Eglise pretend que la predestination 
vient de la volonte absolue de Dieu et la 
re'pP<Iib.i:lruicim de la prevision du peche 41 . 
Appeal to Tradition 
Pascal appeals to the tradition of the Church to place 
the stamp of Patristic authority on the Augustinian doctrine, 
defending, in particular, as conclusively orthodox, the 
Augustinian teaching on the limited number destined by God 
to receive, by Christ's death, the grace of election, which 
had come under attack from the Jesuits and had been branded 
heretical in the five condemned propositions. As in his 
treatment of Scripture, Pascal's theological bias inevitably 
.seeks validation in the "twice-born" Western tradition, 
headed by Augustine and his disciples, for whom divine 
omnipotence is paramount. Pascal's inclusion of St. Thomas 
reflects the evolution towards a Thomistic stand on the 
question of the universality of the divine will which can 
b d t d · h .. 1 42 e e ecte In t e PrOVlnCla es . He makes a sweeping 
claim, 
... que tous les Docteurs en tous les temps ont etabli 
comme une verite constante que Dieu ne veut pas 
sauver tous les hommes ou que Dieu ne donne pas 
a tous les hommes des grace.s suffisantes pour 
leur salut, ou que la predestination est sans la 
prevision des oeuvres 43 
and appeals first to the censure, by the Faculty of Douai, 
of the Jesuit proposition that, after the first sin, God 
offered to all men sufficient means of salvation, and to 
the Scriptural text with which the Faculty rebuts it. 
Je ne prie point pour le monde, mais pour ceux 
44 que vous m'avez donnes . 
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Furthermore, in reply to the Jesuit claim that Scripture is 
full of precepts exhorting men to turn to God, Pascal cites 
Augustine's45 argument that God commands the impossible so 
that we shall know what we must ask of Him. If grace were 
available before it is even asked for, this would make a 
nonsense of the prayer life of the Church. 
Qu'y a-t-il de plus ridicule que de demander, 
que de prier, pour accomplir ce qui est en 
notre puissance 46 . 
Moreover, in a similar censure by the Faculty of Louvain, 
the sufficiency of Christ's redemptive act is stated to 
consist only in the price of his blood, and not in a 
general help offered indiscriminately to all men, since 
this would necessarily have to be attributed to infants who 
die before they are brought to Baptism, which is the foun-
47 tainhead, as it were, of this grace , and therefore 
redemption could not be given for all. Pascal underlines 
in texts cited from Thomas Aquinas and Peter Lombard the 
absolutely arbitrary, though completely orthodox, nature 
of the distribution of the grace of election, in which, 
without any prevision of merit, God bestows mercy on those 
he wishes to save, and exercises his justice in allowing 
the reprobate to remain in the "masse corrompue". If that 
appears unfair Pascal reminds us in the second Ecrit, 
Tous les hommes etant dans cette masse corrompue 
egalement dignes de la mort eternelle et de la 
colere de Dieu, Dieu pouvait avec justice les 
abandonner tous sans misericorde a la damnation48 
As N.P. Williams rightly observes, 
If prevenient grace is absolutely necessary for 
salvation, and if God only wills to bestow it 
upon a given number of men, it irresistibly 
follows that He must be deemed to will the non-
salvation of those on whom He does not bestow 
it ... 49. 
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Citing the authority of Peter Lombard Pascal sets out to 
absolve God from any responsibility for the damnation of 
those left in this mass, appealing to the occult nature of 
the divine justice, by which He can justly withhold the 
divine mercy. This divine justice is of a different order 
from the human conception of justice and is therefore incom-
prehensib1e and mysterious . 
... net i1 est dit qu'i1 1es endurcit, non pas qu l i1 
1es pousse a pecher, mais qu'i1 nlen prend pas 
pitie, et i1 ne prend pas pitie de ceux auxque1s 
i1 a juge de ne donner point sa grace par une 
justice tres occu1te et tres e10ignee du sens 
humain, laquel1e l'Apotre ne nous [dit] pas, 
mais qu'i1 a admiree quand il s'ecrit: 0 Altitudo 
etc"SO. 
As Wi11iams 51 indicates elsewhere the Augustinian 
conception of God in the doctrine of Predestination reflects 
"the influence exerted upon his convictions by the less 
52 
admirable traits of his own character", for as F.R. Tennant 
concludes, "it bespeaks divine parsimony when there appears 
to be no conceivable reason why the gift should not be 
bestowed universally". Two things emerge from Pascal's 
dialectical proof of Augustinian orthodoxy. The first is 
his unconscious recognition of the validity of reason as 
arbiter of religious truth53 when he himse1f·condernns 
the Calvinist doctrine of Predestination as unacceptable on 
moral grounds, acknowledging thereby an ana1alogical 
relation between human justice and divine justice which, 
as has already been pointed out, he nevertheless brands 
incomprehensible and hidden. The second is his insistence 
upon rejecting Mo1inism with the moral accountability it 
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implies, and upon attempting to make Augustinianism accept-
able in spite of its immoral determinism, underlining the 
non-rational ground of his doctrine, the unshakeable 
conviction of divine omnipotence and human weakness borne 
out for Augustine and Pascal and other "twice-born" 
individuals by their own experience. These coexistent 
assumptions at different levels of consciousness appear to 
account for the inconsistencies and irrationalities which 
occur throughout his work. 
In the second Ecrit Pascal elaborates further upon 
this theme of a closed list of elect in his exegesis of the 
apparently contradictory Pauline text "Who will have all 
men to be saved" [1 Tim. II, 4 ] , twisting the meaning into 
a semblance of conformity with the Augustinian teaching on 
election . "Tous" becomes, 
... un nombre d'hommes de tout sexe, ages, conditions, 
complexions, de tous les pays, de tous les temps, 
et en fin de toutes sortes54 . 
He exploits the possibilities of meaning in the word "tous", 
in order to avoid any inconsistency with Scriptural 
authority, interpreting it in a limited collective sense to 
denote simply the totality of the disparate group which 
comprises the elect, and applicable in a similar way to the 
"delaisses". Thus, while both groups are designated a 
"totalite", the elect, Pascal affirms, are always few in 
number while the damned are always many. This dubious 
form of linguistic analysis, or perhaps "verbal jugglery,,55, 
whereby the natural meaning of the word is assumed to 
confer an Augustinian interpretation to any statement, 
becomes an invaluable tool in the hands of Pascal in the 
third and fourth Ecrits. 
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Augustinian Doctrine of Grace: Pre-Fall Adam 
In the second Ecrit Pascal gives a succinct exposition 
of the three doctrines, underlining the differences and 
similarities which the Molinist and Calvinist systems bore 
to that of Augustine, explaining in greater detail the 
catastrophic consequences of the Fall for mankind, and the 
nature and modus operandi of the graces given to Adam in 
the pre- and post-Fall states. In addition to all the 
surpassing physical, moral and intellectual gifts with 
which Adam was endowed in the state of righteousness, 
together with a nature in a perfect state of harmony and 
a will indifferent to good and evil, God had created Adam 
with a desire for beatitude, which could find satisfaction 
only in the supernatural good. 
Desirant sa beatitude, et ne pouvant ne pas la 
desirer56 . 
In spite of his superior gifts, however, Adam was 
incapable of observing the commandments without the addition 
of a special help from God. Having set Adam a supernatural 
goal, God in justice had to grant him the grace necessary 
to enable him to persevere in goodness and attain that end. 
Pascal points out that Adam could not have been held morally 
responsible for his transgression if he had not been granted 
this help, though Pascal does emphasize that the measure 
of this grace was the bare minimum required for him to 
fulfil the precepts and persevere in justice 
... outre 1aque1le aucune autre n'etait necessaire 
pour accomplir les preceptes et demeurer dans la 
justice57 . 
This "sufficient" grace was placed under the control of 
Adam's will, to render it efficacious or not according to 
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the good or bad use he made of it. Clearly the efficacity 
of Adam's grace is dependent upon the direction of his will 
towards the good, or God, while perseveranoe.ibowards. 
the supernatural goal is conditional upon acknowledging a 
continuous radical dependence upon his Creator. If Adam 
had persisted in the right exercise of his will, he would 
not only have merited the glory of the angels, but would 
have passed on to his descendants a similar possibility of 
attaining eternal beatitude. 
The Fall 
Nevertheless, in spite of the fact that Adam's nature 
had no particular bias towards evil, but had only to 
perceive the good in order to be able to move towards it, 
"il n'avait aucun chatouillement au mal, et ... il lui 
suffisait de connaitre Ie bien pour sly pouvoir porter,,58, 
he deliberately succumbed to the temptation of the Devil, 
and rebelled against God to become his own master, turning 
from love of the transcendent good to love of creatures, 
thus heaping upon himself and all mankind with him, the 
catastrophic consequences of this first sin. The pride 
which prompted Adam to seek independence from and equality 
with God, blinded him to the fact that all true beatitude 
must flow from his relationship of dependence upon God, 
and the enormity of his sin lies in his failure to recognize 
this. 
Abandoned by God in the love of creatures as a punish-
ment for his rebellion, Adam immediately became liable to 
physical and spiritual death since he was now cut off from 
the source of grace needed to attain beatitude. Now under 
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the tyranny of concupiscence, his whole nature became 
scarred and vitiated by the corrupting influence of that 
concupiscence. His intellect once "tres fort, tres juste, 
tres eclaire", is now clouded by ignorance, so that his will, 
formerly indifferent to good and evil, is no longer able to 
perceive and choose its true good, and now inevitably 
chooses evil. Furthermore, inasmuch as the whole of the 
human race existed in Adam at the moment of his transgres-
sion, all men sinned in him {"comme un fruit sortant d'une 
mauvaise semence") 59, and therefore justly share in the 
guilt and the consequences, enslavement to ignorance, con-
cupiscence and death. 
Free will 
Yet Pascal goes on to claim, following Augustine 60 , 
that, in spite of this, the free will still retains a flexi-
bility to good and evil, but surely only in a very abstruse 
sense, since the will cannot now even perceive its good, and, 
under the powerful and seductive influence of concupiscence, 
is tricked into believing that its good actually resides in 
evil, which it freely, joyfully and infallibly chooses . 
... maintenant il a une suavite et une delectation 
si puissante dans Ie mal par la concupiscence 
qu'infailliblement il sly porte de lui-meme comme 
a son bien, et qu'il Ie choisit volontairement et 
tres librement et avec joie comme l'objet ou il 
sent sa beatitude 61 . 
The will may technically retain a potentiality for 
choosing the good b~t, under a necessity of sinning, there 
seems no possibility of this choice becoming a reality. 
Since the Fall, in fact, concupiscence inevitably impels 
men to find their satisfaction and happiness in material 
goods rather than in God, the transcendent good and only 
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source of beatitude. As N.P. Williams aptly expresses it, 
"The will of fallen man is free, but in point of fact it 
always freely chooses evil under the overwhelming influence 
62 
of concupiscence, or of the devil's power" • 
The Grace of Redemption 
Pascal outlines in detail the nature and operation of 
the grace merited by Christ's death for the redemption of 
the elect. In view of the enormity of Adam's transgression 
and the corruption wrought upon human nature by concupis-
cence, it is not surprising that a very powerful help,is 
required to pluck the elect from the "masse corrompue", and 
bring them to salvation. Pascal underlines this, 
Et Ie peche d'Adam transmis a toute sa posterite 
est si enorme qu'encore qu'on n'en puisse 
concevoir la grandeur, il suffit de dire qu'il 
a fallu, pour l'expier, qu'un Dieu se soit inc arne 
et qu'il ait souffert jusqu'a la mort pour faire 
entendre la grandeur du mal en Ie mesurant a la 
grandeur du remede 63 . 
The sufficiency of the grace given to Adam before the 
Fall bears no relation to that required by the elect, for, 
whereas Adam's grace allowed him to persevere in the good 
if he had so wished, since election is now the effect 
purely of God's infallible decree, the grace given to 
fallen man must be wholly efficacious, in fact the gift of 
perseverance itself. It must be immeasurably stronger in 
view of the double function it is required to perform: 
first, healing the will of the effects of the Fall; and 
secondly, moving the will infallibly to choose and persevere 
in the good. Pascal describes it as "la grAce medicinale",: 
since it heals and restores freedom to the will by enabling 
it to substitute good choices for the evil ones towards 
which it is inevitably determined by concupiscence since 
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the Fall. Grace acts upon the will as "une suavit6 et une 
d61ectation dans la loi de Dieu", charming the will with 
the promise of sweetness and pleasures greater than those 
offered by concupiscence. The language which Pascal uses 
to describe the action of grace is, in effect, identical to 
that used of concupiscence {"une suavit6 et une d61ectation 
si puissante dans Ie mall!) , the difference between them 
residing only in the degree of power exerted by the stronger 
attraction in the seduction of the will . 
... la grace de J6sus-Christ, qui n'est autre chose 
qulune suavit6 et une d61ectation dans la loi 
de Dieu, r6pandue dans Ie coeur par Ie Saint-
Esprit, qui non seulement 6galant, mais surpas-
sant encore la concupiscence de la chair, remplit 
la volont6 d'une plus grande d61ectation dans Ie 
bien, que la concupiscence ne lui en offre dans 
Ie mal, et qu'ainsi Ie libre arbitre, charm6 par 
les douceurs et par les plaisirs que Ie Saint-
Esprit lui inspire, plus que par les attraits du 
p6ch6, choisit infailliblement lui-meme la loi de 
Dieu par cette seule raison qu'il y trouve plus 
de satisfaction et qu'il y sent sa b6atitude et 
sa f61icit6 64 . 
Grace, therefore, is a love of the good, shed in the 
heart of the elect by the action of the Holy Spirit, 
infallibly drawing the will to turn from the love of 
creatures to the love of God. This corresponds to the 
Augustinian definition of grace, as H. Rashdall has it, as 
"a divine influence upon the soul without which it is 
incapable of the smallest good action,,65 He adds that in 
Augustine "justification" meant a "making righteous" and 
not merely a "declaring righteous" as in St. Paul, and 
Pascal insists that it is the infallible efficacity of this 
grace which is of prime importance, and not the way in which 
it influences the will to achieve the end result. 
Et clest pourquoi on dit indiff6remment ou que Ie 
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libre arbitre s'y porte de soi-meme par le moyen 
de cette grace, parce qu'en effet il s'y porte, 
ou que cette grace y porte le libre arbitre, 
parce que toutes les fois qu'elle est donnee, 
le libre arbitre s'y porte infailliblement66 . 
Every step in the process of redemption is the work of 
this efficacious grace: the reorientation of the will from 
evil to good; the choice and performance of every good 
action by which the elect merit salvation; and perseverance 
itself. Yet Pascal insists upon the positive contribution 
of the fre~'tlll not only in meriting glory, 
... par leur pro pre choix et le mouvement de leur libre 
arbitre qui s'yest porte de soi-meme volontairement 
et librement 
but also in meriting damnation or, 
... lq mort eternelle, puisqu'ils ont choisi le mal 
par leur pro pre et libre volonte 67 
For the will to be deemed free in the Augustinian sense it 
would appear to need only the freedom to choose spontaneously, 
free from any external constraint, but always in accord with 
't 't 'd 't' 68 A N P W'll' '1 1 S ln erlor etermlna lon . s . . 1 lams succlnct y 
expresses the Augustinian view of free will, "We are free to 
do what we like, but we are not free to like what we ought 
to like,,69, and elsewhere, "no liberty can resist His plans, 
though liberty retains always the power of damning itself,,70. 
The will is, in fact, the opposite of "free~ in the sense of 
having the freedom of indetermination enjoyed by Adam in 
the paradisal state. 
Pascal concedes that the Molinists are in agreement 
with St. Augustine on the conditional will of God for man 
at creation, the nature of Adam, and the reason for his fall, 
but he maintains they fail to take account of the effect of 
the Fallon the attitude of God. They believe that God's 
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justice would be destroyed, unless He offered all men after 
the Fall the grace needed to redeem themselves; that it 
would be immoral of God to discern the elect from the damned 
without prevision of merit; and that the free will of man 
would be destroyed if God's precepts were accomplished by 
the agency of efficacious grace. God's will for man after 
the Fall was, then, still conditional upon the choice of 
the good by Adam's freewill, and by the good use of the 
grace offered to it. Because of the effects of concupiscence 
and ignorance a stronger grace was now required, and Christ 
died to merit this and make it available to all ("sans 
exception d'un seul") 71 throughout their lives. This grace 
(llgenerale et suffisante") 72 is sufficient to prompt belief 
in God and prayers for his assistance, and if used well 
elicits from God further graces, called either sufficient 
or efficacious, which enable men to perform good actions 
and merit salvation, while those who reject the initial 
grace remain in the "masse corrompue". Pascal claims that, 
in their desire to preserve the justice of God, the 
Molinists have denied His omnipotence and made salvation 
and damnation subject to the will of man 73 . 
The Calvinists also failed to take account of the two 
states of man, Pascal emphasizes, but their doctrine bears 
no relation at all to that of Augustine. God's will for 
man ("la plus noble de ses creatures") at Creation was an 
unambiguous intention to save some and damn others, the 
purpose of this decree being simply to demonstrate his 
omnipotence. However morally unacceptable that may appear, 
it is the Calvinist claim, Pascal implies, that anything 
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which enhances God's glory must be just. God's justice 
required, nevertheless, that He could not do this without 
prevision of merit or sin, and He therefore did not 
merely permit, but actually decreed the sin of Adam, ren-
dering him and all men liable to eternal death and com-
pletely destroying his freewill, so that it had no flexi-
bility to good, even with the help of efficacious grace. 
Pascal underlines the fact that sin was passed on to Adam's 
posterity, not as the natural consequence of his free fall, 
but by the will of God. 
Que le peche d'Adam s'est communique a toute sa 
posterite non pas naturellement, comme le vice 
d'une semence au fruit qu'elle produit, mais par 
un decret de Dieu ... 74 . 
Christ was born to merit, by his death, the salvation 
only of the elect, and the grace which they are given 
cannot be withdrawn. Since the will was destroyed by the 
Fall, it cannot cooperate with this grace which, in fact, 
takes over its function and performs good actions in its 
place, carrying the will along with it "comme une pierre, 
comme une scie, comme une matiere morte", and "malgre sa 
repugnance". The will itself, capable only of choosing 
evil, merits eternal death, and it is the merits of Christ 
imputed and applied to the elect which bring them salvation. 
Ainsi ceux a qui cette grace est une fois donnee, 
sont infailliblement sauves, non par leurs bonnes 
oeuvres ou bonne volonte, car ils n'en ont aucune, 
mais par les merites de Jesus-Christ qui leur sont 
appliquees . 
... Et ceux a qui cette grace n'est point donnee sont 
infailliblement damnes pour les peches qu'ils 
commettent par l'ordre et decret de Dieu qui les 
y incline pour sa gloire . 
.. . Tous les hommes etant egalement innocents de leur 
part, lorsque Dieu les a discernes 75 . 
123 
In the Augustinian view of grace, then, the will is 
irresistibly but spontaneously drawn towards the good by a 
delectation more powerful than that of concupiscence, 
induced in the heart of the elect by the Holy Spirit. For 
the Molinists grace could be described as a power, placed 
at the disposal of the human will allowing it to advance 
or not, as it pleases, towards salvation. In the Calvinist 
understanding, however, grace suppresses the will, taking 
its place to earn the merit which will be imputed to the 
elect to bring them to salvation. 
The third and fourth Ecrits represent the final step 
in the Augustinian method, namely, proof by way of logical 
demonstration in the interpretation and clarification of 
the content of Revelation, in this instance of the 
apparently ambiguous proposition in Chapter XI of the 
Sixth Session of the Council of Trent, "Que les commande-
ments ne sont pas impossibles aux justes". The Jansenist 76 
denial of a "pouvoir prochain" in the justified, to perse-
vere in the good, was the subject of the first of the five 
condemned propositions and of Arnauld's second Lettre a un 
duc et pair, which precipitated his censure by, and 
threatened expulsion from, the Sorbonne and Pascal's 
writing of the Provinciales. 
The Molinist claim that the Fathers originally 
intended the statement to be understood in a general sense, 
rather than as refuting a particular heresy, and to imply 
"toujours possibles", thereby endorsing their own doctrine, 
posed a serious challenge to the orthodoxy of the Augustin-
ian teaching. 
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In the third Ecrit Pascal defends as orthodox, in 
particular, those aspects of the Augustinian theology 
attacked by the Jesuits in the five propositions taken from 
Jansen's Augustinus, and alleged to be heretical on the 
grounds that they implied a necessity of sinning in the 
Lutheran sense. Having already dealt, in the first two 
Ecrits, with the question of predestination and the semi-
Pelagian error that Christ died for all men without excep-
tion, the points now in question are: that the righteous 
do not always have the grace to perform good actions; that 
grace is irresistible, efficacious and absolutely necessary 
for every step in the process of redemption, and that, 
since the Fall, the will no longer has a freedom of indif-
ference but freedom only from constraint. 
Perseverance 
As in the first Ecrit, Pascal leads the reader from 
an unauthorized and extreme stance to the balanced orthodoxy 
of Augustinianism, undertaking on the Church's behalf the 
task of clarifying those passages of Scripture, the Fathers 
and the Council of Trent which have been wrongly interpreted, 
and pointing out to the Jesuits the error of their ways. 
Elle [the Church] sait, que, pour les Molinistes, 
il suffit qu'elle parle par la bouche de ses 
papes et de ses Conciles, que la tradition de 
l'Eglise leur est en veneration, qu'ils n'entre-
prennent pas de donner aux paroles de l'Ecriture 
des interpretations particuli~res, et qu'ils 
ont dessein de suivre celles que la foule et la 
suite de ses saints docteurs et de ses papes et 
de ses Conciles y ont donnees 77 . 
The tone he adopts towards his correspondent is con-
ciliatory and persuasive, assuming with him, that, on the 
face of it, the Molinist interpretation, 
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... que Ie juste, considere en un instant de sa justice, 
a toujours Ie pouvoir prochain d'accomplir les 
d t d 1 ,· t t . t 78 cornman emen sans lns an SUlvan, .... 
does, in fact, appear at first glance to be the more natural 
one. But Pascal then goes on to demonstrate that "l'autre 
sens qui ne s'offre pas avec tant de promptitude", 
... que Ie juste agissant comme juste et par un 
mouvement de charite, peut accomplir les commande-
ments dans l'action qu'il fait par charite79 . 
is, nevertheless, that intended by the Council. Pascal 
insists that, however unbelievable it may seem, the need 
for the Council to feel obliged to state such a self-evident 
truth, is clear when the Lutheranheresy is recalled. Then 
it will be apparent that the statement in question was 
intended simply to refute the Lutheran error, namely, that 
the actions of the righteous, even under grace, are always 
sins. The mistaken inference drawn from it by the 
Molinists, has now placed the Church in the position of 
fighting two heresies. The Council, therefore, opposed 
the Lutheranerror in Canons 18 and 25 of Chapter XI, simply 
affirming the possibility of the commandments under grace, 
without implying any ability to persevere in righteousness. 
It opposed the Molinist error in Canons 16 and 22 of 
Chapter XIII, condemning as anathema the claim that the 
justified can persevere in righteousness without a special 
help and therefore that it is not common to all. This was 
particularly directed at the Molinist teaching that, after 
the Fall, God gave all men "une grace suffisante seulement 
pour croire en Dieu et pour prier Dieu de les aider", with 
the promise of further graces always available in response 
to prayer. 
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Pascal rejects, out of hand, the possibility of a 
"pouvoir prochain" implied by Chapter XI and insists on an 
Augustinian sense. 
Ainsi son objet, dans ce Chapitre XI est seulement 
de faire voir que le juste agissant par l'amour de 
Dieu peut faire des oeuvres exemptes de peche; 
et qu'ainsi il peut observer les commandements, 
s'il agit par charite, et non pas qu'il a toujours 
le pouvoir pro chain de cons~rver cette charite 
qui les rend possibles 80 . 
Pascal affirms that a special help is needed, not only for 
"la perseverance actuelle", i. e. each individual act of 
goodness, but also for the ability to persevere in goodness, 
which is simply the continuation of individual acts of 
goodness . 
... puisque perseverer n'est autre chose qu'accomplir 
les commandements dans les instants suivants ... 81 
By a series of inferences drawn from Canon 22, Pascal 
enters upon a vindication of the Augustinian teaching on the 
question of perseverance. He urges his correspondent, first 
of all, to examine the whole of Chapter XI for proof that 
the words are intended to apply only to present acts of the 
justified, when they are actually under grace, with no 
suggestion that this possibility should have validity for 
the future . 
... car il est bien dit que ceux qui aiment Jesus-
Christ au temps present observent ses commande-
ments dans le meme temps present ou ils 
l'aiment, mais non pas qu'ils auront le pouvoir 
de les garder a l'avenir. 
Furthermore, it would even appear, Pascal claims, that 
the Council, anticipating possible abuse of its pronounce-
ment, added in Canon 18 the qualification, "et qui est 
constitue sous la grace", "afin qu'on ne put pas croire 
qu'il parlat de cette possibilite pelagienne,,83, something 
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it would do only to make its intention and meaning clear 
and unequivocal, since the canons are always expressed in 
the briefest terms. The words themselves are from the 
works of Augustine, who is named as source in the text, 
and they would, therefore, certainly not have a meaning con-
trary to that intended by him, which was to emphasize 
specifically the need to receive grace in order to keep the 
commandments. 
Canon 22 also necessarily refutes the Molinist view 
that the justified always have the "pouvoir prochain" to 
persevere in prayer, since there can be no difference between 
persevering in prayer and persevering in justice, as the 
Scriptures assure us of obtaining infallibly the justice 
necessary for salvation if we ask for it through the spirit 
of grace. Their view is, therefore, contrary to the 
decision of the canon. Clearly prayer itself is the grace 
by which perseverance is possible, the "secours special" , 
of Canon 22 . 
... et qU'ainsi, si tous les justes ont Ie pouvoir 
prochain de perseverer a prier, ils ont aussi 
tous Ie pouvoir prochain de perseverer dans la 
justice, qui ne peut etre refusee a leur priere? 
Cequi est formellement contra ire a la decision 
du canon 84 
It is thus, Pascal argues, clearly untrue to say that God 
never leaves the justified without the "pouvoir prochain" 
to persevere in prayer, and therefore in justice, for the 
Council expressly states that the righteous have neither 
perseverance itself, nor the power to persevere without a 
special help from God, and that, therefore, it is not 
common to all men. 
128 
Double Delaissement des Justes 
From this chain of inferences Pascal, following 
Augustine, deduces the theory of the "Double Delaissement 
85 des Justes" ,that while it is true in one sense that God 
never abandons the justified, if He is not first abandoned, 
i.e. that God never refuses grace to those who ask for it 
in prayer, it is nevertheless true in another sense that 
God does sometimes leave the justified before they have 
left Him. In other words, God does sometimes withhold the 
grace to persevere in prayer, and Pascal again appeals to 
the evidence of human experience for incontestable proof 
that many of the justified do not, in fact, persevere in 
goodness and are, therefore, clearly abandoned by God . 
... ne paralt-il pas qu'il y a des justes que Dieu 
laisse sans ce pouvoir pendant qu'ils sont encore 
justes, 86 
In Pascal's view, this surely precludes the possibility 
that, at their justification, they receive the "pouvoir 
prochain" to persevere. In an extraordinary passage Pascal 
claims to have reconciled the Augustinian teaching, con-
demned in the five propositions - that the commandments are 
possible to the justified only under grace which is some-
times withheld by God - with the proposition of the Council 
of Trent. 
D'ou nous concluons donc que, suivant le Concile, 
les commandements sont toujours possibles aux 
justes en un sens; et qu'en un autre sens, les 
commandements sont quelquefois impossibles aux 
justes; que Dieu ne laisse jamais le juste, 
s'il ne le quitte, et qu'en un autre sens, Dieu 
laisse quelquefois le juste le premier, et qu'il 
faut etre ou bien aveugle ou bien peu sincere, 
pour trouver de la contradiction dans ces propo-
sitions qui subsistent si facilement ensemble, 
puisque ce n'est autre chose que dire que les 
commandemen-ts sont toujours possibles a la 
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charite, que tous les justes n'ont pas toujours 
Ie pouvoir de perseverer: ce qui n'est point 
contradictoirei et que Dieu ne refuse jamais 
ce qu'on lui demande bien dans la priere, et 
que Dieu ne donne pas toujours la perseverance 
dans la priere: ce qui n'est en aucune sorte 
contradictoire 87 . 
Pascal's transparent attempt to explain away the para-
doxical character of this argument - "les propositions qui 
sont contradictoires dans les paroles, ne Ie sont pas 
toujours dans Ie sens,,88 - is an illuminating instance of 
the way he allows the assumed correctness of the Augustin-
ian interpretation to dominate his thought. 
The apparent contradictions are both reconciled and 
explained, Pascal affirms, by the fact that each step in 
the process of salvation involves participation by both 
man and God; that there are two types of perseverance to 
be considered, one in prayer and one in charity. 
II ne faut que remarquer qu'il y a deux manieres 
dont l'homrne recherche Dieu; deux manieres dont 
Dieu recherche l'homrne; deux manieres dont Dieu 
quitte l'homrne; deux dont l'homrne quitte Dieu; 
deux dont l'homrne persevere; deux dont Dieu 
persevere a lui faire du bien, et ainsi du 
reste 89 . 
God initiates the redemptive process by giving man the 
first grace, "les faibles commencements du foil! so that he 
will cry out to God and receive in response the grace 
necessary to break the bonds of concupiscence and begin to 
move towards his supernatural goal. Up to this point 
Molinists and Augustinians agree. It is on the question 
of perseverance that they differ, because, Pascal explains, 
instead of viewing the redemptive process as a succession 
of individual acts, linked by cause and effect, the 
Molinists wrongly view it as a whole. Both man and God 
are operative in this chain of actions but, as St. Thomas 
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stated, the whole must be attributed only to the divine will • 
... la grace est donnee pour meriter la gloire et 
que la gloire est donnee parce qu'on l'a meritee 
par la grace: mais le don de la gloire et de 
la grace ensemble en commun n'a aucune cause que 
la volonte divine 90 . 
Pascal further bolsters his interpretation of the pro-
position by citing other passages from Augustine, many of 
them referring to Scripture, which appear to have both a 
semi-Pelagian and Augustinian interpretation, and must be 
clarified in the light of others from Augustine's work 
which are univocal. Thus the proposition "il est en notre 
pouvoir de garder les commandements", must be explained by 
another, "c'est Dieu qui opere Ie vouloir et l'action, 
suivant son bon plaisir". Similarly, "Dieu veut que tous 
les hommes soient sauves" must be elucidated by "tous les 
hommes ne sont pas sauves, non parce qu'ils ne le veulent 
pas, mais parce que Dieu ne veut pas". Pascal concludes 
triumphantly, that these univocal expressions of Augustine, 
"par un merveilleux avantage pour sa doctrine,,91, neces-
sarily cancel out any Semi-Pelagian interpretation of 
Scripture, used to support the Semi-Pelagian doctrine, and 
therefore endorse as orthodox that of Augustine. 
In order to demonstrate that the commandments are 
possible to men only if the will is empowered by grace, 
Pascal explores the meanings implied by the word "puissance", 
which, he says, includes "toutes 1es opinions". The whole 
of this section rests upon the Augustinian conception of the 
will, as essentially a love or attraction in which it 
delights freely, reason simply following its choice and 
t ' 1" 92, l' k th S h 1 t' , f h ' 11 ra lona lZlng lt, un 1 e e c 0 as lC vlew 0 t e Wl 
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as determined by the choice of reason When we talk of 
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something as being "en notre puissance", which is the 
natural way of speaking, it follows, in Pascal's view, 
that we normally mean we do something when we will to do so. 
In this sense it is in our power to keep the commandments 
and to change our wills, for as soon as we will a thing, 
not only does it happen, but, in fact, it must happen. 
If, however, we say that a thing is "en notre pouvoir", a 
power which is "prochain", the word with which "pouvoir" 
is naturally linked, then we will have this power only if 
it is given by God, so that the proposition of St. Augustine 
"Les commandements sont possibles aux justes" is Catholic 
in the first meaning and Pelagian in the second. 
A G 'l 94, 1 f " S 1 son p01nts out, ove or August1ne 1S essen-
tially active, and grace confers on the will the ability to 
will and carry out the good. Clearly for Pascal grace 
which is present, but inactive, is a contradiction in terms. 
Since we accomplish only those desires which the will 
actually follows, for the will to turn to the good, it must, 
Pascal states, be prepared by God, so that it has the power 
to will the good actions which were formerly impossible. 
"II est en notre puissance de m~riter ou la 
r~compense ou la peine; car rien nlest en 
notre puissance, que ce qui suit notre volonte, 
laquelle lorsque Dieu la prepare forte et 
puissante, la meme bonne action devient facile, 
qui etait difficile et meme impossible au-
paravant,,95. 
In the fourth Ecrit, Pascal further pursues the possi-
bilities of linguistic analysis to demonstrate that the 
potential within the will for choosing the good, can only 
be realized in action if the will is healed and empowered 
by grace. He examines the relation between lila possibilite" 
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and IIle pouvoirll, claiming that whilst such a relation can 
be present, it is far from being either general or necessary, 
citing as an example of the first possibility, 
Ainsi il est possible qu'un homme sain et libre 
coure quand il lui plait, et il est aussi en son 
pouvoir de le faire. 
and of the second, where ·the relationship is neither neces-
sary or continuous, 
Mais on sait aussi qu'il est possible qu'un homme 
vive soixante ans, et que cependant il n'est au 
pouvoir de personne, non seulement d'arrivera 
cet age, mais de s'assurer d'un instant seulement 96 • 
Thus, although it is within the power of a healthy, free 
man to run where he wills, the same cannot be said of that 
same man in chains, since his freedom, the breaking of his 
chains, though possible, does not depend on him. 
Circumstances, then, may prevent the accomplishment of 
an act, and Pascal provides a rule to determine when, in 
fact, the relationship between possibility and power does 
occur. 
Toutes les fois que la cause par laquelle un effet 
est possible est presente et soumise au sujet ou 
il doit etre produit, il y a relation de la pos-
sibilite au pouvoir; c'est-a-dire que l'effet 
est au pouvoir de ce sujet, et non pas autrement 91 . 
Clearly, infidels, uninstructed in the faith, or the justi-
fied who have been deprived of the grace to pray have not 
the power to keep the commandments; but, Pascal states, 
according to this rule, that always remains possible, since 
man's will is the immediate cause of the observation of the 
commandments. This, however, is explained by the fact that 
another, dominant cause, the will of God, must be present 
to empower man's will. Pascal concludes this contrived and 
specious proof, 
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De sorte que cette cause premiere et principale 
n'etant pas residente dans l'homme, mais dans 
Dieu, ni dependante de l'homme, mais de Dieu, il 
est manifeste, en ce sens, que l'observation des 
commandements n'est pas toujours au pouvoir des 
hommes 98 . 
Similarly, whilst it is possible for a man to be of the 
elect, or to sin, or to die at any moment, it is absolutely 
"incompossible", in Thomas' view, Pascal tells us, for a 
man predestined to salvation to be killed in a state of 
mortal sin. 
Salvation, therefore, is possible only when the chains 
of concupiscence have been broken by the power of grace, 
but even then this grace must be so efficacious that it 
not only shows us our duty, but supplies the will with the 
strength to perform it, for just as the eye with no interior 
indisposition needs light in order to see, so the soul of 
the justified man, which is no longer bound by the passions, 
needs the "secours actuels" in order to love God. Pascal 
comforts the justified who fail to receive from God this 
additional grace needed to perform the good, alleging that 
what they have received is better than none at all, just as 
a little light is better than darkness to the man whose eyes 
are enfeebled by sickness. 
Et ainsi un homme, quelque juste qu'il soit, s'il 
n'est aide d'une grace assez puissante, ou pour 
user des termes du Concile, "d'une secours special 
de Dieu", il est veritable selon Ie meme Concile, 
qu'il n'a pas Ie pouvoir de perseverer, parce 
qu'encore qu'il ait Ie pouvoir dans les divers 
sens qui en sont expliques, il n'en a pas neanmoins 
Ie pouvoir plein et entier auquel il ne manque rien 
de la part de Dieu pour agir ... 99 
Pascal's insistence here upon the absolute sovereignty of 
God's will over all human willing, and upon salvation as 
subject to the arbitrary dispensation of this efficacious 
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grace, bring the Augustinian doctrine very close to that of 
Calvin. The theory of the "Double Delaissement des Justes", 
is clearly an attempt to mitigate the harsh implications for 
the image of God, inherent in the doctrine that a just and 
loving Father withholds from the righteous either temporarily 
or permanently, and for no apparent reason, -the grace neces-
sary to persevere in justice, by attributing at least some 
part of the responsibility to man. By introducing these two 
types of perseverance, and insisting that salvation can be 
achieved only with the cooperation of man, Pascal attempts 
to explain away a serious inconsistency in the Augustinian 
system, implied by the mutually exclusive conceptions of 
arbitrary election and efficacious grace on the one hand, 
and freewill and merit on the other, which if not reconciled, 
h d ' 'f C 1 ' , 100 expose t e octrlne to accusatlons 0 a Vlnlsm . 
Pascal can resort only, in the final analysis, to the 
mystery inherent in all divine operations, claiming that, 
whilst there is nothing mysterious in the fact that God 
should abandon the man who has first left Him, yet that God 
should initiate this chain of events is "tout mysterieux 
et incomprehensible". For a precedent he again appeals to 
Augustine, who, he claims, treated this question with 
equal "nettete" when speaking of the abandonment of the 
justified, "car ils ont ete abandonnes A leur liberal 
b 't ' , 'h,,,101 ar 1 re par un Jugement Juste, malS cac e . The fact 
that God should first leave man can be understood only in 
terms of an occult justice, clearly incomprehensible and 
of a different order, and which should not therefore be 
enquired into, since "ce qui est d'une si grande force, que 
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. 1 l' , / ,,102 Je vous a alsse a exagerer That God should subse-
quently abandon the man who has been forced to abandon Him, 
however, is quite explicable in terms of human justice! 
The mystery of this abandonment by God is dissolved, Pascal 
affirms with Augustine, by the consideration that God is not 
morally obliged to give to the justified any grace apart 
from that due to Adam in Paradise and 
... pourvu qulil lui donne Ie secours qui etait suf-
fisant a sa premiere condition, rien ne doit 
llengager a lui donner tout ce qui lui est neces-
saire dans la corruption ou il slest precipite l03 . 
God owes the gift of prayer only to the elect, "aux enfants 
104 de la promesse" ,to whom He has promised it as an act of 
pure mercy. 
The question of predestination then, involves a mystery, 
and the final state of man must remain the impenetrable 
secret of a hidden God who is transcendent and "wholly other". 
The abandonment of the justified, serves therefore, as a 
reminder of the attitude of humility and dependence which 
God demands of the faithful, and Pascal cites the Augustinian 
view that that abandonment was "permitted" in order to teach 
the elect to hope only in God. 
" ... Dieu par sa permission, ou par sa providence et 
par sa disposition, mele parmi les elus des justes 
qui ne doivent pas perseverer, afin de tenir dans 
la crainte ceux qui demeurent, par la chute de ceux 
qui tombent,,105 
The absence of this delectation for the good, Pascal states, 
is clearly proved by experience and affirmed by the fact 
that even the saints were healed of some vices only late in: 
their lives, to remind them of the need for humble depend-
ence. He insists that it would be an impertinence, against 
the omnipotence of God to assert that the justified have a 
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"pouvoir prochain", which allows them to abandon God before 
H "1' 1'" ",,106, "1 e es alt un peu alsses a eux-memes , slnce, a 
qualite essentielle de prochain est telle qu'elle met 
l'homme dans une [certitude] absolue de la reduction en 
t ,,107 ac e . Anyway, there are clearly millions for whom this 
is not the case . 
... il est moralement impossible qu'entre tant de mil-
liers d'hommes qui ont ce pouvoir prochain, il 
nly en aurait au moins un qui le reduise en 
acte ... 10B • 
Pascal indicates109 that the "pouvoir prochain" of the 
Molinists cannot be equated to the "sufficient" grace of 
the Thomists which they themselves admit will never be 
"reduite en acte". The sufficient grace in the Thomist 
scheme merely indicated the sufficiency of Christ's death 
for the salvation of all men, since the doctrine of God's 
will to universal salvation had by then been accepted by 
the Church. God, in fact, saves only those who receive 
efficacious grace, and it is these antecedent and consequent 
willings of God which are the basis of the distinction 
b t ff ' , t d ff" 110 e ween su lClen an e lcaClOUS grace 
If man, by his misuse of grace, and not God, were 
'bl f th' f 11 l't Id d t 111 responsl e or lS a, wou engen er no error in 
the hearts of the elect, since grace is still available to 
them, and the mystery of election would be destroyed. The 
withdrawal of grace is a clear indication that perseverance 
is never assured and that, therefore, fear of abandonment, 
and hope of a continuance of grace, must always coexist 
even in the most saintly. Pascal points out that, according 
to the new doctrines of the Molinists, the fear and hope of 
which St. Paul speaks in the passage, "Operez votre salut 
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avec crainte", relates only to their good or bad use of 
grace, whereas the apostle intended it to remind them of 
their dependence upon God's absolute sovereignty in the 
dispensation of grace . 
... c'est Dieu qui opere lui-meme en nous ce vouloir, 
et il opere ce vouloir, non pas suivant la 
disposition de notre volonte, mais suivant sa 
propre volonte l12 
Pascal dismisses as absurd the suggestion that the 
justified should pray for the gift of perseverance itself, 
for it consists of a series of actual graces in response to 
, d' 'd 1 113 ln lVl ua prayers . 
... c'est jouer des paroles. 
qui demandent, et non pas 
et c'est pourquoi il faut 
bt ' 114 pour 0 enlr; ... . 
Car Dieu donne a ceux 
a ceux qui ont demande 
perseverer a demander, 
Fear and hope, therefore, are essential since a 
justified man may fall at any moment, or a sinner be raised, 
and Pascal cites as examples the abandonment of St. Peter 
without grace and the conversion of the robber on the Cross. 
The justified must always stand humbly before God, as a 
beggar . 
... tous les hommes doivent toujours s'humilier sous 
la main de Dieu en qualite de pauvres et dire comme 
David (Ps XXXIX, 18): 
"Seigneur, je suis pauvre et mendiant,,115. 
Although, Pascal points out, King David was rich in worldly 
goods and in supernatural grace, his poverty consisted in 
his inability to be assured of beatitude, which depended 
wholly on the mercy of God, who might withdraw it at any 
moment. 
Free will in Fallen Man 
In the third Ecrit Pascal discusses more fully the 
question of freewill as it existed in man after the Fall. 
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The need for a wholly efficacious grace after the Fall is 
due to the fact that God no longer wished man to have the 
freedom of indifference of Adam's will . 
... mais Dieu veuille qu'il n'appartienne plus quia 
sa seule grace et que nous nous approchions de 
lui, et que nous ne nous en eloignions point l16 : 
Adam's will enjoyed this freedom of indifference because it 
was not drawn by any concupiscence but was "entierement 
libre et degage", to use the grace offered by God and to 
remain in justice, or not, as Adam pleased. Since the Fall 
concupiscence has made Adam the slave of sin, and only a 
more powerful delectation will deliver him and make him the 
slave of justice. Pascal follows the Augustinian conception 
of freewill based upon a literal interpretation of the 
Pauline imagery, taken from the Roman law of slavery in 
Romans (VI~ 17, 18), where man is either the slave of sin or 
the slave of righteousness, and either freely sins or freely 
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chooses the good . That the will is determined by the 
stronger delectation is clearly proved both by common sense 
and Augustine, in Pascal's view, since it is self-evident 
that one always does, and therefore always wills what is 
t I .. 118 mos p easlng . Even if the will appears occasionally to 
choose a lesser good, that is only due to the fact that 
demonstrating its power is more pleasing to it than the good 
it has forfeited, "etant impossible qu'elle veuille autre 
chose que ce qu'il lui plait de vouloir". Pascal, in support 
of his view, appeals again to the authority of Augustine, 
"Quod amplius delectat, secundum id operemur necesse est,,119. 
In answering the objection that, faced with two equal 
delectations, the will must recover the "indifference 
139 
prochaine aux opposites" of Adam, Pascal refutes any 
suggestion that the will of fallen man is capable, even 
, 
with the help of grace, of this state of detached equili-
brium. The will would simply be paralysed since it moves 
only in response to the stronger delectation. 
Car comment ferait-il un choix entre deux delec-
tations egales, lui qui ne veut maintenant que 
ce qui le delecte le plus?120. 
Pascal illustrates this governance of the will by the 
metaphors of a man called from both sides by two friends, 
or restrained by each from moving by chains of equal 
length. If one of the chains were longer, however, he must 
infallibly follow the greater force drawing him. So man's 
will since the Fall is, 
... hors d'etat de se porter aDieu, si ce n'est que 
le lien de sa grace le tirant avec plus de force, 
rompe ceux de la cupidite121 . 
This does not fully explain the state of the will, Pascal 
explains, since in these illustrations, although the man's 
body is bound, his will can choose to go in the opposite 
direction, whereas in fallen man, the will can choose only 
the greater delectation. The comparison is valid only if 
the chain pulling the man in one direction, also fills the 
will with "un plaisir victorieux qui lui ftt aussi infail-
liblement aimer celui qui l'attire, que sa chaine attire 
122 infailliblement son corps" The will, in other words, 
chooses and follows that in which it sees its happiness to 
reside, and cannot act against that choice. 
Man cannot, therefore, regain the equilibrium of his 
first state by the pull of equal and opposite attractions, 
but only by deliverance from them. Pascal rejects the 
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Molinist suggestion that man can deliver himself from sin 
in this life without the help of, 
... une delectation plus puissante, non pas seulement 
aussi forte, mais plus forte et absolument 
victorieuse ... 123. 
Moreover, Pascal claims, the sufficient grace of the 
Molinists would always need to adapt to the changing attrac-
tions of the will, diminishing or increasing its strength 
according to the power of each attraction, lice qui serait 
monstrueux a la grace", for the dispensation of God's grace 
would be subject to the direction of a capricious and 
erratic human will. Although Pascal affirms, with Augustine, 
the freedom of the human will, the power is always reserved 
to God of directing its choice by His governance of the 
delectation. He rejects any suggestion of grace as a 
force compelling man to act contrary to his true inclina-
tion, for since willing implies the action itself, his 
desires determine both the movement and goal of the will. 
Original Sin precludes a freedom of indetermination for the 
will and this freedom is not the one with which Pascal is 
concerned. The freedom affirmed by Pascal and Augustine 
can only be effected by the power of a truly efficacious 
grace, substituting the love of God for the love of evil, 
and liberating the elect into the freedom of the children 
of God. 
The Possibility of the Commandments 
Pascal devotes the fourth Ecrit to a logical demonstra-
tion of the fact that, of the two meanings which naturally 
arise from the statement, ilLes commandements ne sont pas 
impossibles aux justes", namely, 
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Qu'il nlest pas impossible que les justes accom-
plissent les commandements. 
and 
Que les commandements sont toujours possibles a 
tous les justes, de ce plein et dernier pouvoir 
auquel il ne manque rien de la part de Dieu 
pour agir124 
the first is the only acceptable meaning from the point of 
view of language and grammar, as well as of the decisions 
of the Councils and Fathers of the Church, who have not 
only upheld it to be the true one but have rejected the 
second. Pascal follows the method for the logical proof 
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of propositions, as set down in De l'Art de Persuader , 
which consists of three steps: the first is to examine 
the terms of the proposition in order to determine the 
meaning which they seem naturally to express; the second, 
to decide which meaning is the correct one in the light of 
the Council's intention; and the third, to establish the 
true doctrine from other passages of the Fathers and 
decisions of the Council. On linguistic and grammatical 
grounds Pascal denies that the proposition implies any but 
the first meaning. His argument is based upon the claim 
that "n'est pas impossible" cannot imply "toujours possible 
du plein et dernier pouvoir", and his proofs for this have 
been disc~ssed in the relation between "la possibilite et 
Ie pouvoir". Pascal adds weight to his logic with a solemn 
warning, to those who interpret the force of the phrase to 
include "toujours", to remember "la malediction qui menace 
ceux qui ajoutent aux paroles du Saint-Esprit", and "que 
Dieu ne punit pas seulement ceux qui font ces choses, mais 
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aussi ceux qui y donnent leur consentement" . 
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with regard to the intention of the Council of Trent, 
Pascal states that the Molinists do not contest the fact that 
it was simply a refutation of the Lutheran heresy, in which 
man is denied the possibility of observing the commandments, 
even with grace. However, they do claim that the same 
cannot be said of this decision found in the Fathers a 
thousand years earlier, for, in this instance, the Church 
had no particular heresy to refute, nor was there any cir-
cumstance to restrict the meaning of the expression, so that 
it can be taken generally and therefore understood in the 
M l OOt 127 o lnlS sense . 
Pascal argues that, although at the time, there was 
not a particular heresy to refute, the Church was obliged 
to deny the accusations of Manicheism continually levelled 
at it by the Pelagians: of denying free1iwill; of maintain-
ing the impossibility of keeping the commandments; and 
that men are under an inevitable necessity of sinning. The 
writings of the Fathers are full of passages, Pascal 
affirms, revealing the outrageous language in which the 
Pelagians, "ces heretiques", accused the Catholics of uphold-
ing this heresy; and in condemning such an error, the 
Church was not fighting a II c himere", or making a general 
statement, but simply refuting those who would impute such 
errors to them128 . 
Ne suffit-il pas qu'une erreur soit veritable, pour 
etre un digne objet de son zele; et pourquoi faut-
il qu'elle soit obligee d'attendre a la condamner 
qu'elle se soit glissee dans Ie coeur de ses 
enfants?129. 
Pascal quotes numerous passages from the Fathers affirming 
the freedom of the will. He lists as chief among them 
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Augustine himself, the author of the doctrine, who, in the 
role of its principal defender, brought "une victoire 
glorieuse" to the Church. 
Pascal concludes from this demonstration that the 
heresy of Luther is simply a recrudescence of Manicheism, 
"que Luther n'a pas inventee, mais renouvelee, 'que les 
commandements sont impossibles absolument,1l130. 
II est donc hors de doute que tout ce que les 
Lutheriens ont ditde la concupiscence etait dit 
mille ans avant leur naissance, par ces anciens 
heretiques, de cette mauvaise nature 131 . 
De sorte que, ne differant que dans les causes, 
et non pas dans l'effet qui est Ie seul dont il 
est question en cette matiere, on peut dire avec 
verite que leurs sentiments sont semblables 
touchant la possibilite, et que les Manicheens 
etaient les Lutheriens de leur temps, comme les 
Lutheriens sont les Manicheens du notre132 . 
In the fourth Ecrit, Pascal claims that it was expressly 
to present the truth on the question of grace, "tout degagee 
d ' 11 133 h h 'I f d es erreurs contralres , t at t e CounCl orme two 
important decisions, affirming in Canon 18 of Chapter XIII, 
the possibility of the commandments under grace, and in 
Canon XXI, the impossibility without grace, thereby refuting 
forever the two opposed errors of Luther and the Pelagians. 
The Molinists, however, have presumed to elude this condemna-
tion by "un artifice ridicule et impie". Since the Council 
did not expressly state whether this grace is always, never, 
or sometimes present, the Molinists have concluded that it 
is never absent. When asked for specific passages from the 
Council which support the doctrine, they have, Pascal states,: 
nothing to offer, and rely for endorsement only upon a 
probability, which itself is inferred from a proposition 
expressly designed to refute their doctrine. Their doctrine 
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is not based on "une verite solide et palpable, mais sur 
le neant, non sur des propositions mais sur une supposition", 
and is accordingly dismissed by Pascal. He suggests, "pour 
A l' b 'l't' d 1 ' ,,134 arreter to ute a valne su tl 1 e e eurs ralsonnements , 
that another possibility be inferred, assuming in this case 
that grace is never present, thus endorsing the Lutheran 
heresy. 
The two decisions of the Council, taken together, 
preclude any such interpretations, he states, for the one 
necessarily negates any inferences drawn from the other. 
The rejection of both errors is necessary if one is to 
arrive at the true doctrine of the Church on the question of 
grace, namely, 
... que Dieu par sa misericorde donne quand il lui 
plalt, aux justes, le pouvoir plein et parfait 
d'accomplir les preceptes, et qu'il ne le donne 
pas toujours, par un jugement juste quoique cache 135 . 
The Augustinian doctrine, Pascal concludes, therefore upholds 
in perfect balance and harmony, the dignity both of God and 
of man, and the contribution each makes in the work of 
Redemption. 
Apprenons par cette doctrine si pure a defendre 
tout ensemble la puissance de la nature contre les 
Lutheriens, et l'impuissance de la nature contre 
les Pelagiens; la force de la grace contre les 
Lutheriens, et la necessite de la grace contre 
les Pelagiens, sans ruiner le libre arbitre par 
la grace, comme les Lutheriens, et sans ruiner la 
grace par le libre arbitre, comme les pelagiens 136 . 
Conclusion 
In the first lines of the Ecrits, Pascal indicates very 
clearly the basic presuppositions about God and man, upon 
which the whole of the Augustinian doctrine is based, namely, 
God's omnipotence, justice, mercy and goodness and man's 
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essential sinfulness, impotence and absolute dependence upon 
God for salvation. It is in the light of all these assump-
tions that his solution to the enigma of the human situation 
must be viewed. Pascal clearly found in the Augustinian 
doctrine of Original Sin a satisfying explanation based upon 
the actual state of man, which accorded well with his own 
view, with his own temperament and with his conversion 
experience. His overwhelmingly pessimistic view of the 
powerlessness of human nature to save itself, without divine 
intervention, is vividly portrayed in the Platonic imagery 
of the man in chains, while his consciousness of the divine 
omnipotence and goodness is clear from the need, which 
informs his writing, to ascribe all salvation to God, as 
"principe" and source of all goodness, and all sin and damna-
tion to man's willing. 
Just as it was necessary for Augustine to affirm the 
freedom of the will against accusations of Manicheism, so, 
for Pascal and the Augustinians of the seventeenth century, 
some semblance of self-determination had to be preserved in 
man, against accusations of Calvinism, and the fully 
developed Augustinian doctrine, in Pascal's view, answered 
the needs of both. By developing the Fall theory, and 
postulating a pre-Fall state of Adam which goes far beyond 
that of Genesis III, Augustine had the perfect formula by 
which to account for the present sinful state of man, the 
introduction of evil into the world by Adam, and the 
apparently arbitrary election and damnation of men by God, 
whilst preserving His omnipotence, love and justice, by 
having Him create Adam in a state of natural righteousness 
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and justice, in the intention that Adam and all men should 
enjoy beatitude. The key to the two states of Adam, to the 
two wills of God for men, and to the two graces given to 
Adam is the supernatural goal, the desire for beatitude, 
written into his nature at creation, together with his 
radical dependence upon God for the ability to achieve this 
goal. The enormity of Adam's sin for Pascal, as for 
Augustine, resided in his denial of this dependence, and 
the vitiation of his present nature with its inescapable 
bias towards evil is thus perfectly explained by Adam's 
turning from the Supreme Good to the love of creatures, a 
crime requiring for its expiation nothing short of the 
incarnation and death of God Himself. 
In the state of original righteousness, and in view of 
his superior endowments~ Adam, because of his finitude, 
needed only a grace sufficient to allow him to achieve his 
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supernatural goal, as healthy eyes need only light to see . 
That grace God was bound by his justice to supply. It is 
with the grace needed for the salvation of the fallen and 
vitiated Adam that Pascal and Augustine are chiefly con-
cerned, however, and, as Hastings Rashdall 138 points out, 
the whole of Augustine's theology is one of Redemption, 
resting upon the twin pillars of the Fall and the death of 
Christ, which he found in the writings of St. Paul (Rom., V, 
12-21 and I Cor.,XV, 2.)~ Augustine, Rashdall argues, 
follows Paul in his belief that, without the Fall, Christ 
would not have died, and for both God's omnipotence demands 
that it is from the death and resurrection of Christ, rather 
than from his life and example, that the grace of salvation 
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flows. Like them, Pascal sees the Atonement as satisfying 
God's justice and meriting the grace of redemption, by which 
the elect can be brought to glory. The Platonism, which led 
Augustine to view goodness as a participation in Divine 
Goodness, and being as a sharing in the being of God, also 
led him to set a similar interpretation upon the words of 
St. Paul "Je vis, non pas moi, mois Jesus-Christ vit en 
moi" , where Paul implies that he is alive only in Christ, 
and that grace as it were divinizes him. For Pascal, as 
for Augustine, justification is the "making good" or 
sanctification of the elect by God, and the evidence of the 
gift of this grace is the resulting good action, for grace 
is always "reduite en acte". 
Pascal does not distinguish explicitly between different 
types of grace in the redemptive process, as all are the 
gratuitous gifts of God's mercy. Redemption is initiated 
by the bestowal of a prevenient grace, by means of which the 
elect pray for and receive deliverance from the power of 
concupiscence, and which is seen as healing the will ("la 
A 'd" 1 ,,)139 grace me lClna e . Thereafter, the elect receive a 
series of graces through which they both desire and perform 
the salutary acts which will merit salvation ("Donc et la 
reception et Ie desir de la grace est l'ouvrage de la grace 
meme,,)140. Pascal describes this salvific work of grace as 
operating by way of an irresistible attraction, a delecta-
tion in the law of God, infused into the heart by the Holy 
Spirit, so that it chooses the good "infailliblement". 
Clearly Pascal shares with Augustine the belief that those 
who have not been brought to baptism, and who are uninstruc-
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ted in the faith are necessarily sinners. ("11 est neces-
saire et inevitable que ceux qui ignorent la justice la 
violent,,)141. 
P 'II' 142 't t b' t l' As N .. Wl lams pOln s ou , ar 1 rary e ectlon 
implies and necessitates an efficacious grace, and it is by 
the distribution of such a grace that God arranges that 
His elect shall end up in glory, since grace ensures both 
perseverance in goodness and death in a state of justice. 
Pascal insists that, after the Fall, God decreed that per-
severance would no longer be subject to the will of Adam, 
but depend solely upon the gratuitous gift of His grace 143 . 
Pascal distinguishes between those called to participate in 
the redemptive process for the good of the elect, and those 
predestined to glory. 
In the "Double Delaissement des Justes", Pascal demon-
strates that it is by the bestowal or withdrawal of the 
ability to pray for help that God arranges the final per-
severance, and the temporary lapse or the abandonment of 
the justified. This represents, therefore, the linchpin of 
the mechanism by which God not only controls the perseverance 
of the justified, but transfers to those who fall away at 
least some of the responsibility for their non-perseverance, 
and further allows the justified a semblance of moral respon-
sibility in choosing the good and meriting salvation. Since 
election is necessarily "hidden" in the Augustinian system, 
the uncertainty surrounding the bestowal of the gift of 
prayer makes it a weapon by which God can ensure an attitude 
of fear, hope, humility and absolute dependence in the elect. 
However complex the chain of events by which the justi-
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fied man either abandons God or perseveres, Pascal explicitly 
states 144 that the whole operation can have no other cause 
but the divine will. He describes prayer itself as lila 
grace efficace" 145 , "ce secours,,146, and also as an effect 
f ff " 147 h 1 t b o e lcaClOUS grace . Tee ec persevere y a grace 
II '1 f' , , "" bl t ,,14 8 d' qUl es alt perseverer tres lnVlnCl emen , an per-
severance in prayer is called "ce don special de Dieu lll49 . 
Governed since the Fall by what it loves most, the 
will's freedom either to sin or to persevere in goodness, is 
determined by the absence or presence of grace. Pascal 
affirms the freedom of the will ("tous les hommes peuvent 
s'ils veulent") 150, but with the implication that if the 
will chooses the good it is always "preparee par le 
Seigneur" 151, which is, surely, a negation of freewill in 
the ordinary sense, i.e. the freedom of indetermination, and 
amounts simply to a euphemism for determination by God. The 
numinous quality of the religious experience of Pascal and 
Augustine, which demands absolute dependence upon divine 
grace as a prerequisite for participation in the supernatural 
good, necessarily precludes the autonomy for the human will 
claimed by the Molinists, to persevere or not in goodness, 
thereby sanctioning some degree of moral effort and self-
determination in man, and without which merit cannot be 
attributed to him. Pascal's denial of the competence of 
the "sens communI! even to recognize the good of the super-
natural order, and his conviction that grace alone can 
direct the will in this work of salvation, brings him very 
close to the Calvinist position, since the effect appears to 
be the same for both. His insistence that the love of the 
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good infused into the will is always and immediately "reduite 
en acte", and that the will always loves and follows the 
greater attraction, leaves little room for the exercise of 
reason or the deliberations of the moral consciousness. It 
is on the question of perseverance that the Augustinians 
disagree most vigorously with the Molinists, since the 
Molinist doctrine of a "pouvoir prochain" amounts to denying 
the need for a radical dependence upon God for all grace as 
a gift, which is, for the Augustinians, an experiential 
truth. The outrage with which Pascal rejects as absurd the 
possibility 'that perseverance should be subject to man's 
will is reflected in the numerous arguments in which he 
rebuts it, and this provides evidence of his unshakeable con-
viction of divine omnipotence, which forms the non-rational 
ground of his doctrine. Men would no longer stand before 
God in fear, humility and hope, the mystery of election 
would be destroyed, and there would be no difference between 
Adam's pre-Fall state and the present deplorable state of man. 
Disregard of such a demonstrably untrue proposition is the 
source, in Pascal's view, of the Molinist error. 
Pascal rejects the Calvinist heresy on the grounds that 
it is injurious to God's love and justice and implies the 
complete suppression of the will, replacing it with grace 
which takes over the will to merit salvation, while man is 
entirely passive, St. Paul's clay in the hands of the Divine 
potter. Since God not only willed the damnation of the 
non~elect at the time of creation, but also caused Adam to 
sin, thus creating evil, Pascal finds the doctrine offensive 
to his idea of ordinary justice and concludes, by analogy, 
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that it must be even more offensive to God's justice. He 
clearly accepts that the idea of justice formulated by the 
moral consciousness of man has an ultimate validity as a 
symbol of the Divine justice. 
However, when confronted with the problem of explaining 
the blatant injustice inherent in God's bestowal of the 
grace of election on only a few, leaving the majority of 
mankind in the mass of perdition for a sin they are alleged 
to have committed pre-natally in Adam, Pascal takes refuge 
in an appeal to an occult justice, which, since it transcends 
any human conception, is shrouded in the mystery that belongs 
to the numinous and must therefore be regarded as inscrut-
able. Pascal confesses, with Augustine, to be confronted 
with an even more astonishing mystery in God's blatant aban-
donment, for no apparent transgression on their part, of 
these justified who fall away. He absolves God on the 
grounds that He owes fallen man only the grace given to Adam 
in Paradise. 
Clearly Pascal attributes to God a retributive concep-
tion of justice, and a niggardly distribution of the divine 
love, which fall far short of the absolute realization of 
human love and forgiveness portrayed in the parables of the 
Prodigal Son and of the Lost Sheep. He fails to realize 
that in his condemnation of the Calvinist view of God, as 
causing Adam to sin and thus introducing evil into the world, 
he is damning his own doctrine, for the expedient by which 
Augustine transfers the responsibility to Adam fails entirely 
to absolve God. That a perfectly balanced and surpassingly 
endowed being should reject what he knew to be his beatitude 
seems a contradiction in terms, though N.P. Williams suggests 
that it is accounted for by Augustine's Platonism which 
requires evil to consist in a defect of goodness 152 
Both Laporte 153 and N.P. Williams 154 conclude that 
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there was virtually no difference between the Calvinist, 
Molinist and Augustinian doctrines, and that the authentic 
thought of Molina, in view of the "scientia medial', was not 
so very different from that of Augustine himself. However, 
Miel 155 explains that it was the interpretation only of 
Bellarmine and Suarez, which developed into Congruism, which 
has an Augustinian meaning. Pascal was clearly attacking 
the interpetation of Lessius, who taught a predestination 
post praevisa merita, and a real freedom of indetermination 
for the will which could almost be termed Semi- Pelagian, 
since it represents the will as only minimally impaired by 
the Fall. 
Augustinian Orthodoxy 
It seems clear from the chapters on Grace, Justifica-
tion and Perseverance in the Dictionnaire de Theologie 
Catholique, that the orthodoxy of the Augustinian doctrine, 
claimed by Pascal, was that affirmed by the Church at the 
Council of Trent, except that in their desire to refute the 
Lutheran heresy, the contribution of the freewill was 
strongly emphasised, giving an appearance of conciliar 
approval to the Molinist doctrine. In Session VI, Chapters 
one to six refute both Protestant and semi-Pelagian heresies, 
by reiterating the decisions of the Council of Orange, 
affirming the necessity of grace for every salutary act, not 
because of the difficulty man experiences because of the 
corruption of his nature, but because of a physical incapacity 
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in human nature, even in that of Adam before the Fall, who 
was dependent on God for grace to persevere in the good. 
Since the supernatural goal of man is the possession of God 
Himself, grace is necessary for every step of the redemptive 
process. 
Yet in the same Council session the freedom of the will 
is affirmed, 
la liberte est une propriete de la volonte et son 
exercice appartient a l'homme comme tel156 
Perseverance and election require a special help, "un don 
•. I d . ,,157 d th th . h speCla e Dleu , an e ree groups ln t e economy 
salvation as outlined by Pascal, are described158 . The 
hiddenness of election, and the need of dependence and of 
of 
fear of backsliding·are also anticipated in St. Paul's words 
"Travaillez a votre salut avec crainte,,159, an inclusion in 
the Council's formulations which N.P. Williams attributes to 
the influence of the Reformers 160 . The selection of only 
the small number of elect is ascribed to the divine mystery 
161 ( Rom., X I, 3 3 ) . 
Chapter V162 affirms the real contribution of the will 
in consenting to and cooperating with grace, or in rejecting 
it, and states that the will is not inert, but nevertheless 
cannot move towards justice without grace, emphasising both 
the necessity of grace at the beginning of faith and the 
necessity for man's free cooperation. 
The Dictionnairestates 163 that the majority of the 
Fathers of Trent acknowledged the effective role of free wili 
and affirmed the necessity of grace, without, however, 
specifying the mode of its efficacity. It states that in 
164 Chapter XIII, Canon 18 was intended, as Pascal claims, to 
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anathematize the Protestants, who claimed that the command-
ments were impossible even for the justified. The Diction-
naire indicates that the primary intention of the Council in 
Canon 22, which states that perseverance is possible for the 
justified with a IIsecours special", was to emphasize that it 
is as wrong to affirm that the justified can persevere with-
out a special help, as to affirm that he cannot persevere if 
he is the recipient of such a special help165. According to 
th . t' . 166 h fl' t d e D1C lonnalre , t e canon was very ree y ln erprete , 
and the nature of the "secours special" was not specified, 
except that it was added to the sanctifying grace, and 
interpreted by the Thomists as "grace actuelle efficace", 
and by the Molinists as "pouvoir perseverer". The Diction-
naire also states that the Augustinian Fathers added the 
proviso: "que per sonne n'est abandonne de Dieu, s'il n'aban-
donne Dieu auparavant", which can surely be interpreted, in 
view of the theory of the "Double Delaissement des Justes" 
as an attempted rejection of the Molinist "pouvour perse-
verer l' • Clearly the Church had moved since the time of 
Augustine towards what may be described as a Jesuit stance, 
but the Council's main intention was to refute the Protestant 
heresy. It states: 
Cette mutuelle interaction, dans l'oeuvre du salut, 
de Dieu cause premiere et de l'homme regenere par 
sa grace caracterise la doctrine catholique, qui 
par la se place a egale distance entre Ie rational-
isme pelagienne qui supprime l'action divine et Ie 
mysticisme protestant ou disparatt la collaboration 
humaine 168 . 
Clearly Pascal and his fellow Augustinians of the seventeenth 
century found themselves in a position parallel with that of 
Augustine's first disciples, namely, that of defending their 
155 
doctrine against similar accusations levelled at them by 
the Pelagians of their own day, but with the important 
difference that the Augustianians of Pascal's time, like the 
Pelagians of Augustine's, are now themselves fighting a 
rearguard action agains~ the incursion of the "nouveaux 
dogmes" of the Jesuits which threaten their orthodoxy. 
The Ecrits sur la Grace constitute, therefore, a 
passionate defence of a particular view of grace and of God 
based on the numinous quality of Pascal's religious exper-
ience and on his assessment of the human situation. As he 
himself admitsl69, within the Christian Church contrary 
opinions have always existed and been debated, and no doubt 
such opinions are similarly informed by temperamental bias. 
W'll' 170 h t ' h f' ld f 1 lam James argues t at reason opera es ln t e le 0 
divinity just as it does in any of the wider affairs of 
life, where our passions or our mystical intuitions fix our 
beliefs beforehand, and where reason's role is to find 
arguments to support our belief, to define that belief and 
to give it plausibility. In both methods by which Pascal 
seeks to prove the authenticity of the Augustinian doctrine, 
this appears to be the role of reason. ("Et enfin nous 
ferons voir combien cette doctrine est conforme au sens 
A 11)171 commune meme . 
In following the method which Pascal claims is the only 
reliable guide in theology, namely, faithful exposition of 
Scripture, the Fathers and the Councils, reason is used in 
precisely the way he condemns in his opponents, who, he 
claims, interpret passages of Scripture to favour their view. 
As Pascal himself illustrates l72 , by the enumeration of 
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various passages from Scripture which can be interpreted 
either in an Augustinian or Semi-Pelagian sense, Scripture 
is a particularly fruitful field for furnishing proof-texts 
to bolster a particular doctrinal bias. This selectivity is 
also very apparent in Pascal's choice of Fathers - Fulgence, 
Prosper, Peter Lombard and, of course, the Faculties of 
Louvain and Douai - all dedicated to upholding the Augustin-
ian tradition, while earlier Fathers of the Eastern tradition 
are ignored. Moreover, following Augustine, Pascal bases 
his theology almost exclusively on the writings of St. Paul, 
focusing on Christ's death as a vicarious punishment for the 
sins of the elect, and disregarding almost completely the 
example of his life and teaching. 
Although Pascal denies reason any competence in the order 
of supernatural truth, he appears to consider it the appro-
priate instrument for making judgements about the nature of 
God's justice, will, love and omnipotence based upon his own 
assessment of the human situation and upon the deliberations 
of his own moral consciousness. In his appeal throughout 
this work to the reason of the reader, Pascal acknowledges 
its function as ultimate arbiter in the evaluation of 
religious truth and in the choice of doctrine. 
In the fourth Ecrit he stresses the need for a careful 
linguistic and textual analysis to establish the meaning 
which the words of a proposition were originally intended 
to convey. In claiming Conciliar approval in this way 
for propositions from Augustine's work sanctioned by the 
Council of Orange, and reiterated by Trent, Pascal deliber-
ately ignores other affirmations which modify their meaning, 
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by emphasising the possibility and obligation of man's free 
participation in the process of justification. Moreover, 
Pascal disregards the first rule of his own method, requiring 
consideration of the "natural ll n::eaning of the words that 
make up any proposition, when he ignores the IInatural" mean-
ing of terms and attributes to them a peculiarly Augustinian 
meaning. Thus "tous" must be understood in the light of the 
Augustinian teaching on Predestination, and "vouloir" is 
assumed to imply a will empowered by efficacious grace, 
producing extraordinarily illogical statements, such as, 
... qu'ils Ie pourraient, s'ils Ie voulaient, mais que 
n'etant pas du nombre des elus, Dieu ne leur donne 
pas ces graces efficaces sans lesquelles ils ne Ie 
veulent jamais en effet l73 . 
He uses the language of verbal equivocation to mask the 
true meanings of statements, and to mitigate or disguise the 
harshness of some aspects of his doctrine. The circumlocu-
tions which Pascal uses to describe the two types of perse-
verance in the theory of the "Double Delaissement des Justes ll , 
in which man is apparently endowed with a degree of moral 
responsibility, which is then denied, when all is attributed 
to the divine will, fails miserably to reconcile an effica-
cious grace with a true freedom for the~ill. 
II paralt donc que Dieu ne quitte que parce qu'il 
a ete quitte, et que l'homme ne quitte que parce 
qu'il a ete quittei et qu'ainsi il est absurde 
de conclure que, dans les sentiments de saint 
Augustin, Dieu ne quitte jamais Ie premier, parce 
qu'il a dit que Dieu ne quitte point Ie premier; 
et que l'un et l'autre est ensemble veritable et 
qu'il quitte, et qu'il ne quitte point Ie premier, 
a cause des differentes manieres de quitter174. 
175 As Trethowan states, "Theology may be mysterious but it 
must always make sense", and the obvious inconsistencies, and 
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the expedients to which Pascal is driven to disguise them, 
highlight that failure. 1 1 1 l 'k A ,176 C ear y Pasca, 1 e ugustlne , 
experienced grace as the love of God, but could not conceive 
of an omnipotent, divine will yielding to that of man, and 
177 Burnaby suggests a solution which both failed to consider. 
If the reality of the consent to receive, and the 
possibility of refusal, be denied, there is an end 
of any understanding of grace as a loving relation 
between persons. Love is "irresistible" only in 
the sense that to overcome the resistance of pride, 
the pride whose essence is the refusal to receive, 
is possible to love and to love only .... But 
"irresistible grace" in the Jansenist sense, is as 
much a contradiction in terms as cogi velle. And 
Augustine never realised that his own conception of 
grace required nothing less than a revolution in 
his thought of the divine omnipotence. 
Oman suggests that omnipotence might have a good deal of 
meaning without the all-inclusive potency which Augustine 
demands -
... to be able to rule men with wills of their own ... 
would at least not detract from God's omnipotence. 
But apparently to be omnipotent, he must cherish 
the mind of a parish beadle who thinks nothing 
rightly done unless he does it himself178 . 
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The Aim of the Work 
CHAPTER IV 
LETTRES PROVINCIALES 
The Augustinian theology of grace, given such a 
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detailed and comprehensive defence in the Ecrits sur la Grace 
as doctrinally orthodox, receives equally zealous, if some-
what wittier and more entertaining, attention in the 
Provinciales, where a direct appeal is again made to the 
moral consciousness of the reader to sanction the doctrine, 
but this time in the light of the morality which it pre-
scribes. Orthodoxy hinges upon establishing grace as the 
8;01e authority in moral theology, both to understand 
Christian Revelation and to practise the precepts there laid 
down, as opposed to the rational moral theology of the 
Jesuits which, according to Pascal threatens to overthrow 
Christendom itself. Further developments of the Augustinian 
distinction particularly relevant to the Provinciales are 
those of the Church as the Body of Christ and sole source 
of grace (and by implication of the truly moral life), and 
of the Church and the world as mutually exclusive societies, 
a concept blatantly denied, at least as Pascal would have it, 
by the Jesuits. 
In the Provinciales, then, the relative claims of grace 
and nature are exemplified in, on the one hand, the Christ-
centred life of the nUns of Port-Royal, and on the other 
hand, in the life of the rich and aristocratic members of 
society, where Christian morality and spirituality are 
subordinated to the enhancement of personal ambition and 
honour in lives dedicated primarily to the glorification of 
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the individual "moil'. The theological and moral aspects of 
the Provincia1es are intricately linked, for Pascal clearly 
seeks to demonstrate in the practical and moral interpreta-
tion of doctrine the affirmation or denial of its authority. 
Renunciation of the world and the adoption of the austere 
life-style and spiritual discipline of Port-Royal, effected 
at the time of his own conversion by the gift of grace, had 
furnished him with ample proof both of the validity of the 
Augustinian doctrine 1,and of the fact that purity of life is 
indeed the condition for the continued reception of the free 
and unmerited grace of salvation. This conviction forms the 
basis of the case he argues in both the Provinciales and the 
, 2 Pensees . 
Background to the Provinciales3 
The immediate cause of Pascal's embarking upon the 
Provinciales was the imminent censure of Arnauld's second 
Lettre A un Duc et Pair by the Sorbonne and his threatened 
expulsion from that body. This crisis represented the climax 
in the long conflict between Jansenists and Jesuits brought 
to a head by the Papal Bull Cum occasione, in 1653, condemning 
as heretical the five propositions purportedly extracted from 
Jansen's Augustinus. As Pascal underlines in the Ecrits sur 
4 la Grace , it was but a recrudescence of the conflict between 
the two views of grace reflected in the Eastern and Western 
traditions of the Church, begun in the fifth century between 
Pelagians and Augustinians and waged fiercely between the 
5 disciples of Duns Scotus and Thomists in the Middle Ages 
At the Council of Trent, convened in 1545 to counter the 
Lutheran revolt, pressure from a strong Scotist faction in 
the Council resulted in decisions representing a compromise 
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between the two parties, so that the decrees were open to 
either a Thomist or Scotist interpretation. This represented, 
in real terms, the official sanctioning, by the Church 
Councils, of the Semi-Pelagian view, until then officially 
branded heretical, that man's will, though weakened by the 
Fall, is capable of responding to grace or rejecting the offer. 
Salvation, therefore, would no longer result solely from the 
arbitrary bestowal of an irresistible grace by an omnipotent 
God, but rather from the free choice of the human will. 
The latter view formed the basis of the doctrine of grace 
embraced by the Society of Jesus, founded in 1534, and pro-
pounded in Molina's Concordia, which became the norm for 
Jesuit teaching on grace 6. Molina's IIsufficient grace ll7 , both 
operant and cooperant, given by God to all men, became 
efficacious as the result of man's own effort, thereby allow-
ing a true freedom of will and genuine personal responsibility 
in meriting salvation. The ensuing battle over the relative 
merits and orthodoxy of these opposing doctrines was finally 
quelled in 1607, when Pope Paul V declared the peace of the 
Church and allowed the teaching of both doctrines of grace 8 
The powerful influence exerted by the Jesuits, both in 
Rome and in the French society of the seventeenth century, 
resulting from their extensive missionary activities abroad 
and from their success as educators and confessors of the 
rich and aristocratic, encouraged the assumption that their 
doctrine was sanctioned as the true Catholic teaching. As 
Abercrombie 9 points out, the Jesuits formed the IIleft wingll 
of the Counter Reformation, and their doctrine of grace 
found a favourable reception in the lax social and moral 
climate of the time. In turn it prompted a resurgence of 
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strict Augustinianism, embodied in the spiritual life of 
Port-Royal under the guidance of St.-Cyran, and it was the 
"irritant ll which determined Jansen to write the 
A t ' 10 ugus lnus . 
Jansenism posed the serious threat to Thomists of 
receiving, by association, the stigma of Calvinism and 
heresy, and led to the coalition of Thomists with the 
Jesuits which is the subject of the first three letters. 
Port-Royal, therefore, saw itself as a last bastion of the 
11 Augustinian theology of grace ,and of the conception of 
the Church as the Body of Christ on earth. Accordingly, it 
attracted support from clergy and devout people shocked at 
the Jesuit tolerance of moral laxityl2. The Provinciales 
are not merely a defence of Arnauld, or of Port-Royal, but 
an attempt to discredit publicly a Society which Pascal 
believed threatened the very Church itself, by dispensing 
altogether with the need for the supernatural grace accruing 
from the death of Christ, as the unique source of truth, 
Christian morality and merit for salvation, and by replacing 
that with a purely natural ethic determined by human reason 
following the dictates of the individual human will. 
Method 
As in the Ecrits sur la Grace, Pascal adopts the 
Augustinian method of persuasion, outlined in De l'Art de 
13 Persuader , to prove the orthodoxy of the Port-Royal 
stance, seeking to undermine the will's enslavement to 
worldly values so that grace may inspire a reorientation to 
love of God. The need to entertain the worldly audience to 
whom the letters were primarily addressed precluded any 
lengthy exposition of doctrine or citation of Scripture and 
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Tradition. Pascal again looks to St. Paul and the Western 
Fathers, but it is rather to the more familiar law of the 
Gospel (i.e. love of God and neighbour) which he represents 
as the apotheosis of the natural concepts of love and 
justice, or to the Ten Commandments, that he most frequently 
appeals. The method is therefore weighted in favour of an 
extensive appeal to experiential evidence to point up the 
need for a return to the authority of Tradition (i.e. the 
Augustinian doctrine) in moral theology, making grace, 
rather than reason, the source of all true morality. 
Similarly, brilliant and witty rational argument occupies 
a major part of the work to expose the more extreme examples 
of casuistry and parry Jesuit counterattacks, all designed 
to convince the reader of the fundamental immorality and 
unacceptability of Jesuit rational moral theology. As 
Benichou writes: 
La theologie janseniste est destinee a ecraser, 
non pas le materialisme, mais plutot toute forme 
d'idealisme, meme chretien, qui ne s'accompagne 
pas d'une negation absolue des valeurs humaines, 
toute forme de vertu ou de grandeur suspecte de 
pactiser avec la nature et avec l'instinct .•.. 
C'est la le veritable adversaire du jansenisme, 
qu'il faut reconnaitre et situer lui-meme si 
lion veut s'expliquer port-Royal14 . 
Reason and Revelation in Theology 
Jansenist Orthodoxy 
The theological aspect is concerned primarily with 
proving the orthodox.yof the Jansenist doctrine of grace, 
for the signing by the inhabitants of Port-Royal of their 
assent to the Bull on the question of "droit" did not 
reduce the pressure upon them from the Jesuits, who with a 
majority in the Sorbonne, increased by the introduction of 
"quelque quarante moines mendiants,,15, pressed for 
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Arnauld's expulsion. It is clear in the Ecrits sur la 
Grace 16 that the five propositions condemned as heretical 
do, in fact, express the substance of the Augustinian 
doctrine to which the Jansenists subscribed, a view with 
which Sellier concurs 17 . The distinction made by Arnauld, 
and again raised by him in his second Lettre a un Duc et 
Pair, between IIfait" (the accuracy of the five propositions 
as a valid interpretation of the Augustinus) f and "droit" 
(whether they, in fact, constitute a heresy), allowed Port-
Royal to declare its loyalty to the Pope and the Church by 
affirming the latter, and to the strict doctrine of 
Augustine by denying the former. 
The debate in the Sorbonne on the question of "fait", 
and on the orthodoxy of the extract from Arnauld's letter: 
"Que la grace sans laquelle on ne peut rien, a manqu~ a 
S. Pierre dans sa chute", are interpreted by Pascal as a 
personal attack on Arnauld, and as an attempt to condemn 
the whole Augustinian doctrine of grace as heretical, thereby 
sanctioning the Jesuits' own "sufficient grace". Pascal 
has M. Ie Moine reveal this stratagem: 
Cette proposition, lui a-t-il excellement r~pondu, 
serait catholique dans une autre bouche; ce n'est 
que dans M. Arnauld que la Sorbonne l'a condamn~e. 
Et ainsi admirez les machines du molinisme, qui 
font dans l'Eglise de si prodigieux renversements, 
que ce qui est catholique dans les Peres devient 
h~r~tique dans M. Arnauld; que ce qui ~tait 
h~r~tique, dans les semi-p~lagiens devient 
orthodoxe dans les ~crits des J~suites; que la 
doctrine si ancienne de saint Augustin est une 
nouveaut~ insupportable, et que les inventions 
nouvelles qulon fabrique tous les jours a notre 
vue, passent pour llancienne foi de l'Eglise18 . 
"Sufficient" Grace 
Since Arnauld's appeal to the authority of Augustine 
and Chrysostym have failed, Pascal's aim in the first three 
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letters is to break up the powerful ruling coalition of 
Thomists and Jesuits by exposing the self-interest upon 
which it is founded: the fundamental dishonesty of the 
Thomists, when they promote the idea of a "sufficient" grace 
which will be generally assumed to carry for both Thomists 
and Jesuits the "natural" meaning normally given to it by 
the Jesuits; and the deceit of the Jesuits who seek 
official sanction for their doctrine by merging with Thomist 
orthodoxy. Pascal demonstrates that the Thomists and 
Jansenists are, in fact, in complete agreement on the mean-
ing of the terms "pouvoir prochain" and "grace suffisante", 
which lie at the heart of the debate. Both affirm the 
Augustinian meaning of the "pouvoir prochain", as the 
ability in the righteous to pray for help so that they may 
accomplish the good, but "il leur faut de plus une grace 
efficace qui n'est pas donnee a tous, et qui determine leur 
I t " . ,,19 vo on e a prler In the Ecrits sur la Grace, where 
Pascal tries to mitigate the determinism of Augustine in 
his treatment of the "pouvoir prochain", the deprivation of 
St. Peter and the saints for a time by God of this special 
help, is explained as a necessary and salutary measure 
designed to induce humility by reminding them of their 
d d . 20 epen ence upon Hlm . 
The Jesuit sufficient grace, however, implies the 
ability, in all men, to pray for help, "sans qu'il soit 
necessaire qu'ils aient aucune nouvelle grace de Dieu pour 
prier,,21 Pascal uses the Augustinian illustration to 
demonstrate that the Jesuit doctrines of "pouvoir prochain" 
and "grace suffisante" are a denial of the Augustinian 
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doctrines of the Fall and Original Sin, and are the 
equivalent of the Pelagian heresy. In the doctrine of 
Augustine 22 , the sufficient grace which Adam received in a 
state of original righteousness was as light is to healthy 
eyes, for his will had a true freedom of indetermination. 
The grace given to Adam and the saints after the Fall, 
however, must open blind eyes and give them light, for a 
much stronger grace is needed both to free the will from 
the bonds of concupiscence, and to turn it to God. Not 
only do the Jesuits deny this corruption of the will after 
the Fall, but they make men independent of God; while for 
Augustine and his followers, the condition of receiving 
grace is their continuous and limitless dependence on Him. 
As Abercrombie observes: liThe notion of good, for 
Augustine, had no meaning except as a real and positive 
participation in universal, omnipotent good, in the 
divine ll23 . 
Pascal has his Thomist Father concede that the Thomists 
share with the Jansenists the orthodox understanding of the 
term, and that the Jesuit-Thomist coalition is purely 
political .since both parties agree only on terminology not 
on meaning. In the second letter, Pascal points up the 
treachery of the Thomists in proclaiming with the Jesuits 
as the consensus teaching of the Church, what they them-
selves believe to be heresy, and allowing themselves to be 
duped. 
Car le monde se paye de paroles: peu approfondis-
sent 1es choses; et ainsi 1e nom de grace suf-
fisante etant reQu des deux cotes, quoique avec 
divers sens, il nly a personne, hors les plus 
fins theologiens, qui ne pense que la chose que 
ce mot signifie soit tenue aussi bien par les 
176 
Jacobins que par les Jesuites. Et la suite fera 
voir que ces derniers ne sont pas les plus dupes 24 
Pascal traces in the Thomist doctrine the apparent move away 
from a strict Augustinianism with the introduction of a 
"sufficient" grace, and the affirmation that Christ died for 
all men, in response to the increasing emphasis on human 
merit and the freedom of the will in the Middle Ages, and, 
after the Lutheran heresy, in response to accusations of 
Calvinism from the Jesuits. While sheltering under the 
wings of the Jesuits, the Thomist "sufficient grace", in 
fact, corresponds to the "grace inefficace" given to the 
intermediate group in the Augustinian economy of salvation, 
d . b d' h . I G A 25 Th , " f f . . escrl e ln t e Ecrlts sur a race. elr su lClent 
grace" is, as Pascal points out, a contradiction in terms, 
C'est-a-dire, lui dis-je, que tous ont assez de 
grace, et que tous n'en ont pas assez; c'est-a-
dire que cette grace suffit, quoiqu'elle ne 
suffise pas; c'est-a-dire qu'elle est suffisante 
de nom, et insuffisante en effet 26 . 
Pascal and Thomism 
Just as, in the second letter, Pascal's Thomist F.ather 
admits an apparent reconciliation with Molinism solely to 
avoid charges of Calvinism, so Pascal himself moves from 
insistance in the early letters upon the need for an effi-
27 
cacious grace, not given to all men ,to the claim in the 
fourteenth that the Church respects all men as "rachetes 
d'un prix infini, pour etre faits les temples du Dieu 
vivant,,28. This becomes in the seventeenth letter a vigor-
ous denial of accusations that he holds Christ died only 
for the predestined29 , and evolves even further in the 
direction of Thomism in the eighteenth letter with his con-
cession that, 
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... non seulement ils tiennent qulon resiste effective-
ment a ces graces faibles, qu'on appelle excitantes, 
ou inefficaces, en n'executant pas le bien qu'elles 
nous inspirent, mais qulils sont encore aussi 
fermes a soutenir contre Calvin le pouvoir que la 
volonte a de resister meme a la grace efficace et 
victorieuse, quia defendre contre Molina le 
pouvoir de cette grace sur la volonte, aussi jaloux 
de l'une de ces verites que de l'autre 30 . 
As Abercrombie observes 31 , Augustine did not deny the exist-
ence of a "sufficient grace", and considered freedom of 
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choice the inalienable prerogative of human nature . Man 
is always, he alleges, free to sin or to do good. But if 
he is to do good freedom by itself will not suffice when the 
power to do good is withheld from him33 . The full statement 
of Pascal's theology of grace in the eighteenth letter, 
however, suggests that, like the Thomists themselves in a 
similar life and death situation, these apparent concessions 
in no way represent a true modification of his stance in the 
early letters, but are merely a verbal alignment with the 
Thomist doctrine for the purpose of public identification 
with Thomist orthodoxy, and with that of the whole tradition 
of the Church 34 . He cites the authority of St Thomas in 
the tenth letter, on the question of confession, and in the 
eleventh, on almsgiving and simony, whereas in the early 
letters it is only to the early Fathers of the Western 
Tradition that an appeal is made. 
Freedom of Will in Augustine 
The Jesuit response to Pascal's claim in the seventeenth 
letter, that the Jansenist upholding of "efficacious grace" 
was sanctioned by the Pope himself, while the five propos-
itions were under scrutiny in Rome, was to differentiate 
between a Calvinist and Catholic interpretation of the term, 
in order to accuse the Jansenists of maintaining it with the 
former meaning . 
. ~.llque Jansenius serait catholique, slil d~fendait 
la grace efficace selon les Thomistes; mais 
qu'il est h~r~tique, parce qu'il est contraire 
aux Thomistes et conforme a Calvin, qui nie Ie 
pouvoir de r~sister a la grace H35 . . 
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Pascal clearly took up this challenge as an opportunity to 
vindicate once and for all the Jansenist doctrine, by demon-
strating its conformity with the Fathers and with St. Thomas. 
His argument proving the will's freedom to reject efficacious 
grace is based upon Augustine's own attempt to resolve the 
36 paradox . Here, however, the will is not unequivocally 
designated slave of concupiscence or slave of grace, as in 
the Ecrits. The emphasis is on man's natural freedom, rather 
than on the crippling power of concupiscence which inevitably 
turns the will to love of creatures. Pascal explains the 
mysterious operation reconciling omnipotence and freedom . 
... mais que n~anmoins quand il plait a Dieu de Ie 
toucher par sa mis~ricorde, il lui fait faire 
ce qu'il veut et en la maniere qu'il Ie veut, 
sans que cette infaillibilit~ de l'op~ration de 
Dieu d~trui~e en aucune sorte la libert~ 
naturelle de l'homme, par les secretes et 
admirables manieres dont Dieu opere ce changement, 
que saint Augustin a si excellement expliqu~es, 
et qui dissipent toutes les contradictions 
imaginaires que les ennemis de la grace efficace 
se figurent entre Ie pouvoir souverain de la 
grace sur Ie libre arbitre et la puissance quia 
Ie libre arbitre de r~sister a la grace 37 • 
Pascal goes on to explain how the will invariably 
inclines towards whatever gives it greatest pleasure, and 
it is by the introduction of just such an infallible attrac-
tion, that God, through the action of the Holy Spirit, con-
verts the will of man to Himself . 
... Dieu change Ie coeur de l'homme par une douceur 
c~leste qu'il y r~pand, qui, surmontant la 
d~lectation de la chair, fait que llhomme sentant 
d'un cot~ sa mortalit~ et son n~ant, et d~couvrant 
de l'autre la grandeur et l'~ternit~ de Dieu, 
conQoit du degout pour les delices du peche, qui 
le separent du bien incorruptible; et trouvant 
sa plus grande joie dans le Dieu qui le charme, 
il sly porte infailliblement de lui-meme par un 
mouvement tout libre, tout volontaire, tout 
amoureux; de sorte que ce lui serait une peine 
et un supplice de slen separer38. 
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Pascal reflects in this passage the intense experience 
of the numinous at the time of his own conversion, and that 
of all "twice-born" Christians, of the felt nothingness of 
man before the transcendent God, and of the love which 
elicits the free surrender of the wil1 39 . In such a con-
version the two apparently irreconcilable sides of the 
paradox, omnipotence and freedom, are felt to be reconciled 40 , 
a belief which clearly has only a subjective validity for a 
41 particular religious type . Since Pascal himself falls 
into this category, he can with conviction cite such a 
belief as "les divins principes de saint Augustin et de saint 
Thomas,,42, upheld by Pope Clement VIII as the true Catholic 
doctrine and thereby refute Calvin. For Pascal, the question 
of merit is entirely explicable on this view, for he can 
affirm both God as first principle of our actions, and the 
free choice of the will by which man acquires merits which 
are genuinely his own and also gifts of God, as the Council 
of Trent and St. Paul maintain. 
Pascal brilliantly concludes his argument with the 
affirmation that the Jansenist doctrine accords not only 
with the continuing tradition of the Church up to the neo-
Thomist teaching of Alvarez, but even with that of the Jesuit 
Father petau. 
De sorte qulon voit aujourd'hui, par une espece 
de prodige, les defenseurs de la grace efficace 
justifies par les defenseurs de Molina: tant la 
conduite de Dieu est admirable, pour faire 
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concourir toutes choses a la gloire de sa verite!43. 
The Jesuits are consequently hoist with their own petard, as 
it were, for their alliance with the Thomists has simply 
served to confirm the orthodoxy of Jansenism. This lengthy 
argument by which Pascal demonstrates Jansenis,t conformi ty 
not only with the whole Catholic tradition but even with his 
enemies, would appear to prove that his apparent change of 
stance in the direction of Thomism, seen also in the Pensees, 
b d "1 l't' l' 't ,44 d can e regar ed as prlmarl y po 1 lca ln ln entlon An, 
as in the stratagem employed earlier by the Thomists, modi-
fications are introduced into popular belief, when, in fact, 
none have been made. 
Pascal and Jansenism 
Many writers 45 have interpreted these concessions as a 
move by Pascal in the direction of a more humanist position 
and away from Jansenism. Sellier notes the progression of 
this accord and observes that lila formule saint Augustin et 
saint Thomas constitue une sorte de refrain dans la Dix-
huitieme Lettre ll45 . He nevertheless affirms elsewhere 47 , 
"Nous pouvons donc conclure qu'aucun texte pascalien ne 
permet serieusement de mettre en doute la permanence de la 
pensee theologique exprimee dans les Ecrits sur la Grace". 
H.F. Stewart goes even further and aligns St. Thomas and st. 
Augustine with Calvin: "Jansen, following St. Augustine, 
admitted that man has the power to resist Grace, if he will. 
But so did Calvin. What Calvin maintained was that man cannot 
will to resist Grace, since it is Grace itself which deter-
mines his will. But this is the position of Alvarez, st. 
Thomas, and St. Augustine himself" 48 . Strowski 49 and 
Chevalier claim that Pascal moved away from the Jansenism of 
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his youth, the latter observing: "Pascal nlest pas 
janseniste: il a tempere le jansenisme par l'humanisme,,50. 
Chevalier believes that in certain Pensees Pascal expressed 
his belief in God's will to universal salvation, and that 
the human will,. thanks to the Augustinian reconciliation, 
h f d f 'b'l't 51 as a true ree om 0 responsl 1 1 Y Yet throughout the 
Provinciales Pascal indicates that he holds strictly to a 
Jansenist belief in efficacious grace. In fragment L911, 
B781 52 , Pascal affirms the sufficiency of Christ's sacrifice 
for all men, but not the efficacity. Laporte interprets 
Pascal's stance as a firm adherence to Port-Royal and to 
the Jansenist belief in the sovereignty of divine grace, 
tempered only by the observations that "Dieu suit habituel-
lement un ordre dans la distribution de ses dons", and that 
humility usually elicits the gift of grace, for it is "sa 
d 't d' , ,,53 con Ul e or lnalre . 
Further proof of Pascal's move away from Jansenism is 
assumed in his protestations in the later letters that he 
is not of Port-Royal, but acting quite independently of the 
nuns or any other group within the Church. In the second 
letter Pascal clearly saw himself, however, as part of a 
particular body raised up by God's grace to defend the 
Augustinian doctrine of "efficacious grace", since the 
Thomists had abdicated their responsibility as its guardian, 
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and this body is clearly the community of Port-Royal . 
Pascal rejects any suggestion of Port-Royal constituting a 
faction within the Church, but rather insists that the 
loyalty of all Jansenists, whose number is not confined to 
Port-Royal, is primarily to God, the Pope and the Catholic 
Church, outside of which he believed, there was no salvation. 
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... je vous declare que vous n'en pouvez rien cone lure 
contre moi, parce que, grace aDieu, je n'ai 
d'attache sur la terre quia la seule Eglise 
catholique, apostolique et romaine, dans laquelle 
je veux vivre et mourir, e·t dans la communion avec 
le pape son souverain chef, hors de laquelle je 
suis tres persuade qu'il n'y a point de salut 55 . 
In the second letter Pascal underlines the devoutness and 
purity of the nuns' lives, exemplifying the teaching which 
he defends, and in the sixteenth letter he refers to their 
veneration of the Eucharist and belief in its uniqueness as 
a source of Christ's redemptive grace. His protestations 
also highlight the fact that the Jesuits' first allegiance 
is not to conscience, but to the head of their Order, a 
body which sanctions principles and teaches a doctrine of 
grace which desecrate the Eucharist and deny the need for 
the blood of Christ. 
11 Y a bien de la difference entre les Jesuites 
et ceux qui les combattent. Vous composez 
veritablement un corps uni sous un seul chef ... 56 . 
Pascal's attitude to "conscience" in the Provinciales 
appears to be somewhat ambivalent. On the face of it his 
moral theology, like his doctrine, rests upon the fundamen-
tal Augustinian distinction between nature and grace. 
Natural justice, therefore, when evaluated in relation to 
that of God is no better than that of the pagans. 
Est-ce done que la morale de Jesus-Christ est 
plus cruelle et moins ennemie du meurtre que 
celIe des paiens, dont les juges ont pris ces 
lois civiles qui le condamnent?57 
As Pascal underlines .in the doctrine of the three orders 
in the Pensees 58 all natural virtues lumped together cannot 
make the smallest measure of charity, which is of a differ-
ent, supernatural order. . 59 Reason, Laporte pOlnts out , 
cannot find principles in the field of morality any more 
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than it can in science, for its function is restricted to 
intuiting such principles and working upon them. It is the 
will for Pascal which determines the moral code by its 
60 love . "Le coeur, donc, ou Ie sentiment, est seul apte a 
61 decider des principes de la morale" . 
In the Provinciales conscience in natural man is 
clearly reason following and rationalizing the choices of 
concupiscent wills, and Benichou 62 observes that Nicole and 
St.-Cyran denied any objective validity to the deliverances 
of this conscience. Reason is unreliable and easily swayed 
by the passions which, Pascal claims, can delude men into 
wrongly believing that they are fighting for the truth, 
"sans que leur conscience leur rende sur l'heure d'autre 
temoignage,,63. For the Jansenist, however, conscience is 
plainly the intellect illuminated by grace so that it under-
stands the law of the Gospel, which the will embraces. The 
source of this grace is prayer, meditation upon Scripture 64 , 
purity of life and pious observance of the sacraments, all 
marks of humility. The anguish of the Pri~re pour demander 
a Dieu Ie bon usage des maladies underscores the absolute 
dependence of the Christian upon God for every step in the 
moral life, and makes it plain that choices for the Christian 
were not between good and evil, but between different 
Ch 't' d ,65 h d f t rlS lan utles . In t e wor s 0 Lapor e, 
Attendre dans un absolu desinteressement, la 
clarte que notre coeur, en s'elevant vers Dieu, 
ne pourra manquer de trouver en Lui, tel est Ie 66. 
veritable moyen de dissiper les cas de conscience . 
Pascal therefore replies to the Jesuit tolerance of duelling 
which the King himself has forbidden: "Mais on doit louer 
Dieu de ce qu'il a eclaire l'esprit du roi par les lumi~res 
184 
plus pures que celles de votre theologie,,67. 
Pascal attacks the Jesuits on the grounds that, as 
agents of Christ and mediators of his grace in confession, 
and as directors of conscience, they do not encourage this 
close relationship. He implies in the Jesuits and their 
followers an ability to turn back freely to the true 
morality of the Gospel as an optional moral code open to 
conscience. Similarly he assumes in man an ability freely 
to reject grace, and deliberately to sin against the light 68 
In the fifth letter he addresses the Jesuit father: 
-Vous parlez donc, continuai-je, contre votre 
conscience? 
-Point du tout, dit-il: je ne parlais pas en cela 
selon rna conscience, mais selon celie de Ponce et 
du Pere Bauny69. 
Yet, in the fourteenth letter, the upshot of Pascal's argu-
ment is that it is possible to adopt a moral code quite 
freely, in the same way that a judge, when handing down 
judgements, is guided by the civil law, rather than by 
personal moral convictions, and is said by Pascal to act 
"en conscience" as he does s070. Similarly the remorse felt 
by transgressors, contradicting the claim that concupiscent 
wills have no consciousness of sinning, would seem to be 
71 proof of just such a freedom . In the tenth letter Pascal 
writes, 
Et ainsi, apres vous avez montre dans toutes nos 
conversations precedentes comment on a soulage 
les scrupules qui troublaient les consciences ... 72 . 
In the fourteenth he says of rebels, 
Ils n' auront plus a vaincre les remor.ds de la 
conscience, qui arretent la plupart des crimes 
dans leur naissance ... 73 
While consciously adhering to the Augustinian distinc-
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tion therefore in his use of "conscience ll , Pascal neverthe-
less unconsciously assumes an objective validity for the 
deliverances of conscience, and an ability in natural reason 
to judge the law of the Gospel as divinely given, as well as 
a freedom of will in man to accept or reject the voice of 
d .. . t 74 Go ln conSClence or Scrlp ure Delumeau 75 observes that 
it is the insistence of the Jansenists upon the sovereignty 
of individual conscience in religion and politics, that 
caused them to be regarded as an opposition party by the 
King himself, when the controversy in the Sorbonne and the 
Provinciales had aroused public opinion to exert pressure 
on the royal power. It is, clearly, in Pascal's interests, 
therefore, to affirm his loyalty to the Holy See and demon-
strate the doctrinal unity of Thomists, Jesuits and Jansen-
ists. 
Pascal concludes his long defence of the Port-Royal 
position in the eighteenth letter by insisting that the 
Jesuits are making a point of law and heresy from what is 
simply a question of fact. The onus is on them to point out 
the passages in the Augustinus which confirm that Jansen's 
meaning is heretical. Pascal develops the Augustinian dis-
tinction 76 between the roles of reason and authority in the 
discernment of religious truth, with the former the rightful 
judge of fact, as in science, and with the latter the rightful 
judge of things supernatural and revealed. Truths of faith, 
however, in Scripture for example, must never conflict with 
the evidence of the senses or with reason, or religion 
would become an object of scorn and conversion would be 
impossible. Pascal is using his own scientific method here 
to promote the clarification of supernatural truth when he 
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requires empirical evidence for proof of a hypothesis 77 He 
cites the fact that Popes have erred on many occasions by 
failing to observe the distinction between fact and super-
natural truth (as in the condemnation of Galileo), and 
suggests that the proposed condemnation of the Augustinus 
on the question of fact would constitute a similar aberra-
tion, since it is the truth of the facts which makes a Bull 
authoritative. Until such a question of fact is established 
Port-Royal will be, 
... sans blame sur ce point de fait, comme ils sont 
sans erreurs sur les points de foi; catholiques 
sur le droit, raisonnables sur le fait, et 
innocents en l'un et en l'autre 78 . 
Reason and Revelation in Morality 
Just as Revelation is the only reliable guide in the 
domain of theological truth, so grace is the sole source of 
Christian virtue, mediated by Scripture, the tradition of 
the Church and its Sacraments. For Augustine, as Abercrombie 
observes, "This grace of God, whereby we receive goodness 
and persevere in it, not only brings it about that we can 
do what we will, but that we will also this that we can do,,79. 
In his attack on the Jesuit doctrine and on the moral laxity 
it condoned, Pascal calls for a return to a purity of life, 
founded upon love of God and neighbour which is the con-
dition for the reception of this grace. 
In his History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle 
Ages Gilson 80 outlines the nature of the Augustinian ethic, 
to which Port-Royal and the Jansenists were dedicated. In 
the Augustinian view, "moral conscience and the knowledge 
of virtues are not enough to achieve moral life. Man is not 
an intellect only, he is also a will, and so long as his 
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will does not conform to the prescriptions of moral truth, 
there is no morality". Only the Christians empowered by 
grace can achieve moral righteousness, and besides being 
members of a temporal society, in which their temporal 
needs are served, they belong to the "City of God", united 
in love of God and with the beatific vision as their 
spiritual goal. The feeling of deliverance experienced by 
Pascal in his own conversion, his ability to renounce the 
world, furnished proof of the need for a special grace which, 
as Strowski 81 points out, he felt as the sign of individual 
election: lila goutte de sang que Ie Christ dans son agonie 
a verse pour l'ame elue, choisie, distinguee, entre toutes 
les autres,,82. 
Gilson also indicates that from the time of the thir-
teenth century, Augustinians have struggled to maintain 
their philosophical position against the rising tide of 
Aristotelianism. In Studies in Self-Interest, Krailsheimer 
traces the development of the humanism which resulted from 
the rediscovery of Aristotle and the works of classical 
antiquity. For the Christian humanist, the latter furnished 
a model for the potential of human effort, while the New 
Testament provided its orientation. With Montaigne, 
however, God was no longer at the centre, but above, and 
respect for authority and custom were replaced by an auto-
83 
matic obedience and outward conformity. Descartes' 
mechanistic view of the universe, according to which, as 
Pascal observes, God withdraws after setting the universe 
in motion, made the "moi" the centre of man's orientation, 
while the deliberations of reason, dedicated to the service 
of the individual ego, replaced the objective moral standards 
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of Christ as the sole authority in Christian morality. The 
linking of "interet" and "amour~propre" in the maxims of 
La Rochefoucauld indicates, in Krailsheimer's view, the 
nature of man's aberration. 
It is not merely transient selfishness, or mis-
calculation of moral values, but the permanent 
and radical reorientation of man's spiritual eye 
on to himself. There can be no religion when man 
becomes his own God, but equally there can be no 
ethics when man's self occupies the place properly 
taken by some transcendental, or at least, object-
ive, standard84 . 
"Honnetete" , "gloire" and "honneur" had thus become, 
by Pascal's time, values devoid of moral connotation, with 
God transformed into an apotheosis of self and salvation 
into an extension of earthly life. 
In the Semi-Pelagian tradition, the bias of Jesuit 
doctrine tended, from the time of the Society's formation, 
towards an optimistic view of the value of human effort in 
earning salvation, with the Jesuits more disposed than the 
Augustinians to make allowances for the shortcomings of 
their flock. In Augustinianism and Modern Theology, de Lubac 
traces the profound influence of Renaissance humanism upon 
the theology of the Jesuit Order, in a gradual evolution 
from the time of Bellarmine to that of Lessius and Pascal 
himself, in the direction of naturalism. Whilst this 
influence was effectively opposed by Thomas Aquinas in his 
Christianization of Aristotle, the Jesuit moral theologians, 
by assimilating the fundamental assumptions of the time into 
their theology, relegated the supernatural to the class of 
h . 1 85 t e mlracu ous . 
The adoption of just such a naturalism by the Jesuits 
is the subject of the fourth letter, in which Pascal attacks 
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the fundamentally heretical presuppositions upon which their 
theology of grace is founded. The "grace actuelle" taught 
by the Jesuits as given for individual acts, was both 
prevenient and cooperant, "une inspiration de Dieu par 
laquelle il nous fait connaitre sa volonte et par laquelle 
il nous excite a la vouloir accomplir,,86. According to 
Jesuit teaching this grace was given to all men on the 
occasion of each temptation: "une action ne peut etre 
imputee a peche, si Dieu ne nous donne, avant que de la com-
mettre, la connaissance du mal qui y est, et une inspiration 
. ., 1'" ,,87 qUl nous exclte a eVlter "Grace actuelle" is clearly 
equated by the Jesuits with the deliberations of the moral 
. 88 
conSClousness it represents for them an illumination of 
the natural reason, which ensures that an act is committed 
with a deliberate intention. This amounts for Pascal to a 
denial of the whole Augustinian doctrine of Original Sin, of 
the corruption of the will and of the need for a Redeemer, 
and of the inability of man to love God or perform the good 
without an efficacious grace. It accords natural reason a 
role in the work of salvation expressly denied by the funda-
mental Augustinian distinction between reason and Revelation 
89 developed in Pascal's doctrine of the three orders , where 
reason, without grace, is useless in true moral endeavour 
since it follows the will ruled by concupiscence. The 
Jesuit doctrine of "grace actuelle" is clearly founded on 
the view that, unless man is to be regarded as a puppet man-
ipulated by God, some degree of moral responsibility and 
freedom of will must be accorded him. For Pascal, however, 
it had much more sinister connotations, and went far beyond 
Pelagianism in the direction of a naturalism which did away 
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with sin and its Redeemer, and, by implication, threatened 
the whole conception of the Church as the Body of Christ 
and mediator of His grace. 
In his definition of the principle upon which the grace 
is founded, Pascal underlines the essentially natural 
Aristotelian ethic underlying the Jesuit moral theology, 
with its distinction between voluntary and involuntary acts, 
and its insistence on the primacy of reason over the will in 
all intentional acts. An act is defined by Aristotle as 
voluntary when the will follows the choice which the reason 
k f fl ' . bl t' 90 rna es, a ter re ectlon upon POSSl e op lons In an 
involuntary act, however, the will moves spontaneously and 
without such deliberation, and such acts are classified as 
morally neutral. However, Aristotle also classed as invol-
untary and, therefore, not culpable, any act committed 
without guilty intention, but which, because of particular 
circumstances, results in moral wrong. Pascal quotes from 
Father Bauny the Aristotelian principle "qu'une action ne 
peut etre imputee a blame lorsqu'elle est involuntaire"91, 
and demonstrates that the Jesuit interpretation of this 
allows such scope in the direction of souls, that every type 
of excess can be excused by ignorance of the moral law, 
and sin itself is virtually abolished, which represents a 
denial of Aristotle's true ethic 92 . 
Quoi! mon ~~re, il ne suffit pas, pour agir volon-
tairement, qulon sache ce que lion fait, et qulon 
ne Ie fasse que parce qulon Ie veut faire; mais 
il faut de plus "que lion voie, que lion sache 
et que lion pen~tre ce qu'il y a de bien et de 
mal dans cette action?" Si cela est, il nly a 
gu~re dlactions volontaires dans la vie; car 
on ne pense gu~re a tout cela. Que de jurements 
dans Ie jeu, que d'exc~s dans les debauches, que 
d'emportements dans Ie carnaval, qui ne sont point 
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volontaires, et par consequent ni bons, ni mauvais, 
pour n'@tre point accompagnes de ces "reflexions 
d'esprit sur les qualites bonnes on mauvaises" 
de ce que lion fait! Mais est-il possible, mon 
Pere, qu'Aristote ait eu cette pensee? Car 
j'avais ouI. dire que c,'etait un habile homme 93 
With this new type of .redemption, Pascal insists, all 
sins committed without any thought of God, can always be 
excused, and incomparably more people will be justified by 
ignorance and forgetfulness than by grace and the sacraments, 
and Father Bauny himself will be hailed as: "Ecce qui 
tollit peccata mundi" 94 . 
Pascal points out that the logical extension of this 
teaching is a reversal of the traditional doctrine of the 
Church and of the Scriptures. Simply by virtue of having 
no thought of God, hardened and avowed sinners, philosophers 
who boast of the power of nature, Epicureans who deny 
divine providence, idolators and atheists, are all justified. 
The very people whom the Jesuits confess, the aristocracy 
and ruling class, sin in their thousands without the least 
sign of regret. Pascal warns the Jesuits, that when 
experience convinces people that this principle, which they 
claim to be an article of faith is wrong, the disillusion-
ment will extend to the whole doctrine of the Church, and 
religion will be discredited. 
The true role of the Church, in Pascal's view, is not 
to save people by their excesses, but to show them their 
infirmity and the physician who can cure it; to teach them 
to desire spiritual health and pray that God will grant it. 
Pascal again appeals to the "sens commun" of the reader to 
decide whether the laxity of those who have Jesuit spiritual 
directors, or the austerity, piety and purity of the Jansen-
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ists, is the correct prescription for spiritual health. It 
is the abdication of reason and submission to the teaching 
of Revelation, required for such purity of life, that he 
argues are the prerequisites for receiving the grace of 
Christ, which is morality itself. 
J'avais toujours pense quion pechat d'autant plus, 
qu'on pensait Ie moins aDieu. Mais, a ce que je 
vois, quand on a pu gagner une fois sur soi de 
niy plus penser du tout, toutes choses deviennent 
pures pour l'avenir95 . 
By making grace available to all men, the Jesuits, as 
96 Laporte points out, have made it "une fontaine publique". 
For Pascal and the Jansenists, reason's competence in the 
moral domain is restricted to acts of natural goodness 
which, as for Augustine, are no better than vices since they 
are useless for salvation97 . Any sin, whether of surprise, 
ignorance or deliberate intent is culpable, .. for it is per-
formed by a will under the rule of concupiscence. Saints 
themselves are at times trapped by concupiscence to sin 
quite unintentionally, when they sincerely believe they are 
yielding to necessity or acting in the interests of truth. 
Pascal's ambivalence to the role of the human will is 
pointed up in this passage, where, though the saints yield 
to sin, it is simply because grace has been withdrawn, so 
that 
... les plus saints doivent toujours demeurer dans la 
crainte et dans Ie tremblement, quoiqu'ils ne se 
sentent coupables en aucune chose, comme saint Paul 
Ie dit de lui~meme?98. 
This is pure determinism which makes a nonsense of the appeal 
Pascal makes to will and reason in the Pensees and the 
Provinciale , and can only be attributed to the need of 
"twice~born" Christians such as Pascal, Augustine and St. Paul 
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himself to attribute all the mercy of God. Grace, in 
Pascal's view, is a continuous infusion directly related 
99 to purity of life and heart , but neither sinners, nor the 
most righteous, have the knowledge, desires and inspira-
tions of "gr8ce actuelle" on every occasion of sin. 
For proof of the authenticity of the Jansenistdoctrine 
and of the essentially heretical character of the Jesuit 
teaching, and of the threat posed by such naturalism to the 
Body of Christ, Pascal looks to Scripture and to Augustine. 
His strongest appeal is to the facts of experience and it is 
from the moral consciousness of the reader, not necessarily 
enlightened by divine grace, that he seeks a favourable 
judgement. 
Croira-t-on, sur votre parole, que ceux qui sont 
plonges dans l'avarice, dans l'impudicite, dans 
les blasphemes, dans Ie duel, dans la vengeance, 
dans les vols, dans les sacrileges aient des 
veritables desirs d'embrasser la chastite, 
l'humilite, et les autres virtus chretiennes?lOO. 
For Pascal purity of life is clearly both the condition and 
the gift of grace. 
Jesuit Casuistry: Probabilism 
Having established the philosophical basis of the 
Jesuit doctrine of grace, Pascal turns in the fifth letter 
to the question of Jesuit casuistry and the moral laxity 
which it has condoned, and even encouraged, in seventeenth 
century French society. The material for Pascal's attack 
was furnished by the work of Escobar, a collection of the 
opinions of twenty-four Jesuit casuists, and by Arnauld's 
Theologie des Jesuites published in 1643 101 In this work, 
Strowski states, "Arnauld avait degage Ie double caractere 
de Ia casuistique: Ie probabilisme d'abord et l'innovation 
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ensuite", and it is the practical implications of these two 
aspects for society and for the Church that Pascal is con-
cerned to denounce. 
. t t t 102 dId h CaSU1S ry, as R.F. Stewart s a es , eve ope as t e 
inevitable accompaniment of the sacrament of penance, since 
the confessor was obliged not only to give counsel but also 
to judge between mortal and venial sins, by investigating 
the circumstances which could mitigate the seriousness of 
a particular sin. The ability to consult a recognized 
authority provided guidelines for the confessor while safe-
guarding the penitent. Books of casuistry, therefore, 
became a necessity, and probabilism evolved out of this 
practice. Where a difference of opinion existed among 
authorities on a particular question of moral law, a con-
fessor could follow the most strictly legal opinion 
(Tutiorist), a less safe but still probable opinion 
(Probabiliorist), or an opinion with even less probability 
(Probabilist). It is the latter group with which Pascal is 
most particularly concerned, for probabilism gave a confes-
sor the excuse for absolving the penitent while still allow-
ing him to follow his inclinations with no true amelioration 
of life-style. Stewart points out that St. Thomas' develop-
ment of the Aristotelian virtue of "epieikeia" or "reason-
ableness", the equivalent of equity in the law, gave 
probabilism further moral sanction by encouraging such 
codification. The moral laxity of the aristocracy, many of 
103 
whom had Jesuit confessors, as Pascal stresses , was 
notorious and Arnauld attacked it in 1643 in La Frequente 
Communion, protesting against the unworthy r.eception and 
inevitable profanation of the sacrament, thus precipitating 
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his censure. 
The Jesuit principles cited by Pascal in the Provinciales 
are those perceived by him, and by Jansenists generally, to 
be in direct contradiction to the law of the Gospel, to love 
of God and neighbour, and amounting to nothing short of the 
overthrow of Christendom itself since: "ils ont change la 
face de la chretiente,,104. The whole thrust of the Jansenist 
movement was towards a return to the simplicity of the early 
Fathers, Augustine, Chrysostym, Ambrose and Jerome, who were 
closer, in Pascal's view, to the Apostles. As Pascal points 
out in the fifth letter, when he asks the Jesuit Father if 
he were speaking against his conscience in citing Father 
Bauny, the Jesuits no longer follow the law of the Gospel as 
their guide in morality, but the principles sanctioned by 
their own Order. Pascal's Jesuit Father remarks, "Et vous 
pourriez les suivre en surete; car ce sont d'habiles 
gens,,105. 
In Pascal's view it is the overriding ambition of the 
Jesuits to govern the consciences of everyone, especially 
those of the rich and powerful, thereby gaining universal 
credit, which has made them use probabilism as a means of 
accommodating all types and abandon the certainty of 
Revelation. "La doctrine des opinions probables", says 
Pascal's Jesuit Father, "C'est Ie fondement et l'a.b.c. de 
toute notre morale,,106. Whilst some of the Fathers are as 
faithful to the Gospel precepts as others are opposed to 
them, Pascal claims that the former, unfortunately, cannot 
be counted as representative of the whole Society, which he 
sees as officially tolerating those who are lax. Ambition 
dictates that there should be precepts suited to all, evan-
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gelical or worldly, 
Clest par cette conduite "obligeante et accommo-
dante", conooe l'appelle Ie P. Petau, qu'ils tendent 
les bras a tout Ie monde . 
... Par la ils conservent tous leurs amis, et se de£en-
dent contre tous leurs ennemis 107 . 
Pascal underlines the self-interest which has replaced 
God for the Jesuits in their modifications of the traditional 
teaching of the Church in their missionary activities in the 
East, where, to gain converts, they have adapted to local 
religious beliefs and suppressed the scandal of the Cross, 
preaching only Christ in glory and not Christ in agony108 
This is a denial of the Jansenist view of the Church as the 
Body of Christ, continuing the sufferings of Christ as a 
con tinual 109 source of grace . Under the cloak of probabil-
ism the Jesuits are promoting a purely natural ethic in the 
guise of Christian virtue, for pride, the root of all evil 
for Augustine, has led them to substitute human reason for 
G d th ' " 1 11 0 o as elr true prlnclp e . Instead of presenting the 
faith, and the tradition which maintains it, as one and 
immutable in all times and in all places, they regard it as 
a rule which can be bent to accommodate any need, so that 
absolution results from corruption of the law of the Lord . 
... au Lieu "que la loi du Seigneur, qui est sans 
tache et ,toute sainte, est celIe qui doit convertir 
les ames ", et l,es conformer a ses salutaires 
instructions! ,111. 
The probabilists have, in fact, replaced the Christian 
moral rule with one catering to the individual "moi,,112, 
h ' h K' 1 h' 113 b 'th t f' t w lC ,as ral selmer 0 serves, lS e cen re 0 1 sown 
universe, where the moral grounds for an action are dis-
covered arbitrarily within the self. The will of that "moi" 
is "quasi divine". Christian virtue has been set aside in 
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favour of a purely pagan morality and a mechanistic observ-
ance of religion in tune with the self-sufficient temper of 
the times, in a world from which God has been banished. 
Charity has been replaced by the law and reason which are 
grace enough, as Pascal satirically notes, to achieve what 
amounts to a wholly natural virtue, since only the power of 
efficacious grace can free the will and convert it from love 
of worldly affections and unite it to God. 
Comme leur morale est toute paienne, la nature 
suffit pour l'observer •... La loi et la raison 
sont des graces suffisantes pour ces effets. 
Mais pour degager l'ame de l'amour du monde, pour 
la retirer de ce qu'elle a de plus cher, pour la 
faire mourir a soi-meme, pour la porter et l'at-
tacher uniquement et invariablement aDieu, ce 
n'est l'ouvrage que d'une main toute puissante l14 . 
There can be no compromise for Pascal, in the attainment 
of the sovereign good, between the rule of charity, arbi-
trarily bestowed and irresistible, and the power of natural 
reason. 
115 For reason, though unaffected by the Fall , and 
competent in its own order in dealing with scientific and 
mathematical truth, has no such competence in the field of 
theology or morality where, subordinated to the will, it 
follows the choice of grace or concupiscence. Pascal points 
this up by having his Jesuit Father compare the truth of an 
opinion of a casuist with that of an account of an event 
which has occurred in Rome. 
La plaisante comparaison, lui dis-je~ des choses 
du monde a celles de la conscience11o . 
The Jesuits have abandoned the true teaching of the 
Church by which sinners are humbled and turned to God, and 
they have replaced Christ's grace with reason, which absolves 
the sinner by rationalizing the choices of wills ruled by con-
cupiscence, in the opinions of casuists, and by virtually 
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abolishing sin itself. 
La diversit~ des jugements est si grande .... "Sj 
quelque dieu nous presse, un autre nous d~livre"117 
Absolution, moreover, is guaranteed, since a confessor cannot 
refuse a penitent armed with a probable opinion without him-
self committing a mortal sin. The conscience of the con-
fessor, supposedly illuminated by the law of the Gospel, is 
released from any such constraint. 
Je croyais que vous ne saviez qu'oter les peches; 
je ne pensais pas que vous en sussiez introduire. 
Mais vous avez tout pouvoir, a ce que je vois l18 . 
Pascal claims that the Gospel and the early Fathers have 
simply been abandoned by those who study positive theology, 
in favour of Jesuit moral principles formulated within the 
last eighty years. 
Direction of Intention 
In the sixth and succeeding letters Pascal describes 
the methods employed by the Jesuit casuists to reconcile 
contradictions which arise between their opinions and those 
of the Church, the Fathers and the Popes, and the way in 
which the casuists overturn, not only the Sermon on the 
119 Mount and the Decalogue , but also the authority of the 
King, the state and the laws of the land, so that worldly 
values, based on self-interest, "honneur" and "gloire", 
have replaced all other laws both natural and divine. 
Moral corruption is so widespread that conversion must now 
120 be on man's terms and.not God's . 
Accordingly, by the specific interpretation of a term 
dispensations from such requirements as almsgiving, were 
readily available. By appealing to special circumstances, 
the religious were relieved of obedience to the rules of the 
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Order to which they belong and, following the doctrine of 
contrary opinions, even the decrees of Popes in their Bulls 
are no longer binding, for in every Bull a positive affirma-
tion must always imply that the contrary is probable; and 
a favourable interpretaiton can be found. 
Vous voyez assez par la que, soit par l'interpre-
tation des termes, soit par la remarque des 
circonstances favorables, soit enfin par la double 
probabilite du pour et contre, on accorde toujours 
ces contradictions pretendues, qui vous etonnaient 
auparavant, sans jamais blesser les decisions de 
l'Ecriturer des conciles ou des papes, comme vous Ie voyez 12 
Even more subtle is their method of insinuating new 
principles into the corpus of the Church's teaching by 
allowing these principles imperceptibly to take root and 
gain general acceptance, so that they become authorized by 
the Church's tacit approval. In this category Pascal would 
no doubt include the Jesuit doctrine of grace itself, intro-
duced into popular belief through their coalition with the 
h . 122 T omlsts . 
These principles can be applied to all types of people 
whether priests or the dissolute, in whom the enjoyment of 
temporal goods takes precedence over the vision of God as 
the goal both of priest and penitent, and they reverse 
Augustine's rule discriminating between "use" and "enjoyment" 
of temporal and spiritual goods in the city of God123 . By 
the doctrine of Direction of Intention, the deflection, 
that is, of the intention of the penitent from an evil end 
to one which is morally acceptable, the Jesuit "sufficient 
grace li , allows a priest to practise simony, or to say mass 
on the day he has committed a mortal sin, or to exchange 
the sacrifice of the mass for money, so that, in debasing 
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the sacrament, the faithful no longer receive the grace 
which flows from it. As Laporte observes, "La vrai nom de 
la direction de l'intention est hypocrisie,,124. 
Pascal stresses that it was as important as probabilism 
in the practice of Jesuit moral direction, since it dis-
pensed altogether with the sincerity, humility, and desire 
for change to a purer life, which are the true conditions 
for the reception of absolution and grace from the Eucharist. 
A M' 1125 , h h" b 1 ' s 1e p01nts out, suc a mec an1st1C a so ut10n repre-
sents merely a "purgative" for the worldly who have no 
intention of changing their lives, a means of uniting human 
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and divine laws for "salvation on easy terms" . In his 
vilification of this practice, Pascal is discrediting 
"sufficient grace" itself, for the "intention", by which it 
makes an act voluntary and sinful, can readily be redirected 
and absolution obtained on false pretences, as it were. 
It was a particularly valuable means of allowing the 
Jesuits to reconcile the acts of violence, to which the 
aristocracy were driven in defence of "honneut", with the 
Gospel teaching which insists that vengeance should be left 
to God, so that even murder for a slap can be justified. 
The conduct of such people, Pascal reminds the reader, 
proves that they are, in fact, no different from the 
irreligious. 127 In direction of intention, as Stewart 
points out, Jesuit casuistry has surrendered the moral 
progress achieved both by the Gospels and the law of Moses. 
En verite, mon Pere, il vaudrait aut ant avoir 
affaire a des gens qui n'ont point de religion, 
qu'A ceux qui en sont instruits jusqu'a cette 
direction. Car enfin l'intention de celui qui 
blesse ne soulage point celui qui est blesse128 . 
Corrupt judges, usurers, fraudulent bankrupts, fallen 
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women and sorcerers are all favoured by casuists and dis-
pensed from paying back what they earn in their respective 
professions. 
Car vous avez bien trouve des expedients pour 
rendre la confession douce, au lieu que vous n'en 
avez point trouve pour rendre la restitution 
agreable 129 . 
Justice: Natural and Divine 
In the eighth letter Pascal hammers home the fact that 
the moral consciousness of people generally, accords with 
the natural justice abandoned by the Jesuits along with 
charity itself, when he cites the condemnation of corrupt 
practices by judges, by an order introduced into the 
Parlement by the First President, also a Jansenist . 
... et tout Ie monde a loue une reformation si utile 
a toutes les parties130 . 
Pascal demonstrates in the thirteenth letter how the Jesuits 
. have, in fact, reversed the order of natural and divine 
justice by elevating civil justice to a higher order than 
that of God Himself, when they make God abhor crimes less 
than men, and make men fear judges more than God, the Judge 
of Judges. In questions which concern only the Church, such 
as penance, contrition or the love of God, laws are readily 
subverted, but in those which concern the state and the 
Church, such as usury or bankruptcy, the Jesuits have simply 
divided them into theoretical and practical categories, so 
that the laws of God may be overturned while those of the 
state are obeyed. Pascal here underlines the relationship 
which must always exist as he sees it, between natural and 
divine justice, with natural justice as a shadow or reflec-
tion of Charity itself. 
Je ne vous reproche pas de craindre les juges, 
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mais de craindre que les juges et non pas Ie juge 
des juges. Crest cela que je blame: parce que 
crest faire Dieu moins ennemi des crimes que les 
hommes. 8i vous disiez qulon peut tuer un 
medisant selon les hommes, mais non pas selon Dieu, 
cela serait moins insupportable; mais que ce qui 
est trop criminel pour etre souffert par les 
hommes, soit innocent et juste aux yeux de Dieu, 
qui est la justice meme, qu'est-ce faire autre 
chose, sinon montrer a tout Ie monde que, par cet 
horrible renversement si contra ire a l'esprit des 
saints, vous etes hardis contre Dieu, et timides 
envers les hommes 131 . 
Moreover, theory and practice are so closely connected 
that once the first has taken root, permission to kill for 
the sake of honour or property, for example, then it is but 
a small step for such permission to be accepted by the 
state, so that the teaching of the Jesuits becomes the 
authority for civil disorder and crime. 
Qu'en peut-on conclure, si ce nlest que Lessius 
ruine Ie Decalogue et l'Evangile?132 
Pascal shows 133 just how far the Jesuits have departed from 
the teaching of the Church, and even from the natural law, 
in their tolerance of murder, and challenges them to return 
to the basic principles of religion and "sens commun". He 
stresses the respect which the true Christian always has 
for the law and those who administer it, presenting no 
threat of disobedience to King or state. 
Elle a toujours enseigne a ses enfants qu'on ne 
doit point rendre Ie mal pour Ie mal: qu'il 
faut ceder a la colerei ne point resister a 
la violence; rendre a chacun ce qulon lui doit, 
honneur, tribut, soumissioni obeir aux magis-
trats et aux superieurs, meme injustes; parce 
guion doit toujours respecter en eux la puissance 
de Dieu, qui les a etablis sur nous 134 • 
The Jesuits, on the other hand, do not respect the 
natural law or judges, as ordained by God. 
Dans vos nouvelles lois, il n'y a qu'un juge, et 
ce juge est celui-la me me qui est offense. II est 
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tout ensemble le juge, la partie et le bourreau. 
11 se demande a lui-meme la mort de son ennemi; 
il l'ordonne, il l'execute sur le champ; et sans 
respect ni du corps ni de l'ame de son frere, il 
tue et damne celui pour qui Jesus-Christ est mort I35 
The Church's express prohibition of killing, Pascal insists, 
springs from the belief that men are made in the image of 
God, and worthy, therefore, of holy respect, since they have 
been redeemed at an infinite price and are all capable of 
redemption. Pascal outlines the Augustinian concept of the 
two worlds into which all humanity is divided, children of 
the Gospel and enemies of the Gospel, mutually exclusive 
groups between which the Jesuits must choose. 
"Qui n'est point avec Jesus-Christ, est contre lui". 
Ces deux genres d'hommes partagent tous les hommes. 
11 y a deux peuples et deux mondes repandus sur 
toute la terre, selon saint Augusitn: Ie monde 
des enfants de Dieu, qui forme un 60rps dont 
Jesus-Christ est le chef et le roi; et le monde 
ennemi de Dieu, dont Ie diable est le chef et le 
roi. Et c'est pourquoi Jesus-Christ est appele 
le roi et le Dieu du monde; parce qu'il a partout 
des sujets et des adorateurs; et le diable est 
aussi appele dans l'Ecriture Ie prince du monde et 
le dieu de ce siecle parce qu'il a partout des 
suppots et des esclaves l36 . 
Children of the Gospel follow the laws of Christ who 
taught men to turn the other cheek, to suffer with him and 
share his disgrace, while the world of the devil considers 
it an honour to avoid suffering, to kill those who would 
injure them and curse those who are disgraced. Pascal asks 
the reader to decide whether the Jesuits belong to "le 
Hierusalem mystique" under God, or lila spirituelle Sodom,,137, 
serving "honneur" and "gloire" the twin idols of the worldly, 
the Devil himself. 
Reason or . Revelation 
In Pascal's view the Jesuits respect no independent 
moral truth, for in their doctrine of probable opinions 
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truth is dependent on each individual will. Yet they claim 
an equal authority for each opinion as an effect of predes-
tination in those who are absolved by such opinions. 
"Dieu, de toute ~ternit~, a voulu que la chaine 
d'or de leur salut d~pendit d'un tel auteur, et 
non pas de cent autres qui disent la meme chose, 
parce qu'il n'arrive pas qu'ils les rencontrent. 
si celui-Ia n'avait ~crit, celui-ci ne sera it pas 
sauv~e"138. 
In the Jesuit teaching, then, moral truth results from the 
arbitrary choice of wills ruled by concupiscence and turned 
irrevocably towards temporal goods, whereas it is a Christian 
duty to uphold not only natural justice but divine justice 
also. The Jesuits have taken the place of God in the ques-
tion of predestination by making salvation depend only on 
an outward conformity in religious practice. 
Thus they offer an easy piety, making devotion as 
painless as absolution, evidence for Pascal that they are 
simply in the service of the same idol, "gloire", as those 
whom they confess, and are subordinating their true aim, the 
greater glory of God, for the greater glory of their Order. 
Salvation, then depends upon the wearing of a bracelet, or 
carrying an image of the Virgin, which the Order guarantees 
will suffice, at least until a death-bed conversion. No con-
version of hearts totally dedicated to material values and 
pleasures, is demanded: 
Cela n'est point n~cessaire, dit-il, quand on est 
trop attach~ au monde. Ecoutez-Ie: "Coeur pour 
coeur, ce seiait bien ce qu'il faut; mais Ie 
votre est un peu trop attach~ et tient un peu trop 
aux cr~atures. Ce qui fait que je n'ose vous 
inviter a offrir aujourd'hui ce petit esclave que 
vous appelez votre coeur139. 
Pascal accuses the Jesuits of misleading their penitents, 
and lulling them into a false sense of security, by not 
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urging them to seek the grace which alone can effect a con-
version to God. 
The Church and the World 
In the ninth letter Pascal also underlines the mutually 
exclusive nature of the two life-styles envisaged by the 
Jansenist teaching, that of the Church, and that of the 
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world . Pascal is here clearly responding to the attacks 
of Jesuits upon the austere and ascetic life-style of the 
Jansenists, as unnatural and unloving, and attributable 
rather to disposition than to a true piety. Father Ie 
Moine's analysis of the two religious types corresponds well, 
in fact, with the "once-born" and "twice-born" categories 
of religious temperament described by William James 141 . 
"Je ne nie pas qulil ne se voie des d~vots qui 
sont pales et mEHancholiques de leur complexion, 
qui aiment Ie silence et la retraite, et qui 
n'ont que du flegme dans les veines et de la 
terre sur Ie visage. Mais il slen voit assez 
dlautres qui sont d'une complexion plus heureusesi 
et qui ont abondance de cette humeur douce et 
chaude et de ce sang b~nin et rectifi~ qui fait 
la joie,,142. 
In the view of N.P. Williams 143 , the Reformation repre-
sents a rebellion of the "twice-born" religious type, to 
which the Jansenists clearly belonged, aimed at restoring 
the Church to what they regarded as the spirituality and 
true teaching from which it had strayed too far in the 
direction of Pelagianism. Pascal here endorses the charac-
teristics of those who belong to the city of God, character-
istics which the Jesuits deride: the shunning of pleasure; 
love of silence and retreat, simplicity and purity of life, 
the elimination of all worldly attachments, even those of 
family, and the repudiation of "honneur" and "gloire" as 
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ends to be worshipped, all of which might draw the will 
away from love of God. Although the Jesuits clearly have 
attacked the extreme austerity and asceticism favoured by 
Port-Royal and Pascal particularly, it is nevertheless true 
that for the Jansenists there could be no compromise for the 
will between the rule of charity and that of concupiscence. 
Augustine's city of God has been overthrown by the Jesuits 
who reverse its order, and Pascal rejects the Aristotelian 
view of.man'.~ true end as a natural good attained by the 
:: 'f'; .~t:,,;, ;<>~,t~.:: ~ 
use Q,f'rea'$oh' :and by following the natural inclinations 144 . 
, \,... 
The vision of God is the true goal of man, attained only by 
145 the will empowered by supernatural grace 
Thus almsgiving, the crushing of pride, conceit, vanity 
and envy, which were the particular aims of Pascal himself 
towards the end of his life, are dispensed with by the 
Jesuits, so that the worldly may pursue natural ends, 
ambition, avarice and honour, and enjoy pride and self-
satisfaction as they follow their natural bent, for all 
these are merely venial sins. 
C'est ainsi que Dieu, qui est juste, donne aux 
grenoui1les de la satisfaction de leur chant146 
The Augustinian requirement for the appropriate use and 
enjoyment of temporal goods in the city of God is reversed, 
and all sins of the flesh become venial. Lies and perjury 
are permitted by the doctrines of equivocation and mental 
restriction, and direction of intention nullifies promises. 
Immodesty in dress and behaviour, and an ever lower standard: 
of purity in women than that demanded by the writers of 
classical antiquity, are proof that the Jesuits have fallen 
below a natural morality, let alone that of the Scriptures. 
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Sacraments: Confession 
It is in the Jesuits' attitude to the Sacraments, par-
ticularly the Eucharist and Confession, that Pascal exposes 
what he sees as their esential heresy, in making devotion 
"'plus facile que Ie vice, et plus aisee que la volupte', 
en sorte que 'Ie simple vivre est incomparablement plus 
malaise que Ie bien vivre,,,147. All that is required for 
attendance at mass, particularly revered by the Jansenists, 
is the outward observance of one's obligation in the 
quickest and easiest possible way . 
... "qu'il suffit d'etre present a la messe de corps, 
quoiqu'on soit absent d'esprit, pourvu qulon 
demeure dans une contenance respectueuse 
exterieurement,,148. 
But far more serious, in Pascal's view, is the mitiga-
tion of confession practised by the Jesuits, where sins, 
which cannot be made legal by the use of reason, and for 
which confession is, therefore, the only cure, are easily 
expiated, "'de pieuses et saintes finesses, et un saint 
artifice de devotion''', so that "lIes crimes s'expient 
aujourd'hui alacrius, avec plus d'allegresse et d'ardeur 
qu'ils ne se .. commettaient autrefois 1,,149. Mitigations have 
been devised for all difficulties associated with confession 
so that the shame of confessing a particular sin is overcome 
by having two confessions, one for venial and one for 
mortal, or by including the sin in a general confession. 
The confessor, was forbidden to ask if sins were habitual 
or oblige confession of circumstances which would aggravate 
them. Penitents could renounce both absolution and penance, 
or defer the penance until Purgatory, receiving meanwhile 
only a light penance in order outwardly to preserve the 
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integrity of the sacrament. 
Pascal calls into question the whole ministry of the 
priest, who stands in the place of the divine physician, 
diagnosing the ills of the penitent and healing sick souls 
by making them fit for the reception of the grace of 
absolution. True contrition, for Pascal, is the life and 
soul of confession; and sincerely and humbly exposing the 
state of one's conscience, as if speaking to Christ himself, 
and undergoing a penance as the pledge of amelioration, 
suffering as Christ did himself, are the prerequisites for 
receiving that grace. The confessor, in Pascal's view, 
ought to forgive only those whom he believes Christ would 
forgive, and Pascal spells out his sacred duty. 
Avez-vous l'idee veritable de votre ministere? 
Et ne savez-vous pas que vous y exercez Ie 
pouvoir de lier et de delier? Croyez-vous 
qu'il soit permis de donner l'absolution indif-
feremmenta tous ceux qui la demandent sans recon-
na!tre auparavant si Jesus-Christ deiie dans Ie 
ciel que vous deliez sur la terre?150. 
Since most of the penitents would be barred from the 
confessional on such terms, ambition has forced the Jesuits 
to abandon the early Fathers and follow only the most recent 
of their own moral theologians. Contrition has, in fact, 
been phased out and become unnecessary even on one's death-
bed, and been replaced by attrition, a natural regret arising 
from fear of hell, or even from loss of health or money, so 
that a supernatural grace is no longer required for absolu-
tion. Contrition, in fact, constituteD an obstacle since it 
wipes out sino, leaving nothing for the Sacrament itself to 
do. With sincerity and humility abolished, salvation may be 
attained by expiating sins by natural means all one's life, 
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thus dispensing with the love of God and the blood of 
Christ. Works alone are sufficient since God has performed 
in Christ the perfect act of contrition by which man's 
obligation is fulfilled. 
C'est ainsi que nos Peres ont decharge les hommes 
de l'obligation penible d'aimer Dieu actuelle-
ment .... Vous fera juger de la valeur de cette 
dispense par Ie prix qu'il dit qu'elle a conte, 
qui est Ie sang de Jesus-Christ. C'est Ie 
couronnement de cette doctrine l51 . 
Thus crimes which can not be excused by the Jesuits are 
absolved by destroying the priests' sacred ministry and 
obliging them to absolve, "plut8t en esclaves qu'en 
juges,,152, hardened sinners, without love of God, change of 
life, sorrow or penance, except on their own terms. Even 
worse, they have removed the very spirit which gives the 
sacrament its life, claiming that God is not necessary for 
salvation. 
"que cette dispense d'aimer Dieu est l'avantage, 
que Jesus-Christ a apporte au monde,,153. 
This, in Pascal's view, constitutes the heresy, to which 
reliance upon the false light of reason has led the Jesuits: 
that Christ's blood actually dispenses men from loving him, 
and that those who have never loved him in their lives are 
thus made worthy to enjoy him in eternity, while his priests, 
the mediators of that grace, are themselves the slaves of 
h ld d h d d f ,154 t e wor , an ave re uce grace to a type 0 maglc . 
Eucharist 
For Pascal and the Jansenists it is in the Eucharist 
that the Christian meets Christ and only through him receives 
th f 1 t ' 155 e grace 0 sa va lon . In the seventeenth letter Pascal 
vehemently affirms his loyalty to the Pope and the Catholic 
Church, which held for him the key to the Kingdom of Heaven, 
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i.e. grace, available only within its communion. In the 
sixteenth letter, where he defends Arnauld and the nuns 
against accusations by the Jesuits that they were Calvinists 
at heart, and did not uphold the doctrine of the real 
presence of Christ in the elements, he underlines the 
reverence in which they, in fact, venerated this sacrament, 
interpreting the view of Port-Royal in terms of his theory 
of the "Dieu cach~··156, developed in the Pens~es. Whilst 
the Jews possessed Christ only under figures and veils, 
like manna and the paschal lamb, and the blessed possess 
him in reality, Christians truly do so, hidden under the 
veil of the Eucharist, which, as Pascal points out, is the 
official teaching of the Council of Trent. The nuns have, 
in fact, taken the Eucharist as the principal object of 
their devotion, wearing the habit of the Saint-Sacrament 
and consequently are known as IIFilles du Saint-Sacrament ll • 
They are present night and day before the Host to make 
reparation for the impiety of the heresy which tries to 
d t 't157 es roy 1 • 
It is the Jesuits themselves, in Pascal's view, who 
should more rightly be regarded as Calvinists, since the 
nuns' conduct confirms their belief in the real presence, 
while that of the Jesuits is a denial of it. If they truly 
believed that the bread changed into the Body of Christ, 
they would demand sincere change and love of God in those 
who approach it. 
Si vous croyez que J~sus-Christ y est dans un 
~tat de mort, pour apprendre a ceux qui slen 
approchent a mourir au monde, au p~ch~ et a 
eux-memes, pourquoi portez-vous a en approcher 
ceux en qui les vices et les passions criminelles 
sont encore 'toutes vi vantes? Et comment jugez-
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vous dignes de manger le pain du ciel ceux qui ne 
le seraient pas de manger celui de la terre?158 
The facts prove that both communicants and priests desecrate 
the sacrament in their sacrilegious and mechanistic attitude 
which banishes Christ altogether. 
Qu'il est digne de ces defenseurs d'un si pur et 
si adorable sacrifice, d'environner la table de 
JESUS-CHRIST de pecheurs envieillis, tout sortants 
de leurs infamies, et de placer au milieu d'eux un 
pretre que son confesseur meme envoie de ses 
impudicites a liautel, pour y offrir, en la place 
de JESUS-CHRIST, cette victime toute sainte au Dieu 
de sainiete, et la porter de se mains souillees en 
ces bouches toutes souillees159 . 
Sincerity and humility, love of God and submission to 
his truth, are the conditions both for receiving this grace 
of salvation and for leading the truly moral Christian life 
under the rule of charity. Pascal deplores the slander which 
he freely accuses the Jesuits of, both in their personal 
attacks upon Arnauld and upon himself, and in the clearly 
unsubstantiated accusations of heresy against the nuns of 
Port-Royal. The credit enjoyed by the Jesuits in the world 
allows them to shelter under the authority of the rich and 
powerful, in order to further their intrigues, while their 
own principles dispense them from divine justice, since 
they are defending the honour of their Order, in the service 
of "honneur" and "gloire". 
L'amour-propre nous persuade toujours assez que 
crest avec injustice qu'on nous attaque; et a 
vous principalement, mes Peres, que la vanite 
aveugle de telle sorte que vous voulez faire 
croire en tous vos ecrits que c'est blesser 
l'honneur de l'Eglise que de blesser celui de 
votre Societe160 . 
Pascal quotes, in the seventeenth letter, the Jesuits own 
admission that slander forms the main line of their defence, 
"'il suffit de dire 15 fois que je suis heretique; et 
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qu'etant declare tel, je ne merite aucune creance,,,161. But 
their own principles will betray them, Pascal warns, since 
their reputation for encouraging insincerity will inevitably 
guarantee the failure of their tactics, and, even worse, 
place their own salvation in jeopardy. 
In his satire of the Jesuits, however, Pascal claims 
that he has not only the sanction of Scripture and the 
Fathers, but that his meticulous regard for the truth in 
denouncing their principles and the moral laxity they 
encourage, will guarantee a conviction against them, for 
"Vous sentirez la force de la verite que je vous oppose,,162, 
whereas, "Si la verite etait pour vous, elle combattrait 
pour vous, elle vaincrait pour vous; et quelques ennemis 
que vous eussiez, la verite vous en delivrerait, selon sa 
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himself, and his grace defends those who revere it. 
The disregard for truth required by the Jesuit tactics 
conclusively proves, for Pascal, the essential unsoundness 
of their doctrine, and that they are not under the rule of 
charity. He appeals to the facts for confirmation that the 
life of true christian virtue is that exemplified by the 
community of Port-Royal, founded upon reverence for the 
revealed truth of Scripture and the Early Fathers. 
Chevalier describes this life as, "obeissance,pauvrete, 
penitence et joie, union etroite des coeurs dans un silence 
tres exact et une grande attention aux observances, en vue 
d 1 f ' 1" ,,164 e a per ectlon re 19leuse Pascal himself found that 
this inward and outward surrender to the truth, striving 
to conform life to belief, was the only blueprint for the 
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authentic Christian life165 . 
Unlike the Jesuit principles, Christian truths revealed 
by the Holy Spirit, the immutable deliverances of God, are 
worthy of veneration, 
... parce qu'il y a deux choses dans les verites de 
notre religion: une beaute divine qui les rend 
aimables, et une sainte majeste qui les rend 
venerables 166 . 
filling the saints with the love and fear upon which their 
absolute dependence on God is founded. Purity of life, in 
an ascetic detachment from the world and rejection even of 
family ties, is, for such "twice-born" religious tempera-
ments, the condition of the continuous infusion of grace 
which will lead to salvation167 . Pascal underlines the 
practice of this virtue in the lives of the nuns, "ces 
saintes vierges"168, "dans une piete douce et solide"169, 
who not only love God and their neighbour, but even secretly 
pray for their enemies, the Jesuits, and the whole Church, 
while the Jesuits, far from desiring the salvation of the 
Jansenists, have prayed publicly at Caen170 for their 
damnation. The manifest discrepancy between Jesuit doctrine 
and its effects in human lives confirms the fact that they 
are under no such divine rule of charity. They have replaced 
God with the two idols, "honneur" and" gloire" , of a society 
whose modus operandi is "plaire"; and the practical appli-
cation of their casuistry has done away with the love of 
God, the need for a Redeemer and both natural and divine 
justice, encouraging pride, ambition, murder, lying, conceit,: 
envy, immodesty and every physical excess. 
Conclusion 
N.P. Williams describes the Reformation as "a great 
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uprising of the 'twice-born' genius and temperament against 
a religious system which had, consciously or unconsciously, 
become adapted in the main to the spiritual needs of the 
'once-born' man, and indeed of the 'once-born' man in his 
1 ., d t . d" 171 east asplrlng an mos easy-golng moo . Jansenism may 
be regarded, therefore, as a reflection of this movement 
and the Jansenist conflict with the Jesuits as simply a part 
of the on-going struggle for supremacy, within the Church, 
between these two traditions 172 . Elsewhere, Williams defines 
these two types and their doctrines. "If the 'twice-born' 
genius inevitably tends to conceive grace as power, it is 
no less true that the 'once-born' tends to identify it with 
intellectual Instruction or Illumination,,173. Officially, 
the Augustinian doctrine was that sanctioned by the Church, 
as Pascal himself points out, and the tenuous foothold of 
the Jesuit doctrine rested only upon the refutation of 
Lutheranism at the Council of Trent. Clearly the Jesuits' 
efforts to attain orthodoxy by the tacit consent of the 
Church to their teaching were greatly enhanced by the 
prestige gained in their activities as educators and confes-
sors of the King and the aristocracy. 
The Jansenists called for a return to the purity of the 
Gospel teaching and the Augustinian doctrine, untainted by 
Renaissance influences, and clearly saw themselves as 
disciples raised up by grace to defend an "efficacious 
grace" and the concept of the Church as the Body of Christ, 
a role in which the Thomists had failed. The Provinciales 
attempt publicly to discredit a Society which the Jansenists 
believed threatened the very Church itself, by dispensing 
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with man's supernatural goal and the supernatural grace 
accruing from Christ's death which the Christian needed to 
achieve it, replacing that with a purely natural ethic sub-
ject to the choice of the human will. 
The theological aspect of the Provinciales is concerned 
with proving Jansenist orthodoxy, first with an appeal to 
the Fathers of the Western tradition, and secondly by 
establishing identification with the Thomist doctrine, which 
is in line with the continuous tradition of the Christian 
Church. In the first three letters Pascal demonstrates, 
therefore, that the "sufficient grace" of the Thomists is, 
in fact, not sufficient except in a political sense, and 
that, with the Jansenists, they uphold the Augustinian 
"efficacious grace". He later makes increasing appeals to 
the authority of St. Thomas, and in the eighteenth letter 
establishes a total equivalence between the Jansenist and 
Thomist doctrines, by adopting the very modifications the 
Thomists had introduced to avoid the stigma of Calvinism, 
namely, the ability of the will to resist even "efficacious 
grace", and God's universal will to salvation. 
There seems nO evidence that this indicates a move by 
Pascal in the direction of humanism and away from Jansenism 
and Port-Royal, whose doctrine and discipline he passionately 
defends throughout the letters. That he was temperamentally 
suited to their doctrine and ascetic life-style is very 
evident in the ninth letter. Moreover, his protestations 
that he was not of Port-Royal seem designed to stress the 
loyalty of himself and all Jansenists only to God, and to 
show that each is under the rule of charity, and follows 
this in the dictates of conscience, while the Jesuits' 
allegiance is to their Order, where ambition and honour, 
the idols of the worldly, are worshipped in its glorifica-
. . d . d .. th . d' 174 tlon, In lrect contra lctlon to elr avowe alm . 
As in theology, so in morality, only grace, for Pascal, 
makes the Christian life possible, for it is necessary to 
understand Revelation and draw the will by the "delectatio 
victrix ll to God, his supernatural end. The Port-Royal 
ethic is embodied in Augustine's conception of the two 
societies, the city of God and the world of the Devil, the 
one using temporal goods and loving God, and the other 
reversing this order. The citizens of the city of God are 
the elect, the members of the Body of Christ, and it is in 
their relation to him through the life and sacraments of 
the Church, and in the practical application of his law, 
that their morality consists. The role of the Church in 
the Jansenist view is to show people both their sins and 
the physician who can heal them, to teach them to desire 
spiritual health and to pray that God will grant it. Their 
belief that only Christ bridged the gap between man and God, 
and that there is no evidence of God in the natural sphere, 
meant that the grace of Christ is the only source of salva-
tion, turning man from the love of creatures to the love of 
God, his true end, and thus raising him to the order of 
charity. Only the Church, through the sacraments, and the 
teaching of Scripture and in the Fathers, mediates this 
grace; outside it there is no salvation, no divine truth 
nor any saving knowledge of God. Since the Fall and the 
corruption of the will, the latter is inevitably under the 
domination either of concupiscence or of efficacious grace. 
The sins of ignorance or suprise, which Pascal insists must 
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be culpable, are evidence for him of the choices made by 
wills clearly deprived of grace. The law and reason are 
sufficient for the natural goodness and justice of the 
pagans, for scientific and mathematical truth, but useless 
for salvation. 
The Jansenists believed that members of the Body of 
Christ continued Christ's suffering in the world providing 
a continuing source of grace, so that purity, austerity, 
true piety, and conforming their lives to that of Christ, 
were the conditions for its bestowal. Pride, the making of 
self the centre of existence instead of God, must be con-
tinually repressed, while sincerity and humility always 
demonstrate the absolute dependence upon God which is vital 
for a continuous infusion of divine grace. The attitude of 
fear and love which Pascal believes the Christian must always 
have before God, together with the rigorism of the Jansenist 
life-style, reflect the feel,ing of "awe" in the face of the 
transcendent God, experienced by the "twice-born'! personality. 
Pascal stresses the essentially lawful and loyal atti-
tude expected of the Christian in the secular society, and 
the strict obedience to the law and state which he believed 
were ordained by God. There can be no conflict between 
natural truth, morality and justice and their divine counter-
parts, which the former merely reflect. 
In their adoption of a purely natural ethic based on 
reason, and with their doctrine of a "sufficient grace" 
given to all men, the Jesuits, in Pascal's view, have gone 
far behond Pelagianism, or even the purely natural ethic of 
Aristotle and of the writers of antiquity. They have over-
218 
thrown Christendom itself. He accuses them, in their devel-
opment of probabilism, of abandoning the true law of the 
Gospel and even the Decalogue, by introducing principles 
which accommodate the current worldly values of the aris-
tocracy whom the Jesuits wish to bring into the Church by a 
painless conversion, requiring neither renunciation of the 
world nor love of God, Natural regret, rather than true 
sincerity, humility and sorrow, suffices for absolution; 
piety has become mechanistic and a mere lip service; truth 
has been degraded by bla-tantly condoning slander, hypocrisy 
and lying; and justice bears no relation even to the 
natural law, let alone to divine justice thus undermining 
the civil order. The Jesuits openly encourage pride, 
ambition, avarice, sloth and other sins deplored by 
Scripture and tradition; whereas the spiritual discipline 
encouraged at Port-Royal has love of God to determine the 
rule of conduct and has purity of life to confirm faith. 
In their adoption of the Molinist doctrine of grace, 
the Jesuits, like the whole of the "once-born" tradition of 
the Church, were clearly attempting to give man some scope 
for human effort and free choice in the work of salvation, 
without which there can clearly be no human merit or moral 
growth. While admitting that probabilism became the watch-
word of the Society, H.F. Stewart l75 nevertheless suggests 
that, in the Provinciales, Pascal is less than fair to the 
Jesuits l76 in his attack upon their casuistry and upon the 
moral laxiety he believed it encouraged and condoned. Yet 
Pascal does establish a very convincing correlation between 
the Jesuits' methods of prosetylising at horne and abroad, 
accommodating the IIgods" of each society, which tends to 
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confirm the truth of his accusations. Krailsheimer's 
analysis of the society of the time confirms that "honneur" 
and "gloire" had, indeed, replaced God as the true end of 
man in the lives of the aristocratic and worldly, and makes 
it plain that Descartes' mechanistic view of the world was 
reflected in an outward conformity to Church and state, with 
the individual "moi" as the true axis of human existence. 
The deliberations of reason replaced the objective moral 
standards of Christ as the sole authority in Christian 
morality, dispensing with the grace of Christ, so that the 
choice of the human will, following the deliberations of 
reason, became sovereign in the matter of predestination. 
De Lubac confirms Pascal's accusations that the Jesuit 
order had passed from a Christian humanism towards a purely 
natural ethic, by banishing God and the supernatural to the 
sphere of the miraculous only, and by assimilating into 
their doctrine the presuppositions of the current social 
climate. 
Pascal's sincerity in the Provinciales is evident, and 
his claim that he has been factually correct in the trans-
cription of texts from the Jesuit casuists is endorsed by 
177 b h' . f h . many commentators , ut 1S own V1ew 0 w at 1S true 
doctrine and true morality must be assessed in the light of 
his ascetic temperament and conversion experience. As 
Gilson observes, Augustine's own doctrine of grace was a 
"metaphysics of inner experience,,178, and N.P. Williams 
points out that "man's conclusions in these matters are apt 
to be determined by their temperaments, and that the doc-
trinal schemes which they construct are, in the language of 
modern psychology, "rationalizations II, intellec·tual facades, 
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concealing one or other of the two great types of emotional 
l ' , ,,,179 re 19lOUS experlence 
Pascal's own experience impelled him to attribute every 
movement of the will in the direction of the good to the 
gift of divine grace; yet the same ambivalent attitude to 
the value of human responsibility and effort in the work of 
salvation is evident here, as in the Ecrits and the Pensees. 
Underlying the whole of Pascal's attack on the Jesuit 
casuistry is the assumption that man can, in fact, choose 
to renounce pride, ambition, the pleasure of the world, 
and adopt an inward disposition of sincerity and humility 
before God; and that he can ~spouse a morality based upon 
the Christian ethic, and upon love of God and neighbour, 
simply by the right use of reason and the free choice of a 
will unaided by the irresistible force of the "delectatio 
victrix". In Pascal's challenge to the Jesuits in the 
fourteenth letter, the Jesuits are confronted by a straight-
forward choice of accepting or rejecting the moral rule to 
which Christ pointed them in the Gospels. 
Car enfin, mes Peres, pour qui voulez-vous qulon 
vous prenne: pour des enfants de l'Evangile, 
oupour des ennemis de l'Evangile? On ne peut 
etre que d'un parti on de l'autre, il nly a 
point de milieu. "Qui n'est point avec Jesus-
Christ, est contre lui,,180. 
This ambivalence is particularly clear in Pascal's 
denunciation of the Jesuits' attitude to Confession and 
Penitence, where true contrition and love of God is the 
condition for leading a truly moral life. As John Oman 
states, "In His presence men realize that they are of unclean 
lips and dwell amid a people of unclean lips, even as the 
prophet did who saw God in His temple, because, in the 
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presence of Christ, penitence and the vision of God are one 
. bl . ,,181 lnsepara e experlence Neither Chevalier, who inter-
preted this ambivalence as evidence of a move towards 
humanism, nor Laporte, appears adequately to explain a 
phenomenon characteristic not only of Pascal but arguably of 
all the Fathers of the Western Tradition from the time of 
St. Paul. It is to their authority that Pascal appeals. 
The evidence of the Provinciales adds weight, then, to the 
view that the holding of such irreconcilable beliefs by 
such religious temperaments is more adequately accounted 
for in psychological terms, and that the doctrine of Pascal 
is attributable to the authoritarian tendencies of the 
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"twice-born" religious temperament . 
Pascal, therefore, ignores his own clear-cut distinction 
between the roles of revelation and reason by making reason 
the arbiter of religious truth and of true morality, a 
reversal of which he accuses the Jesuits in the fourth 
letter. Throughout the whole of the Provinciales it is to 
the "sens commun" or, by implication, to the moral conscious-
ness of his readers, presumably not touched by grace and 
even perhaps dedicated to worldly values, that Pascal 
appeals to determine not only the authenticity of religious 
truth in the respective doctrines, but true morality and 
justice as these are seen to inform the lives of the 
community of Port-Royal and of the Jesuit flock. When Pascal 
states in the eighteenth letter that Revelation and reason 
must not conflict, and that human morality and justice must 
bear an analogical relationship to their divine counterparts, 
he is affirming the role of reason as arbiter of supernatural 
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truth. 
Pascal, in fact, applies his own scientific method for 
the verification of an hypothesis to the field of religious 
truth, by looking to its practical application, to the facts 
of experience, to establish its truth. Hastings Rashdall 
endorses this method, and insists that reason cannot abdi-
cate its role, for "We cannot pronounce on the authority 
justly to be claimed by the teaching of Jesus till we have 
examined what that teaching is, and asked how far it appeals 
to our moral consciousness,,183. However vehemently Pascal 
affirms, in the Provincia1es, that only those touched by 
grace can know the truth, and practise true Christian virtue 
based on love of God, his "involuntary" intention is clearly 
to restore his readers to their true axis, God himself, by 
acknowledging in sincerity and humility the witness of His 
reality in the lives of devout Christians and in the teach-
ing of Christ. Rashdall argues that the moral influence 
which Christ exerts consists in "supplying an example which 
makes men more willing to do what their own Consciences 
. . ,,184 
en]Oln It is on just such an ability in man to recog-
nize the good through the "sens commun ll , and to respond to 
its call by the choice of the free will, that the writing 
of the Provinciales was founded. 
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CHAPTER V 
PENSEES 
In view of the insistence with which Pascal reiterates 
in the Ecrits sur la Grace and Provinciales the absolute 
necessity of the gift of efficacious grace for man even to 
take the first tentative step in the search for God or to 
live the truly moral life, the undertaking of an apology for 
the Christian religion seems somewhat incomprehensible. If 
one adds the small and fixed number of the elect arbitrarily 
chosen by God from the "massa damnata " after the Fall, the 
complete sovereignty of the divine will in initiating, com-
pleting and persevering in the acts which merit salvation, 
and the uncertainty in which the final discernment of the 
elect is shrouded, Pascal's intention in writing the Pensees 
becomes even more inexplicable. The harsh and uncompromising 
doctrine of the Ecrits, which, if published in Pascal's life-
time, would, in the opinion of Jean Steinmann1 , have invoked 
a condemnation similar to that given the works of Jansen and 
Arnauld, and would seem to preclude any possibility of per-
suading men to turn to God of their own volition, though 
given more muted expression in the Pensees and subordinated 
to the apologetic purpose, is in no way mitigated. 
Y t . . I d 2 b th e , as Laporte so convlnclng y emonstrates, 0 
theology and methodology show a faithful conformity with 
those of Augustine, founded upon the important distinction 
between the truths of the supernatural and natural orders, 
and the vehicles by which each is appropriated, namely the 
authority of Christian tradition and reason. Nevertheless, 
inconsistencies similar to those of the Ecrits and 
Provinciales point to underlying assumptions of reason as 
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arbiter of religious truth and of the human will as capable 
of a free commitment to God, which conflict with the funda-
mental Augustinian presupposition. 
Several themes and conclusions developed in the shorter 
works play an important role in the Pensees, reinforcing 
doctrinal presuppositions and contributing to the method. 
The Doctrine of the Three Orders 
The mathematical perspective which Pascal applied to 
the domain of theology clearly led to the codification and 
hardening of the Augustinian theology in the doctrine of 
3 the three orders, which, by making absolute the distinction 
between nature and grace, intensified the inaccessability 
of God at the natural level of the senses and intellect since 
it is only the heart touched by grace which can have a saving 
4 knowledge of God. Pascal defines "corps", "esprit" and 
"charitE~" as three heterogenous and ascending orders of being, 
each defined by the end the members of a group pursue, the 
difference in kind precluding access from one, to another. 
De tous les corps ensemble on ne saurait en faire 
reussir une petite pensee. Cela est impossible et 
d'un autre ordre. De tous les corps et esprits on 
n'en saurait tirer un mouvement de vraie charite, 5 
cela est impossible, et d'un autre ordre surnaturel 
Laporte defines the heart: "fond de la volonte, trefonds 
de l'ame, ou atteignons , la nous a fois ce qu'il y a de plus 
essentiel en la nature, et ce par quoi la nature se rejoint 
s'ouvre 
6 The heart in Pascal, in et au surnaturel" . as 
Scripture, denotes the. most intimate part of being 7 our , 
the seat of the will and intellect, where grace operates 
the transition to the supernatural order by inclining the 
will to love God and the intellect to believe with a felt 
certainty and immediacy which reason cannot give 8 It is 
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the "gouffre infini " , the capacity in man for the infinite, 
satisfied only by absolute truth and goodness, God Himself, 
9 its natural goal. The role of the heart is described in 
fragment LIlO, B282 where it can be seen to belong either 
to the "ordre des esprits", or the "ordre de charite". In 
the former it is "une sorte d'instinct intellectuel" which 
intuits the immediate principles (time, number, space, motion) 
"par sentiment", "d'une vue", whose extreme clarity is more 
convincing than rational demonstration10 , and from which 
all our reasoning proceeds. 
Car les connaissances des premiers principes: 
espace, temps, mouvement, nombres, sont aussi 
fermes qu'aucune de celles que nos raisonnements 
nous donnent et c'est sur ces connaissances du 
coeur et de l'instinct qulil faut que la raison 
s'appuie et qu'elle y fonde tout son discours .... 
Les principes se sentent, les propositions se 
concluent et le tout avec certitude quoique par 
differentes voies 1l . 
Chevalier distinguishes between "raison" or pure thought 
which, in the Traite du Vide l2 tends to the infinite, and 
"raisonnement", which Pascal opposes to "coeur", "cette 
faculte aux vues lentes et dures, qui veut tout prouver, 
jusqu'aux principes, qui ne comprend rien aux choses de 
finesse ou de sentiment, parce qu'elle veut toujours proceder 
par demonstration"l3. It places man above the level of the 
14 
sensory world and constitutes his greatness ,but knowledge 
of God from reason leads only to deisml5 , and such knowledge 
is sterile and useless for salvation. A true Christian 
believes by intuition.of the heart l6 , the gift of God which 
has united him with Christ and raised him to the order of 
charity. 
Et c'est pourquoi ceux a qui Dieu a donne la 
religion par sentiment de coeur sont bienheureux 
et bien legitimement persuades, mais ceux qui ne 
l'ont pas nous ne pouvons la [leur] donner que par 
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raisonnement, en attendant que Dieu la leur donne 
par sentiment de coeur, sans quoi la foi n'est 
qu'humaine et inutile pour le salut l7 . 
The absolute discontinuity in Pascal between the natural 
and the supernatural spheres implies the rejection of all 
natural theology, including the function of reason as arbiter 
of religious belief. The intellect must first be enlightened 
by divine grace in order to understand Revelation, the only 
18 
authority in religion and source of divine knowledge . 
Moreover, unlike Augustine 19 who believed that evidence 
of God could be perceived in his creation, Pascal rejected 
any suggestion of access to God through the natural world. 
"Si on vous unit aDieu c'est par grace, non par nature" 20 
The theme of the "Dieu cach~1I underlines the function of 
the natural sphere as the instrument of predestination, the 
action of grace illuminating the intellect of the elect so 
that they can perceive the qualitative difference between 
the unreal, transitory, material world and the truly real, 
eternal kingdom of God 21 , and recognize the divine self-
revelation in Revelation and the world by means of which 
22 they are enabled to attain their supernatural goal . 
It is the grace of Christ, the "Homme=Dieu,,23, which 
makes access to the supernatural order of charity possible 
for only he bridged the gulf between man and God, uniting 
them in his two natures, human and divine . 
... la religion chr~tienne, qui consiste proprement au 
mystere du R~dempteur, qui unissant en lui les deux 
natures, humaine et divine, a retir~ les hommes de 
la corruption du p~ch~ pour les r~concilier aDieu 
en sa per sonne divine 24 . 
Nous ne connaissons Dieu que par J~sus=Christ. 
Sans ce m~diateur est ot~e toute communication 
avec Dieu 25 . 
In the perspective of the infinite all finites are equal, 
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so that, while man considered according to his end may be 
judged "grand et incomparable", in the light of the super-
natural order he is "abject et vil,,26 
... le fini s'aneantit en presence de l'infini et 
devient un pur neant. Ainsi notre esprit devant 
Dieu, ainsi notre justice devant la justice divine. 
II n'y a pas si grande disproportion entre notre 
justice et celle de Dieu qu'entre l'unite et 
l'infini27. 
Conversely, to those who have been raised to the order of 
charity evidence of God's existence now shows that everything 
is his handwork . 
... car il est certain que ceux qui ont la foi vive 
dedans Ie coeur voient incontinent que tout ce 
qui est n'est autre chose que l'ouvrage du Dieu 
qulils adorent 28 . 
K.E. Kirk 29 points out that the Platonic categories 
of Augustine's thought enhanced the relative worthlessness, 
the vain and illusory character of the things of this world 
and the powerlessness of man in the face of an omnipotent 
God. Pascal adopts the Platonic imagery of Augustine to 
make men aware of the limits of their powers and the need 
for dependence, and to establish the disproportion between 
supernatural truth, justice and goodness and those of the 
natural sphere. Moreover, the ascetic practices and self-
annihilation to which Platonism gave rise as a means of 
releasing the soul from the prison-house of the body were 
, 'I 1 f 11 d bPI tIl t' 30 Slml ar y 0 owe y asca 0 ensure persona sa va lon . 
Yet, in the Pensees, there appears at times to be a 
definite change of emphasis from the unequivocally 
determinist stance of the Ecrits sur la Grace, which would 
surely have made the apology self-defeating, to one in which 
man does indeed have a role to play in preparing himself 
for the reception of grace. In describing the three states 
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of man in the Ecrits sur la Grace, Pascal stresses the 
absolute sovereignty of God's will in determining the member-
ship of each group. 
Et partant qulil y a trois sortes d'hommes: les 
urns qui ne viennent jamais a la foi; les autres 
qui y viennent et qui, ne perseverant pas, meurent 
dans le peche mortel; et les derniers qui viennent 
a la foi et y persev~rent dans la charite jusqu'a 
la mort. Jesus-Christ nla point eu de volonte 
absolue que les premiers reQussent aucune grace par 
sa mort, puisqu'ils nlen ont point en effect reQu. 
11 a voulu racheter les seconds; il leur a donne 
des graces qui les eussent conduits au salut, slils 
en eussent bien use, mais il ne leur a pas voulu 
donner cette grace singuli~re de la perseverance, 
sans laquelle on n:',en use jamais bien. 
Mais pour les derniers, Jesus-Christ a voulu 
absolument leur salut, et il les y conduit par des 
moyens certains et infaillibles 31 . 
In the Pensees however human reason seems to be respons-
ible, at least in some degree, for the classification to 
which a man belongs. 
11 n'y a que trois sortes de personnes: les uns 
qui servent Dieu l'ayant trouve, les autres qui 
s'emploient a Ie chercher ne l'ayant pas trouve, 
les autres qui vivent sans lechercher ni l'avoir 
trouve. Les premiers sont raisonnables et heureux, 
les derniers sont fous et malheureux. Ceux du 
milieu sont malheureux et raisonnables 32 . 
The right use of reason appears to be the criterion by which 
the latter are judged, yet Pascal explains that the indif-
ference displayed by this last group is so unnatural and 
incomprehensible that it must have an omnipotent power as 
cause, namely, the concupiscence resulting from God's aban-
donment of man after the Fall. They are "fous et malheureux" 
because of "un enchantement incomprehensible, et un assoupis-
sement surnaturel qui marque une force toute-puissante qui 
la cause,,33. Later in the same fragment, however, he shows 
a scarcely concealed contempt for those same men who 
apparently wilfully disregard their fate instead of seeking 
God. 
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Mais pour ceux qui vivent sans Ie connaitre et 
sans Ie chercher, ils se jugent eux-memes si peu 
dignes de leur soin, qu'ils ne sont pas dignes du 
soin des autres et qu'il faut avoir toute la 
charite de la religion qu'ils meprisent pour ne 
les pas mepriser jusqu'a les abandonner dans leur 
folie. 
The irrationality of Pascal's thinking clearly reflects that 
of Augustine who, as N.P. Williams observes, "whether con-
sciously or not, is really trying to run with the hare and 
hunt with the hounds,,34, in his insistence upon man's respons-
ibility for sin and need for an irresistible grace to avoid 
it. 
Pascal's Conversion Experience 
The key to Pascal's ambivalent attitude to man's role in 
the redemptive process, which gives rise to such inconsisten-
cies throughout the Pensees, can perhaps be found in his own 
. . . d d' th M ' . 1 35 h converSlon experlence recor e ln e emorla ,were 
insights gained at the experiential level, conflict with the 
interpretation of these in dogmatic form. As Gouhier 36 
points out, Pascal's conversion was a gradual one preceded 
by a period of spiritual barrenness and despair, during which 
he turned to the Bible and devoted himself to intense study 
and reflection, in an effort to explain the paradox of human 
nature and find the way to personal salvation . 
... je ne connais ni rna condition, ni mon devoir. Mon 
coeur tend tout entier a connaitre ou est Ie vrai 
bien, pour Ie suivre 37 . 
This fragment indicates that he was concerned to determine 
the future direction of his life which clearly presented him: 
with a choice between staying in the world or turning to the 
Church, through which the grace of redemption was mediated, 
and which in Pascal's understanding would imply the spiritual 
discipline of Port-Royal and Augustinianism38 The resolu·tion 
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of this conflict was effected in the act of ascetic renuncia-
tion and surrender, during which Pascal experienced God as 
the source of personal redemption, forgiveness and grace, and 
exchanged despair for the joy and peace resulting from the 
assurance of divine adoption. 
The conclusions drawn by Gouhier 39 from the Scriptural 
quotations in the Memorial suggest that Pascal found confirma-
tion, in the experience, of the basic presuppositions of the 
Augustinian teaching. It furnished conclusive proof that a 
saving knowledge of God results, not from the use of reason 
but from the divine self~disclosure ("Dieu d'Abraham, Dieu 
d'Isaac, Dieu de Jacob, non des philosophes et des savants"), 
and that the capacity in man for the apprehension of God is 
the heart, a matter of feeling ("sentiment"), and not a 
function of the intellect. The difference between a sterile 
deism and a response of love is clear in fragment L377, B280. 
Qu'il y a loin de la connaissance de Dieu a l'aimer. 
Pascal believed that it was God in the person of Jesus Christ 
("Dieu de Jesus-Christ") whom he had encountered, the 
mediator and only source of grace, that God is indeed hidden 
from the world, but is present to those who have received the 
gift of faith. 
Pere juste, le monde ne l'a point connu, mais je 
l' ai' connu. 
Pascal also concluded that the conditions for the reception 
of this grace and the attainment of eternal life were to be 
found in the Scriptures: a humble acknowledgement of the 
need for grace; an act of total surrender to the Church; 
renunciation of the world and absolute dependence on Christ. 
II ne se conserve que par les voies enseignees 
dans l'Evangile. 
Renonciation totale et douce. 
Soumission totale a Jesus-Christ et a mon directeur. 
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Eternellement en joie pour un jour d'exercice sur 
la terre 40 . 
The fulfilling of these conditions is clearly of vital import~ 
ance since the obverse of the joy of election is a, very real 
fear that it may be lost if God withdraws his grace. 
The profoundly numinous quality of Pascal's conversion 
experience 41 , the feeling of spontaneous self-depreciation 
before the transcendent God, of deliverance resulting solely 
from an act of divine intervention, ("par sentiment de 
coeur,,)42, clearly reinforced his Augustinian view that 
salvation must be attributed wholly to God's merciful giving, 
thus limiting the possibility of human effort and response, 
and diminishing grace to a power arbitrarily bestowed. This 
"creature-consciousness" 43 is described by Rudolph Otto as 
"a felt submergence and annihilation over against the 
numen ... here impotence and there orimipotence; here the 
futility of one's own choice, there the will that ordains 
all and determines all". It is given very clear expression 
in fragment L199, B72 where the disproportion between man 
and God is vividly underlined, and fragment L378, B470 
reflects the response such a feeling elicits. 
La. conversion veritable consiste a s'aneantir 
devant cet etre universel ... a reconnaitre qu'on 
ne peut rien sans lui et qu'on n'a rien merite 
de lui que sa disgrace. 
Yet the valid insights into the nature of man's relation 
to God, gained from this experience and used by Pascal as a 
guide to lead others to God, seem to imply a very clearly 
defined human contribution which denies such complete 
passivity. He perceived that: there is a capacity in man 
for the experience of God and for responding to God's mani-
festation of Himself, and that such knowledge is grasped at 
44 the intuitive level and cannot be proved by reason 
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reason plays an important role as arbiter of religious 
45 truth; an attitude of humility and sincerity is the pre-
requisite for the reception of the divine disclosure and 
pride precludes such an attitude 46 ; such humility and a 
desire for the truth must be awakened in man, so that he is 
receptive to God's self-revelation47 ; the truth cannot be 
48 imposed upon him by force but takes the form of an appeal, 
so that he will love it and freely choose it49 . Conversion, 
"therefore, involves the recognition and choice of God 50 as 
the meaning and end of existence and implies renunciation 
and reorientation of the wil1 51 , while the attainment of the 
vision of God depends upon the maintenance of the focus of 
the will in a close relationship with God 52 . 
H. Bremond states in Histoire Litteraire du Sentiment 
Religieux en France, 
Qui ne voit en effet que ce qu'il y a de plus 
original, de plus vivant, de plus fort dans 
l'apologetique des Pensees, de plus pro fond dans 
la vie interieure de Pascal, respire, cornrne on 
disait alors, contre les dogmes de Jansenius 53 . 
However, the narrow confines of the doctrine within 
which Augustine himself had given expression to the inter-
pretation of such insights, after a similar conversion 
experience, limited the scope of the divine self-revelation 
only to such a feeling of election, and the human response 
solely to those marked down for salvation and always to the 
effect of grace. Just. as the Ecrits sur la Grace constituted 
a defence of Augustinianism as the true doctrine of the 
Church, so the Pensees are an apology for it as the way to 
salvation. Conversion, on this narrow view, therefore 
implies an experience of the twice-born type similar to that 
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of Pascal himself 54 and occurring in response to the same 
stimuli: the feeling of lostness and despair; conviction 
of sin and the need for divine grace, the joy of forgiveness 
and deliverance; and renunciation of the world and submission 
55 to the direction of Port-Royal . 
The gift of grace is thus dependent upon fulfilling 
t . d" 56 cer aln con ltlons , and the world and the body of elect 
become mutually exclusive groups, the latter characterized 
by a spiritual anxiety57 which focused such attention upon 
attaining personal salvation (in Pascal leading to a type of 
rigorism) 58, that self-interest appears to conflict with the 
sincere desire that others should share in their deliverance. 
This seems apparent in fragment L427, B194 where Pascal 
states that the Church obliges its members to regard all men 
until they die as capable of receiving grace and becoming 
more faithful than the justified who could at any time fall 
and be in need of a similar instrument of grace. 
Pascal underlines the Augustinian view of election as 
mysterious and uncertain, dependent solely upon the will of 
God, when he states that all men must be shown their wretched-
ness but that redemption cannot be for all . 
... il est juste que tous ceux qui sont en cet etat 
Ie connaissent, et ceux qui s'y plaisent, et 
ceux qui s'y deplaisent, mais il n'est pas juste 
que tous voient la redemption 59 . 
Here salvation would appear to depend upon the acceptance of 
the Jansenist view of the human condition, but elsewhere he 
seems to betray a recognition of the true humility necessary 
for the ability to know God. 
Mais pour ceux qui y apporteront une sincerite 
parfaite et un veritable desir de rencontrer la 
verite, j'espere qu'ils aurpnt satisfaction ... 60. 
, 
The conflict between the insights of religious experience and 
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doctrinal affirmations gives rise to such inconsistencies 
throughout the Penseesi and a genuine desire, that those 
who seek God should experience Pascal's joy, is constantly 
negated by the arbitrary nature of election and the suspicion 
that the apology itself may even be founded on self-interest. 
The Aim of the Apology 
Pascal believed that the Church, Scripture, the sacra-
ments (especially baptism) 61, inspiration and prayer were 
the only means of mediating divine grace in the world. 
Je te suis present par rna parole dans l'Ecriture, 
par mon esprit dans l'Eglise et par les 
inspirations, par rna puissance dans les pretres, 
par rna priere dans les fideles 62 . 
Outside the Church, therefore, true goodness or justice 
63 
cannot be found , and truth apart from God is nothing but 
an image and an idol of charity64. Clearly Pascal sees his 
role in the Pensees as similar to that of a prophet calling 
Israel back from corruption and idolatory to worship the true 
God whom they have abandoned, offering, like Isaiah, God's 
mercy and forgiveness. 
Si on se convertissait Dieu guerirait et pardon-
nerait 65 . 
Pascal's challenge would appear to be directed not only at 
the agnostics whose social ideal was "honnetete,,66, but also 
at lax Catholics 67 whose worldly morality the Jesuits had 
accommodated in a Church which Pascal believed had become 
68 degenerate ,and he sought to persuade them to return to the 
authentic teaching and. spirituality of the true Church. Just 
as nature is an image of grace, so the Jesuits were only an 
image of the Body of Christ on earth69 . It seems clear in 
fragment L903, B851 70 , where he states that miracles are the 
supreme effects of grace, that Pascal interpreted the miracle 
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of the Holy Thorn as bestowing the seal of divine approval 
on Port-Royal as a source of grace and model of renewal and 
regeneration for the whole Church, just as Christ claimed 
his works to be proof of his divinity. The Jesuits are 
criticised for degrading the Church by granting absolution 
without demanding true penitence and purity of life, when 
God's forgiveness depends solely upon the state of the 
71 inward man Pascal accuses the Jesuits of reducing their 
"grace suffisante" to a sort of magic adaptable to every 
kind of man and to every occasion, but in reality leading to 
hell . 
... s'il y a des degres pour descendre dans le neant 
[cette grace suffisante] est maintenant au plus 
proche 72 . 
A d . t MIn ,. 73 th 1 . d ccor lng 0 e Perler e apo ogy was concelve as 
74 
a direct result of the miraculous healing of his goddaughter , 
and intended as his contribution to the work of the Church 
whose duty it was to mediate the grace of conversion in 
Revelation and in the life of charity75. As the instrument 
of grace therefore he seeks to arouse in men an awareness of 
their true condition, replacing the pride arising from self-
love and self-sufficiency by a state of humility and penitence, 
the prerequisites for the recognition and choice of God as 
the true good. 
Je voudrais donc porter l'homme a desirer dlen 
trouver, rla verite], a etre pret et degage des 
passions, pour la suivre ou il la trouvera, 
sachant combien sa connaissance slest obscuDcie 
par les passions; je voudrais bien qu'il hart 
en soi la concupiscence qui Ie determine d'elle-
meme, afin qu'elle ne l'aveuglat point pour faire 
son choix, et qu'elle ne l'arretat point quand 
il aura choisi 76 . 
In fragment L12, B187 Pascal indicates that he intends to 
break down these barriers by showing men that religion is 
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not contrary to reason but worthy of reverence and respect, 
and also of love since it promises the true good. 
Les hommes ont mepris pour la religion. Ils en 
ont haine et peur qu'elle soit vraie. Pour guerir 
cela il faut commencer par montrer que la religion 
n'~st point contra ire a la raison. 
Ve~e~able, en donner respect. 
La ~~~dre ensuite aimable, faire souhaiter aux 
bons qu'elle flit vraie et puis montrer qu'elle 
est vraie. Venerable parce qu'elle a bien connu 
l'homme. 
Aimable parce qu'elle promet Ie vrai bien. 
Pascal would seem to imply in this fragment that even 
without grace man is capable through the use of reason to 
recognize, love and choose the true good77 , evaluate his 
true condition and the validity of the remedy offered; that 
reason, in fact, is the judge of supernatural truth. More-
over, the impatient tone of fragment L427, B194 indicates 
that Pascal, consciously or unconsciously, expects reasoned 
argument to convince others, however blinded by passions, to 
turn to the Scriptures and the Church to find God, and 
believes that their refusal to do so is the mark of a weak 
intellect. 
Rien n'accuse davantage une extreme faiblesse 
d'esprit que de ne pas connaitre quel est Ie 
malheur d'un homme sans Dieu; rien ne marque 
davantage une mauvaise disposition du coeur 
que,dene pas souhai ter la verite des promesses 
eternelles; rien n'est plus lache que de faire 
Ie brave contre Dieu78 . 
Again, those who, clearly deprived of grace, abandon the 
truth because of the greater attraction of self-interest 
are held responsible for their lapse and labelled "malins". 
Les [mal ins] sont, gens qui connaissent la verite 
mais qui ne la sotttiennent qu'autant que leur 
interet sly recontre mais hors de la ils l'abandon-
nent 79 . 
Ceux qui n'aiment pas la verite prennent le 
pretexte de la contestation et de la multitude 
de ceux qui la nient, et ainsi leur erreur ne 
vient que de ce qu'ils n'aiment pas la verite 
ou la charite. Et ainsi ils ne s'en sont pas 
excuses 80 . 
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In Existentialism and Religious Belief, Roberts con-
cludes that in Pascal's view a man can exclude himself from 
salvation and that it is the human will which determines 
If' h d b h . t 81 man s ate, a Vlew s are y ot er wrl ers . 
Since the offer of fellowship can be actualized 
only through a human response of trust and love, 
it is a fact that man can exclude himself from 
salvation ... o If some men separate themselves 
from Him eternally, this reflects the fact that 
it is only a living soul and not an automaton 
which can enter into salvation82 . 
This does not appear to be consistent with the sympathy Pa~cal 
shows to those who sincerely seek God but do not find Him. 
Pascal's Augustinianism requires that, because of the mystery 
of election the Church can, in fact, go only so far in the 
work of converting men, and is restricted to preparing them 
either for the reception of grace which is God's gift, 
reserved only for the elect, or for condemnation. 
L'Eglise enseigne et Dieu inspire l'un et 
l'autre infailliblement. L'operation de 
l'Eglise ne sert qu'a preparer a la grace, 
on a la condemnation. Ce qu'elle fait suffit, 
pour condamner, non pour inspirer 83 . 
Men cannot find the truth by their natural lights, for it 
is only grace which can deliver them from the concupiscence 
which blinds them and makes them follow self-interest. 
"Priere pour demander a Dieu Ie bon usage des maladies" 84 
states unequivocally that surrender to the authority, rites 
and ascetic or charitable practices of the Church is useless 
unless the will receives the divine assistance of grace. 
85 As Gouhier suggests , the apology will act as a vehicle 
of self-revelation for the "Dieu cache", bringing to the 
elect an experience of individual certitude similar to 
Pascal's own, and establishing the rapport with God which 
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Port-Royal believed was the precondition for the life of 
h . 86 c ar1ty . 
L460, B544. 
Pascal's intention is clearly set out in fragment 
The paradoxical quality of Pascal's appeal in the 
Pensees is very evident, for whilst in fragment L427, B194 
he employs all the persuasive force of rational argument to 
convert men to God, blaming their refusal upon weakness of 
intellect, deliberate hardness of heart, cowardice or 
sheer bad form, implying a very real ability in man at least 
to dispose himself for grace 87 , he nevertheless states 
unequivocally in fragments L874, B881 and L149, B430 that 
their failure to respond and their indifference can be 
attributed solely to the will of God, in accordance with 
h d .. . . 88 h . f 1 th f w ose 1V1ne Just1ce t 1S re usa serves as e source 0 
their own damnation. Pascal would appear to be telling men 
on the one hand that they should make the right use of 
reason to lead them to God, and on the other hand that they 
cannot do so without the gift of grace. 
Method 
As Gouhier 89 indicates, Pascal's conversion provided 
the framework for the apology which understandably coincided 
with the Augustinian method and endorsed the Augustinian 
distinction, both the fruit of a similar experience 
recorded in the confessions; Gilson90 outlines the Augustin-
ian journey of the soul to God, beginning with self-
knowledge followed by faith, the prerequisite for under-
standing, and finally by rational evidence to satisfy 
reason. Central to the method is the view of the will as 
enslaved since the Fall by concupiscence and no longer under 
the control of reason, but ruled by the passions, its choice 
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determined by some perceived good with reason simply rational-
izing that choice 9l . In its analysis of the mechanics of 
belief, De l'Art de Persuader92 reveals the relationship 
between the will and reason in Augustine which both explains 
and determines the method. A change of belief at the natural 
level implies more than rational demonstration, for the will 
must also be persuaded by "agrement", an appeal to self-
interest93 . For a conversion to the supernatural order 
however, will and reason must be restored to pre-Fall equili-
brium, in which the will loves the divine truths and reason 
accepts them as true. It is in the heart, lila racine commune 
du sentir et du connaitre" 94 , where the two faculties are no 
longer differentiated that grace operates this transposition 
and gives an assurance of faith in a "certitude vue,,95. 
The fragments collected under the heading "Misere de 
l'Homme", then, appeal to the facts of human experience to 
make the worldly aware of the concupiscence which blinds them, 
to humble their pride by shocking them out of a vain reliance 
upon reason to bring lasting happiness, and to predispose the 
will to seek God. Explanation and solution are presented in 
Revelation (or more particularly in the Augustinian doctrines 
of the Fall and Original Sin), and in Christ in His Body the 
Church as the only source of grace, again seeking to induce 
humility in the submission of reason. Proofs of the divinity 
of Christ and of the validity of the Christian religion are 
offered to convince the mind, while the "Pari" fragment 
offers a final avenue of grace in the submission of the will 
or "automate,,96. 
Misere de l'Homme sans Dieu 
In the first section of the apology Pascal often assumes 
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the role of God 97 to teach men their condition, so that by 
the action of grace illuminating the minds of the elect, he 
will arouse the desire for God and lead them along the path 
to conversion similar to his own and that of Augustine 98 . 
Since the apology is aimed specifically at the worldly and 
indifferent in whom a state of despair would not readily 
arise, a strong appeal to self-interest is necessary in order 
to awaken such a response. Pascal bases his appeal on that 
f t d . t . 1 th . f d' A . 99 d A . 100 o ra l lona e lCS, oun In qUlnas an ugustlne , 
1 h . 1 . 101 f th d . f name y, t e Arlstote lan concept 0 e eSlre or 
happiness, as both universal and the most powerful motivating 
force in men's natures. 
Tous les hommes recherchent d'etre heureux. Cela 
est sans exception quelques differents moyens qui 
ils y emploient. Ils tendent tous a ce but. Ce 
qui fait que les uns vont a la guerre et que les 
autres n'y vont pas est ce meme desir qui est dans 
tous les deux accompagne de differentes vues. La 
volonte [ ne] fait jamais la moindre demarche que 
vers cet objet. C'est le motif de toutes les 
actions de tous les hommes, jusqu'a ceux qui vont 
se perdre l02 . 
William James endorses the psychological soundness of Pascal 
in so grounding his appeal, for he writes: 
How to gain, how to keep, how to recover happiness, 
is in fact for most men at all times the secret 
motive of all they do, and of all they are willing 
to endure .... With such relations between religion 
and happiness, it is perhaps not surprising that 
men come to regard the happiness which a religious 
belief affords as a proof of its truth. If a creed 
makes a man feel happy, he inevitably adopts it103 . 
Pascal is concerned to arouse men from the false security, 
the illusion of happiness, resulting from reliance on reason 
alone, which the Humanist philosophers promise, and compel 
them to face up to the reality of their condition and look 
beyond themselves, turn to God, the source of lasting 
happiness, and listen to Him in Revelation. The Entretien 
avec M. de Saci 104 clearly constituted a rehearsal and 
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appraisal of the first section o~ the projected apology. 
Pascal adopts the dialectical style favoured by Port-Royal 
to juxtapose the insights and errors of Stoic and Sceptic 
philosophies. The extremely pessimistic view of the human 
condition revealed in the Pensees clearly reflects Pascal's 
own feelings of lostness and despair before his conversion 
experience, characteristic of the twice-born religious type. 
The constraints of the apology have plainly required that he 
should depict the misery of the human lot in the most lurid 
and frightening terms, for acceptance of the Augustinian 
doctrine depends upon inducing a state of despair which would 
predispose wills and minds to hate their concupiscence and 
humbly submit to the Church. 
1 d h '1 ,105 t d l' h Pasca raws eaVl y on Montalgne 0 un er lne t e 
inconstancy and unrelieved misery of human existence, 
attributable in his view entirely to "amour-propre" , "gloire" 
and "ambition" which are the goals of the concupiscent will 
to which reason is subordinated. 
Les trois concupiscences ont fait trois sectes, 
et les philosophes n'ont fa~t autre chose que 
suivre une des trois concupiscences l06 . 
He adopts the Platonic imagery of Augustine l07 further to 
enhance the relative worthlessness and transience of human 
existence and of natural pleasures. 
He lays the groundwork for his appeal by stripping away 
the illusions with which men prop up their existence, concen-
trating on the gulf which separates men's aspirations to 
happiness and their ability to realize them. Reason and the. 
senses in which men place such faith are, in fact, unreliable, 
often at odds and create a state of civil war in man. 
L'homme n'est qu'un sujet plein d'erreur naturelle, 
et ineffa~able sans la grace. Rien ne lui montre 
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la verite. Tout I' abuse. C,es deux principes de 
veri te, la ra'ison et les sens, outre qu I ils 
manquent chacun de sincerite, s'abusent 
reciproquement l'un et l'autre; les sens 
abusent la raison par de fausses apparences. Et 
cette meme piperie qu'ils apportent a l'ame, ils 
la recoivent d'elle a leur tour; elle slen 
revanche. Les passions de l'ame les troublent 
et leur font des impressions fausses. lIs mentent 
et se traupent a 1 I envi 108. 
Imagination, illness, or self-interest cloud their judgement, 
for imagination, "cette superbe puissance ennemie de la 
raison", has established a second nature in man which induces 
false self-confidence and bestows undeserved reputation on 
others. Reason has had to yield and 
L'homme est donc si heureusement fabrique qu'il 
,n'a aucun principe auste du vrai, et plusieurs 
excellents du faux 1 9. 
Pascal states that justice is founded on authority, custom 
or ownership and changes from country to country. It is a 
matter of fashion 110 . Laws must be obeyed for their own 
k 1 111 b d h' 112 d f 11 h sa e on y ,are ase on owners lp , an men 0 ow t e 
laws of their country only because they have no true principle 
of justice. 
La coutume [est] toute l'equite, par cette seule 
raison qu'elle est recue. C'est Ie fondement 
mystique de son autorite. Qui la ramenera a son 
principe l'aneantit l13 . 
Pascal goes even further by claiming that men, in fact, have 
no true natural principles which are absolutes, but only 
those inherited from the habits of their forbears, a second 
nature which they assume and which can be replaced. 
Thus he systematically exposes the moral disharmony 
underlying the semblance of order and the apparently great 
achievements of human intelligence, as well as the unreason-
able expectations which bolster men up and make their 
wretchedness bearable. In reality, men can find only a make-
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shift order, the shortcomings of" which imagination cleverly 
cloaks by deluding reason, "thereby encouraging men to believe 
that by their own efforts they can achieve perfection. The 
situation is compounded by the fact that men never live in 
the present but recall the past or anticipate the future, in 
order to avoid the distress which the present often brings. 
Ainsi nous ne vivons jamais, mais nous esperons 
de vivre, et, nous disposant toujours a etre 
heureux i il est inevitable que nous ne Ie soyons jamais1 4. 
In fragment L128, B396 Pascal states that "l'instinct et 
l'experience" should teach men the truth of their condition: 
that they are incapable of attaining the good to which they 
, b h' ff 115 asplre y t elr own e- orts . Moreover, if they were 
truly happy they would not have to divert themselves from 
thl'n]'l'ng about l't l16 . Th ' t' t f h' , ~ e lns lnc or applness conVlnces 
men that it must be sought outside themselves l17 , and they 
are driven by a continual agitation to avoid the state of 
rest which will force them to contemplate their misery. 
Ce n'est pas cet usage mol et paisible et qui 
nous laisse penser a notre malheureuse condition 
qulon recherche, ni les dangers de la guerre, ni 
la peine des emplois, mais c'est Ie tracas qui 
nous detourne d'y penser et nous divertit. Raison 
pourquoi on aime mieux la chasse que la prise l18 . 
This concentration upon the hunt rather than the capture, the 
debate rather than the verdict and the fight rather than the 
victory, provides a succession of transitory pleasures which 
, th '11' f h ' 119 glve e l USlon 0 applness 
Pascal aims his criticism not only at the worldly whose 
chief distractions are hunting, gambling and feminine society~ 
but also at those who concentrate on intellectual or physical 
achievements which not only distract them in a similar way 
but will bring them renown and a transitory happiness. These 
also prevent men from reaching the point of despair, but 
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allow them to turn their backs on it and organize their lives 
in such a way that some absorbing occupation, however sense-
less or trivial, 'constantly distracts them and provides a 
temporary, illusory and makeshift happiness. 
L'homme quelque plein de tristesse qu'il soit, si 
on peut gagner sur lui de le faire entrer en quelque 
divertissement le voila heureux pendant ce temps-
la ..... Sans divertisnement il niy a point de joie i· avec le divertissement il nly a point de tristesse 20. 
Even kings must have continual diversion to avoid this rest 
which will bring boredom and despair. This boredom is like 
a constantly reappearing vacuum which must be filled and 
which in Pascal's view can be filled only by God121 . It must 
be avoided at all costs, since it faces man with his true 
condition. 
11 sent a10rs son neant, son abandon, son insuf-
fisance, sa dependance, son impuissance, son vide. 
Incontinent i1 sortira du fond de son arne, l'ennui, 
1a noirceur, 1a tristesse, 1e chagrin, 1e depit, 
1e desespoir122 . 
It is natural, in Pascal's view, for the man without God 
to love only himself and disguise the imperfections which 
crucify all attempts to attain goodness and happiness in 
this life, and drive him to hate the truth, since deliberate 
self-delusion is the only way in which he can love himself 
in his obviously unlovable state . 
... il veut etre grand, il se voit petit; il veut 
etre heureux, et i1 se voit miserable; i1 veut 
etre parfait, et i1 se voit plein d'imperfections; 
i1 veut etre l'objet de l'amour et de l'estime 
des hommes, et i1 voit que ses defauts ne meritent 
que leur aversion et leur mepris 123 . 
He must suppress the instinct which points out his faults, 
and, by extension, must himself avoid pointing out their 
faults to others, in order to be loved by them. Human 
relationships then become based on hypocrisy and deception. 
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L'homme n'est donc que deguisement, que mensonge 
et hypocrisie, et en soi-meme et a l'egard des 
autres. II ne veut donc pas qulon lui dire la 
veri te. II evi te de la dire aux autres;- et toutes 
ces dispositions, si eloign;§'es de la justice et de 
la raison, ont une racine naturelle dans son coeur124 . 
Man allows imagination to magnify the present into eternity 
and reduce eternity to nothing125 , drifting towards death 
without considering whether his own philosophy or that of the 
Christian religion has any merit. In an effort to penetrate 
the hard shell of indifference and insensitivity with which 
some men envelop themselves, denying the existence of God, 
careless of what will become of them after death and yet 
fearful about trivial things, Pascal attempts to shock men 
into an attitude of intense anxiety about their salvation, 
similar to his own before his conversion. The view, reflected 
in the doctrine of the three orders, that the pleasures of 
this life are as nothing if viewed in the light of eternity 
made death, for Pascal, the focal point of existence and he 
tries to arouse in the reader a similar perspective, under-
lining its finality with stark clarity. 
L'immortalite de l'ame est une chose qui nous 
importe si fort, qui nous touche si profondement, 
qu'il faut avoir perdu tout sentiment pour etre 
dans l'indifference de savoir ce qui en est126 . 
It is in the light of men's expectation in the next life, 
"eternellement ou aneantis Oll malheureux", that their lives 
ought to be directed, and it should form the basis of the 
moral 11'fe127. P 1 h' l' f th h asca sums up 1S ana YS1S 0 e uman con-
dition in fragment L434, B199. 
Qu'on s'imagine un nombre d'hommes dans les 
chaines, et tous condamnes a la mort, dont les 
uns etant chaque jour egorges a 1a vue des 
autres, ceux qui restent voient leur propre 
condition dans celIe de leurs semb1ables, et se 
regardant 1es uns et 1es autres avec dou1eur et 
sans esperance, attendent a leur tour. C'est 
l'image de 1a condition des hommes. 
Man is, in . 128 fact, a paradox and his nature dual . 
Juge de toutes choses, imbecile ver de terre, 
depositaire du vrai~cloaque d'incertitude et 
d'erreur, gloire et rebut de l'univers 129 . 
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In fragment L199, B72 Pascal develops the theological dimen-
sion of the idea of the infinite set out in De l'Esprit 
G ' 't' 13 0 t h h h d ' t ' b t eome rlgue 0 s ow t at t e lspropor lon e ween reason 
and natural truth points to an even greater one between 
reason and supernatural truth. 
Car en fin qu'est-ce que l'homme dans la nature? 
Un neant a l'egard de l'infini, un tout a l'egard 
du neant, un milieu entre rien et tout, infiniment 
eloigne de comprendre les extremes; la fin des 
choses et leurs principes sont pour lui invincible-
ment caches dans un secret impenetrable. Egalement-
incapable de voir Ie neant d'ou il est tire, et 
l'infini ou il est englouti. 
Pascal underlines the qualitative difference which exists 
between man and God upon which the whole of the Augustinian 
doctrine is founded. This fragment, clearly intended to 
evoke the felt awe in the face of the omnipotence and trans-
cendence of God and the consequent disvaluation of self of 
the conversion experience, highlights the inability of man 
ever to find God through reason. Man is, in fact, lost. 
Que l'homme etant revenu a soi, considere ce qu'il 
est au prix de ce qui est, qu'il se regarde comme 
egare [dans ce canton detourne de la nature]; et 
que de ce petit cachot ou il se trouve loge, 
j'entends l'univers, il apprenne a estimer la 
terre, les royaumes, les villes et soi-meme, 
son juste prix. 
Clearly, the infinite capacity ("gouffre infini" 131 ) in 
which, as Laporte writes, "l'homme passe l'homme", can be 
f 'll d 1 b d h' lf132 1 e on y y Go lmse . Pascal drives concupiscent 
wills to seek this sovereign good, underlining the urgency 
of the task by reminding them of the briefness of the life-
, 1 t' t t 't 133 span ln re a lon 0 e ernl y In fragment L414, B171 
Pascal underlines the folly inherent in this perpetual 
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escapism which merely postpones the moment when man must 
face death. 
Reason and Revelation 
134 It is reason , in Pascal's view, which constitutes 
man's greatness and distinguishes him from the rest of 
creation, for it enables him to reflect upon his condition 
d k '1' d t 135 an rna e ratlona JU gemen s . A tree cannot know that 
it is wretched, but the human individual's ability to do 
so should lead him to acknowledge his unhappiness and 
136 
recognize it as evidence of a fall from a happier state . 
It is therefore on thought that man must depend for his 
recovery and to find the object which will satisfy his 
aspirations 137 Yet Pascal goes beyond Augustine in his 
, 'f h'l h I' G d 138 reJectlon 0 nature or p 1 osop y as revea lng 0 • 
The theme of the "Dieu cache" stresses the total absence of 
communication between God and a corrupt nature 139 , while 
the doctrine of the three orders strictly limits the role 
of reason to the domain of natural truth. Similarly Pascal 
contemptuously dismisses the view that God manifests Himself 
through reason as "conscience,,140. Natural reason, though 
unaffected by the Fall in the sphere of science and 
th t ' 'II 1 bl 't t ,,141, I' rna ema lCS, lS P oya e a ou sens ln mora lty, a 
matter of "sentimen"t", where it is ruled by a concupiscent 
will. 
Nor can reason in philosophical systems, founded as 
th ,142 h th t d ey are upon concuplscence , agree were e rue goo 
143 is to be found , telling men to look both within and 
outside themselves 144 . Similarly, metaphysical proofs for 
the existence of God are sterile since they do not inspire 
1 f d 1 d ' 1 d' th' 145 Wh '1 t ove 0 Go I ea lng on y to elsm or a elsm . 1 S 
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philosophers and all other religions have been forced to take 
natural reason as their guide, Christians have been obliged 
to take their rules from Revelation as sole authority146. 
Without Scripture whose only object is Christ we can know 
nothing and see nothing but obscurity and confusion in the 
nature of God and in nature itself l47 . Having taught man 
his true state under concupiscence ("imbecile ver de 
terre", reminiscent of the "chetif vermisseau" of Sur la 
conversion du Pecheur) 148, Pascal nevertheless affirms that 
reason ought to acknowledge its inadequacy and listen to 
God, SUbmitting to the higher truth of Revelation149 . 
Clearly, for Pascal himself, the extremely pessimistic 
assessment of the human condition found in the Pensees, and 
the need to concentrate upon one's destiny in the next life, 
were endorsed and explained by the Augustinian doctrines of 
the Fall and Original Sin, as the source of man's unhappiness 
and frustration, and the answer to the paradoxical character 
of human nature. The hiatus between the desire for happiness 
("instinct"), and man's actual performance (llexperience") 150, 
furnishes evidence for him that man did once possess a true 
happiness of which there now remains but an empty print and 
trace. Man was created with an infinite capacity for God 
and tries in vain to fill it with everything else. Since 
losing his true good he is capable of seeing it in anything, 
even in his own destruction. 
Qu'est-ce donc que nous crie cette avidite et cette 
impuissance sinon qu'il y a eu autrefois dans l'hornrne 
un veritable bonheur, dont il ne lui reste maintenant 
que la marque et la trace toute vide et qu'il 
essaye inutilement de remplir de tout ce qui 
l'environne, recherchant des chosesabsentes Ie 
secours qu'il n'obtient pas des presentes, mais 
qui en sont toutes incapables parce que ce gouffre 
infini ne peut etre rernpli que par un objet infini 
et irnrnuable, c'est-a-dire que par Dieu meme 151 . 
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The wretchedness of man's condition, the anxiety with which 
he seeks unsuccessfully for truth and happiness, are for 
Pascal evidence that man has fallen from his original 
place 152 , for, like a dispossessed king, men can only be 
153 
unhappy about what they have lost ._ He quotes Ecclesiastes 
as showing that man without God is totally ignorant and 
inescapably unhappy, for he is equally incapable of knowing 
the good and of not desiring to know154 . 
Yet, Pascal affirms, those who have come close to this 
universal good, recognize that since it is desired by all 
men, it cannot lie in any particular object each pursues, 
but must be such that it can be possessed by all without 
diminution and that no one should be able to lose it against 
h ' '11155 lS Wl • Pascal clearly believes that the wisdom of God 
on this question is contained in the Augustinian doctrine. 
Voyons ce que fer a la sagesse de Dieu. N'attendez 
point, dit-elle, 0 hommes, ni verite, ni consolation 
des hommes. Je suis celIe qui v.ous ai formes et 
qui puis seule ~ous apprendre qui vous @tes 156 . 
He undertakes to teach men what all other religions have 
failed to do: where their true good lies; their duties; 
the weakness which led them astray; the cause of the weak-
ness; the treatment by which they can be cured; and the 
means of obtaining such treatment. Men are no longer in the 
state in which they were created, i.e. holy, innocent and 
perfect and capable of beholding God, but are shut out in 
darkness and subject to suffering and death. Man chose to 
rebel against God, making self rather than God his centre, 
seeking happiness in himself rather than God, who, as a 
punishment, abandoned him so that he has become like the 
b d ' 1 d b h' ,157 easts an lS ru e y lS passlons 
158 Concupiscence became man's second nature , the source 
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of all his voluntary actions 159 , and from which through his 
intellectual endowments he has achieved an admirable image 
of h 't 160 carl y . Without grace, however, which alone makes true 
goodness possible, natural achievements are of no value and 
man can only be regarded as "un sujet plein d'erreur, 
naturelle, et ineifacable sans la gr~ce"161 
The Grace of Christ 
l ' , S 11' 162 , In Pasca et Salnt Augustln e ler wrltes: 
Adam et Jesus-Christ! Voila selon saint Augustin 
et son disciple le coeur de la foi chretienne. 
Ils l'ont maintes fois repete. "Toute la foi 
consiste en Jesus-Christ et en Adam et toute la 
morale en la concupiscence et en la gr~ce"163. 
The Christian religion offers the only remedy for the wretched-
ness of man in the person of Christ. As Laporte states, "le 
remede consiste tout entier dans la charite, c'est-a-dire dans 
la predominance de l'amour de Dieu sur l'amour des creatures 
et de soi-meme, predominance qui ne s'obtient que par l'union 
a Jesus-Christ". In him, as "Homme-Dieu", the weakness of 
human nature and the power of God, nature and grace, were 
uniquely joined as the Entretien avec M. de Saci demonstra-
ted164 . The grace of Christ in the heart unites the partial 
truths of philosophy, "Le bonheur n'est ni hors de nous, ni 
dans nous; il est en Dieu, et hors et dans nous" (L407, 
B465), and completes them by transforming sterile knowledge 
into belief. 
Therefore, Jesus is the true God of men165 who came to 
tell them that they have no enemies but themselves, that it 
is their passions which cut them off from God, and that he 
came to destroy those passions and give man his grace 166 . 
Pascal presents the Augustinian view of the Atonement as 
effected solely by Christ's death 167 , and is concerned to 
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emphasise him in his Body, the Church, as the unique source 
of grace, who came to save men from God's anger and redeem 
them from the bondage of sin by offering his body and blood 
as a spotless sacrifice168 f "Je pensais a toi dans mon 
agonie; j'ai verse telles gouttes de sang pour toi,,169 
Without Scripture, without Original Sin, without the 
necessary mediator whose divinity is proved by the prophecies, 
it is impossible to prove the existence of God conclusively 
or t h d d t ' l't 170 eac soun oc' r1ne or mora 1 y . Christ came to 
k th 1 ff ' 171 f h' l'k th rna e e aw e ect1ve , or 1S grace, un 1 e e 
sufficient grace of Adam before the Fall, which permitted 
Adam to choose and perform the good, gives men both the power 
and the will172. Under grace man shares in the divinity of 
Ch ' t 173 r1S , and without it can be only corrupt and wretched. 
Sans Jesus-Christ il faut que l'homme soit dans 
le vice et dans la misere. Avec Jesus-Christ 
l'homme est exempt de vice et de misere. 
En lui est toute notre vertu et toute notre 
felicite 174 . 
Pascal saw Christ by his death as bridging the gap between 
man and God, the finite and the supernatural orders, between 
which there is an irreconcilable opposition without the 
atoning grace of Christ. In Early Christian Doctrines Kelly 
observes that although Augustine does stress the exemplary 
aspect of Christ's work, he perceived his specific activity 
to consist in his role of mediator and head of the Church. 
"What this doctrine seeks to establish is that in Christ's 
humanity fallen man and his Creator have a common meeting-
ground where the work of reconciliation and restoration can 
take effect" 175 . Gilson echoes the words of Otto when he 
describes Christ as the person through whom the just cling 
to the Father, continually cleansed by his blood and made 
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fl't f th d' , 1 7 6 or e lVlne presence True conversion therefore, 
... consiste a connaitre qu'il y a une opposition 
invincible entre Dieu et nous et que sans un 
mediateur il ne peut y avoir de commerce l77 . 
The God to whom Pascal is seeking to unite the reader 
is not the God of mathematical truths or of the philosophers, 
but the God of the Memorial, the God of Abraham, Isaac and 
Jacob 178 who fills the soul and heart of those whom he 
possesses with "certitude, certitude, sentiment, joie, paix", 
making them inwardly aware of their wretchedness and his mercy 
and making them incapable of having any other end but Him. 
Pascal's own experience clearly convinced him that this God 
of love and consolation is known only in Christ. Unless God 
places the grace of Christ directly into the heart, it is to 
be found only within his Body the Church, outside of which 
there is no salvation. Only within its communion are both 
love of self and love of God possible by incorporation with 
Christ, in whose redemptive suffering all Christians are 
't d l79 unl e . 
... on s'aime parce qu'on est membre de Jesus-Christi 
on aime Jesus-Christ parce qu'il est Ie corps dont 
on est membre. Tout est un~ l'un est en l'autre, 
comme les trois Personnes l8u . 
Humility 
Humility and purity of heart are the prerequisites for 
the reception of grace in Pascal, and the same ambivalence 
between man's responsibility and God's mercy seems evident 
in his attitude to these also. Pascal's impatience with 
hypocrisy, nominal faith and superstitious observance of the 
sacraments implies that an inward disposition of humility, 
or impiety before God, is the result of free choice rather 
than of slavery either to grace or to concupiscence. 
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Dieu ne regarde que l'int~rieur, l'Eglise ne 
juge que par l'ext~rieur. Dieu absout aussitot 
qu'il voit la p~nitence dans Ie coeurr l'Eglise, 
quand elle la voit dans les oeuvres 18 . 
However, elsewhere (L449, B559) it is God IIqui la [arne] 
remplit d'humilit~, de joie, de confiance, d'amour". 
Because of the Fall man is incapable of recognizing the true 
good without efficacious grace which gives both knowledge 
and action. The sin of hypocrisy or pretended virtue, 
which consists in a deliberate insincerity in the face of 
the perceived will of God, is therefore an impossibility. 
The humility which Pascal demands is that of Augustine: 
submission of the mind to the authority of Revelation and 
surrender of the whole being to Christ in His Church, both 
182 implying an acknowledgement of dependence upon God . 
In the view of Gilson183 , Augustine's conversion experience 
amounted to a discovery of humility and once Augustine had 
been converted, "his formula was humility first, humility 
last and always ll184. For Augustine, faith or the submission 
of heart and of mind by the right use of reason must be the 
first step, so that grace can heal the will and thereby 
enable reason to receive understanding. 
Deux sortes de personnes connaissent, ceux qui 
ont Ie coeur humili'e et qui aiment leur bassesse, 
quelque degr~ d'esprit qulils aient haut ou bas, 
ou ceux qui ont assez dlesprit pour voir la 
v~rit~ quelques oppositions qu'ils yaient185 . 
Pascal himself clearly belonged to the former category, 
"creature-consciousness" arousing a sense of sinfulness and 
wretchedness which led to a ready acceptance of revealed 
truth as interpreted in the Augustinian doctrine as the way 
of salvation. 
Je vois mon abime d'orgueil, de curiosit~, de 
concupiscence 186 . 
... un homme plein de faiblesse, de misere7 de concupiscence, d'orgueil, d'ambition18 . 
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Men can only understand their true nature, then, by the 
submission of reason and blind acceptance of this doctrine, 
on the grounds that it is a mystery and belongs to the sphere 
of supernatural truth, in spite of the fact that, as Pascal 
states, it is shocking to reason and his own concept of 
ordinary justice 188 The limitation of the scope of reason 
to a discursive function which works only upon finite 
principles precluded any competence in the sphere of super-
natural truth. Reason's greatness resides in the recognition 
that there is an infinite number of things which are beyond 
189 it in the natural world, let alone the supernatural . 
However incomprehensible then, reason ought to accept the 
doctrinesof the Fall and Original Sin as it does the 
infinities in mathematics as a "given" principle which cannot 
190 be defined or proved As the truth of the infinities is 
proved by examining the negation of the proposition, so 
Original Sin is acceptable on the grounds that without it man 
" h 'bl to h1'mself19l . P 1 L t 1S 1ncompre enS1 e asca , as apor e 
observes, is urging the reader to make Revelation not reason 
the working principle of his life as a source of illumination 
192 for the mind and purification of the heart ,just as he 
h ' 1 f d' d d th 1 f d t' d 193 1mse 1 an - ereJY oun cer 1tu e . 
Yet Pascal would also appear to affirm that our religious 
belief, though belonging to a higher order of truth must have 
the sanction of reason if it is not to become ridiculous and 
absurd. 
Si on soumet tout a la raison notre religion 
n'aura rien de mysterieux et de surnaturel. 
Si on choque les principes de la raison notre 
religion sera absurde et ridicule 194 . 
C'est Ie consentement de vous a vous-meme et la 
voix constante de votre raison et non des autres 
qui vous doit faire croire195 . 
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It is difficult not to conclude from fragment L131, B434, 
that in his enthusiasm to lead the reader along the same path 
as his own, to a similar experience of God, he is asking men 
to waive the voice of conscience and make a calculated commit-
ment on the grounds of self-interest. He himself is here 
clearly judging the doctrine of inherited guilt and the 
damnation of unbaptised children in the light of concepts of 
justice and truth which he recognizes have an objective 
validity for all men, even if he does speak of "notre 
miserable justice ll • On the grounds that our justice is the 
fruit of concupiscent wills it is changeable and unreliable 
(L520, B375), and since it is, in any case annihilated in the 
presence of divine justice (L418, B233), it ouglrtto be dis-
regarded in the interests of submission and salvation. 
In fragment L617, B492 Pascal again appeals to such an 
independent concept of justice and truth as having a 
universal validity to judge the doctrinesof the Fall and 
Original Sin as explaining the human situation. In recognizing 
that such concepts exist, he is also acknowledging the 
presence in man of a moral consciousness and the necessity 
for its sanction of revealed truth which clearly received just 
such an inner assent from himself. When Pascal stated that 
men recognized that the truth which they sought must be the 
same for all, this would seem to be an admission that it must 
be such as to appeal to the moral consciousness as true, and: 
can be accepted as a divine revelation only on those grounds. 
In Conscience and Christ, Hastings Rashdall underlines the 
truth of this presupposition. 
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We can accept the revel~tion only because, and in so 
far as, it appeals to the moral consciousness as 
true: it is because it does make such an a~peal to 
us that we believe it to be a revelation19 . 
It is enough to insist that no one really makes his 
submission even to the teaching of our Lord Himself 
absolute and unlimited except in so far as the 
actual injunctions of that authority commend them-
selves to his conscience 197 . 
Dieu Cache 
The theme of the "Dieu cache,,198 underlines the omni-
potence and inaccessibility of God and the arbitrariness and 
uncertainty which surround the discernment of the elect. 
Pascal states that God deliberately made the difficulties of 
man's existence unintelligible to him so that he could know 
himself only through submission and not reason199 . Every-
thing in the world points to the fact that God is hidden200 , 
and that the world exists solely to teach men about their 
corruption and redemption, so that they will recognize their 
wretchedness and their need for the grace of Christ201 . The 
only indicators to the cure for man's wretchedness are to be 
found in the "marques sensibles" appointed by God in His 
Church and perceptible only to those who seek Him with all 
th ' h 202 elr eart . Pascal adopts a fractious tone towards those 
who do not make this choice. Sheer self-interest and reason 
should convince them that not to consider these proofs which 
lie at hand is the mark of an unreasonable man. 
Qu'ils donnent a cette lecture quelques-unes de 
ces heures qu'ils emploient si inutilement ailleurs: 
quelque aversion qu'ils y apportent, peut-etre 
xe_n.c,ontreront-ils quelque chose 6 et pour Ie moins ils n'y perdront pas beaucoup2 3. 
Pascal states quite categorically however that it is 
neither sincerity of heart nor the submission of reason which 
brings salvation, for ·the choice is made by a will determined 
by God to be the slave either of concupiscence or grace, and 
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all willing, seeking or sUbmitting must be attributed in the 
final analysis to the divine will. 
11 Y a assez de clarte pour eclairer les elus et 
assez d'obscurite pour les humilier. 11 y a assez 
d'obscurite pour aveugler les reprouves et assez 
de clarte pour les condamner et les rendre 
inexcusables 204 . 
Et par ce moyen il y a assez d'evidence pour 
condamner, et non assez pour convaincre, afin qu'il 
paraisse qu'en ceux qui la suivent c'est la grace 
et non la raison qui fait suiv.re, et qu'en ceux 
qui la fuient c'est la concupiscence et non la 
raison qui fait fuir 205 • 
Revelation, then, is the divine instrument of predestination, 
for only those to whom grace gives understanding will turn 
to God, the remainder inexplicably deprived and left in the 
"massa damnata" in virtue of original guilt, yet judged by 
Pascal "inexcusables". The conclusion of Filleau de Chaise 206, 
rejected by Laporte, that the efforts of the apologist serve 
the justice of God rather than his mercy, appears to have 
some merit. 
Pascal's ambivalent attitude to the reason why some men 
receive grace while others do not, would seem to result from 
the recognition that, on the one hand, purity of heart is 
the prerequisite of seeing God, and on the other, that all 
salvation must be attributed to His will alone. The fact 
th t d 1 H . . h f' d' . 207 a some men 0 see< 1m Wlt out ln lng Hlm , contrasts 
with the strong affirmation that God wishes to make Himself 
. bl t h h' 1 k H' 208 h recognlza e 0 t ose w 0 Slncere y see 1m , t at 
seeking implies finding. 
Console-toi. Tu ne me chercherais pas si tu ne 
m'avais trouve 209 . 
The arbitrary nature of election in the Augustinian 
doctrine gives rise to rationalizations which are somewhat 
incomprehensible and in no way save the image of God as 
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loving and merciful. 
Dieu a voulu racheter les hornrnes et ouvrir le salut 
a ceux qui le chercheraient, mais les hommes slen 
rendent si indignes qu'il est juste que Dieu refuse 
a quelques-uns, a cause de leur endurcissement, ce 
qu I il accorde aux autres par une misericorde qui ne 
leur est pas due 210 . 
On n'entend rien aux ouvrages de Dieu si on ne 
prend pour principe qu'il a voulu aveugler les uns 
et eclaircir les autres 211 . 
Pascal's God is a God of love and consolation but only for 
those whom He enlightens with His grace. The joy and relief 
which the assurance of election gave Pascal himself is 
'd 212 b h h eVl ent , ut e can offer no suc assurance to those who 
seek God but have not been blessed with a similar experience. 
Nor, in view of its supernatural status, can the divine 
dispensation be judged by the same yardstick which Pascal 
applies to the actions of his fellows. 
The Role of the Heart 
The capacity in man for the perception of first princi-
ples in mathematics, which cannot be proved by reason, is 
the heart acting as an intellectual instinct213 . As Pascal 
states in De l'Art de Persuader, it is into this intuitive 
capacity that God instils knowledge of Himself 214 . Just as 
reason cannot prove or disprove rational principles, so this 
"felt" knowledge of God cannot be proved by dogma or dis-
proved by scepticism215 . For a belief which makes men say 
not "I know" but "I believe,,216, God not only reveals Himself 
but inclines the will to love His self-disclosure. 
Ne vous etonnez pas de voir des personnes simples 
croire sans raisonnement. Dieu leur donne l'amour 
de soi et la haine d'eux-memes. 11 incline leur 
coeur a croire. On ne croira jamais, d'une creance 
utile et de foi si Dieu n'incline le coeur et on 
croira des qu'il l'inclinera217 . 
Central to the method of the Pensees is the Augustinian 
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view of the will or heart as one of the chief organs of 
belief, not because it forms belief, but because it accepts 
or rejects truth presented to it, and reason follows its 
h ' 218 c Olce . For Pascal, as for Augustine moreover, belief 
implies action so that whatever the heart loves as its end 
or ideal, God or self, is the mainspring of all men do. 
Le coeur a ses raisons que la raison ne connalt 
point; on Ie sait en mille choses. 
Je dis que le coeur aime l'etre universel nature 1-
lement et soi-meme naturellement, selon qu'il sly 
adonne, et il se durcit contre l'un ou l'autre A 
sonchoix. vous avez rejete l'un et conserve 
1 I autre; est-ce par raison que v.ous v.ous aimez 219. /\ 
This was directly opposed to the Aristotelian relationship 
between will and reason adopted by Aquinas and the Jesuits 220 , 
in which the act of choice is elicited by the will but under 
the command or judgement of reason and therefore "formally" 
an act of reason. 
Pascal indicates that the method of exposition cannot 
be that of intellectual activity, the use of principles or 
logical demonstration, since God wishes to touch the heart 
and humble it so that it will love the truth22l , inducing 
humility rather than pride. In order to arouse love, it is 
f l ' 222 'd' ", , h' h ee lng ,.an lmme late, lntultlve assurance, In w lC we 
should put our faith 223 . G h ' 224, h t h ou ler pOlnts out tat e 
"sentiment" felt by Pascal during his experience of God was 
of the kind described in fragment L75l, B3 in which reason 
plays no part, but the act of judgement is made by penetra-
tion of the heart "d'une vue". Pascal therefore adopts the 
225 
order or, as Gilson observes , the lack of order to be 
found in Augustine, Scripture, Christ and St. Paul, namely, 
digression upon each point which relates to the end, so that 
this will always be kept in sight 226 . In the view of 
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Chevalier 227 the heart arrives at certitude by making a 
228 
synthesis of probabilities. Laporte , however, insists 
that the heart operates a transition to the order of charity 
only insofar as it is illuminated by divine grace. The heart, 
he believes, has only two direct involvements in the apology: 
when, under the inspiration of grace it opens the mind at the 
beginning to proofs which Pascal will present; and at the end 
when it gives the absolute assurance born of inspiration. 
The "Pari" Fragment 
In the "Pari ll fragment (L4l8, B233) Pascal makes a final 
assault on the concupiscent wills of the most indifferent for 
whom Revelation or proofs have failed to bring individual 
certainty. In a powerful and somewhat blatant appeal to 
self-interest, which shocked the inhabitants of Port-Royal, 
Pascal seeks to persuade the sceptical by "agrement" to sub-
ject their wills to a third avenue by which the grace of 
conversion is mediated, namely, the observances and charitable 
practices of the Church. The method is that of the whole work: 
an appeal to reason to acknowledge its inadequacy to find the 
sovereign good, thereby inducing humility and submission of 
the will to the grace of Christ in His Church. The whole of 
the appeal is couched in mathematical terms, with a full 
statement of the three orders serving to underline the range 
of reason in the field of natural and supernatural truth, the 
"otherness" and inaccessibility of God, and the unknowableness 
of both His existence and His attributes. 
S'il Y a un Dieu il est infiniment incomprehensible, 
puisque n'ayant ni parties ni bornes, il nla nul 
rapport a nous. Nous sommes donc incapables de 
connaitre ni ce qu'il est ni s'il est 229 . 
He points to the conclusion of De l'Esprit Geometrique 230 
to underscore this gulf: just as reason can know the exist-
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ence of the infinite without being able to understand its 
nature, so grace can give us knowledge of God's existence 
although we cannot know His nature until the next life. In 
fragment L975, B275 Pascal states that conversion consists 
in more than mere thought. 
Les hommes prennent souvent leur imagination pour 
leur coeur; et ils croient etre convertis des 
qu'ils pen sent a se convertir. 
An act of renunciation is indispensable, in Pascal's view, 
because reason follows the concupiscent will and rationalizes 
whatever it chooses to accept as the end or ideal of existence. 
Tout notre raisonnement se reduit a ceder au 
sentiment . 
... La raison s'offre mais elle est ployable a 
tous sens 231 . 
Thus in fragment L821, B252 Pascal states that habit provides 
the strongest proofs which will convince the indifferent and 
make them Christians. Man is as much automaton as mind, and 
the "automate" must be trained to accept belief in God as the 
working principle for the moral life, just as night and day 
and the inevitability of death are accepted unquestioningly 
by reason. 
Enfin il faut avoir recours a elle quand une fois 
l'esprit a vu ou est la verite afin de nous 
abreuver et nous teindre de cette creance qui nous 
echappe a toute heure, car d'en avoir toujours les 
preuves presentes c'est trop d'affaire. II faut 
acquerir une creance plus facile qui est celIe de 
l'habitude .... II faut donc faire croire nos deux 
pieces, l'esprit par les raisons qu'il suffit 
d'avoir vues une fois en sa vie et l'automate par 
la coutume, et en ne lui permettant pas de s'incliner 
au contraire 232 . 
The will or "automate" trains the mind into an instinct-
ive belief by keeping its attention fixed upon divine Revela-
t ' 233 lon • In a footnote to the "Pari" fragment Brunschvicg 
234 quotes from the "Avis" of the Port-Royal pUblication which 
states that Pascal intended it as an encouragement to the 
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worldly and uncommitted, that it is to their advantage to 
believe and to make some effort to prepare themselves for 
the reception of grace by giving up obstacles to faith, "les 
passions et les vains amusements .. 235 . It seems evident that 
Pascal envisaged such a faith arising through identification 
with the spiritual life and charitable practices of Port-
Royal, an option in which belief was dramatically authentic a-
ted for him, rather than through the superstitious observan-
ces of the Jesuits. 
Les penitences exterieures disposent a l'interieure 
comme les humiliations a l'humilite 236 . 
Various writers endorse as psychologically sound the advice 
given by Pascal in the "Pari" fragment, both as a means of 
arou~ing an awareness of God as present, and of amelioration 
of the moral life and validation of a system of belief. 
H.D. Lewis observes that instruments of worship predispose 
a person to be exceptionally aware of God 237 . Of the rites 
and sacraments of the Church H.D. Rashdall writes: 
They are all means by which the good influences 
that ultimately spring from God and from Christ, and 
that are transmitted by the Society which Christ 
founded, may be brought to bear upon the individual 
soul and the individual life 238 . 
Pascal emphasises the importance of habit for effecting a 
reorientation of belief and moral principles. 
Qu'est-ce que nos principes naturels sinon nos 
principes accoutumes .... Une differente coutume en 
donnera d'autres principes naturels. Cela se voit 
, . 239 par experlence ... . 
John Oman confirms the primacy of the choice of moral environ-
ment or ideal: 
Victory over ourselves ... is not possible by resolu-
tion, however courageous, but only by finding a 
better environment waiting to be possessed 240 . 
In his essay The Will to Believe, William James concedes that 
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Pascal's appeal to reason to persuade men to opt for God out 
of sheer self-interest seems dishonest and inexplicable in 
, f h 'f 1 t' 241 Vlew 0 t e uncertalnty 0 e ec lon Yet, he also 
observes that, where objective certitude is impossible, the 
empirical approach to religious belief advocated by Pascal, 
where faith in the truth must, as in the scientific approach, 
d 'd f h t' 't ' , f t I'd 242 prece e eVl ence 0- aut en lCl y, lS ln ac a va lone . 
Krailsheimer and Chevalier believe that Pascal in fact 
applied to the domain of religious truth the scientific 
method of the Traite du Vide, namely "soumission aux faits" 
which "facts" in this order of knowledge consist in the 
"given" truths of Revelation. Grace will provide certainty, 
for "quand l'homme fait ce qui est en lui, Dieu fait Ie 
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reste" . Pascal, however, denies both the possibility of 
making such a commitment and the inevitability of the reward. 
In fragment L814, B6 he states that whilst the consequences 
of our individual choices are momentous for our lives, since 
environment shapes belief, our choices are, paradoxically, 
already predetermined. 
Ainsi cela fait un cercle dont sont bienheureux 
ceux qui sortent. 
A man can open his mind to proofs of Christianity, con-
firm himself in it through habit, but faith issues only from 
inspiration, the unmerited gift of the grace of Christ, 
wh·ich alone can produce the real and salutary effect, "ne 
t h ' ,,,244 evacue ur crux C rlstl . Pascal can only pray that God 
will not only enlighten his own intellect to give his argu-
ments persuasive force but also those of his readers who are 
d t ' d t "11' t' 245 pre es lne 0 recelve 1 umlna lon . Laporte defines the 
role of the Jansenist apologist: lIil faut planter et arroser 
comme s'il le devait donr'ter partout et toujours,,246. 
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Tous 
The need to encourage at least the hope of finding the 
sovereign good by affirming some measure of human responsi-
bility in the redemptive process, demanded by the apology 
and recognized by Pascal himself, is clearly responsible for 
the apparent tempering of the uncompromising predestinarian-
ism which, Pascal admits in fragment L912 B78, would be self-
defeating. If grace is not available to all, concupiscent 
wills may not warm to a life of renunciation on the slender 
chance of becoming one of the small number of elect. As in 
th P . . 1 247 P I f th k f d . e rOVlnCla es asca moves or e sa e 0 expe lency 
to the stance of an antecedent and consequent salvific will 
in God 
Aussi c'est a Jesus-Christ d'etre universel; 
l'Eglise meme n'offre Ie sacrifice que pour les 
fideles. Jesus-Christ a offert celui de la croix 
pour tous 248 . 
Jesus-Christ redempteur de tous. Qui, car il a 
offert comme un homme qui a rachete tous ceux qui 
voudront venir a lui. Ceux qui mourront en chemin 
c'est leur malheur, mais quant a lui il leur 
offrait redemption .•.. Jesus-Christ en qualite de 
redempteur n'est pas peut-etre maitre de tous, et 
ainsi en tant qu'il est en lui il est redemRteur 
de tous 249 . 
The introductory sentence of fragment L931, B550, which was 
struck out by Pascal, also suggests that he was prepared to 
go as far as possible to mollify the harsh predestinarianism 
of the Augustinian doctrine to encourage a reorientation of 
life and the hope of redemption, though not quite to the 
admission of a universalism implied by the deleted statement. 
J'aime tous les hommes comme mes freres, parce 
qu'ils sont tous rachetes 250 • 
; 251 Clearly, as Brunschvlcg points out, the extreme pre-
destinarian stance of the Jansenists in its practical appli-
cation would be an attitude of fatalism towards salvation, 
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and that had not been missed by the society of the time, and 
must have challenged the ingenuity of Pascal in the writing 
of this work. Elsewhere, however, Pascal does not appear 
to be conscious of the need for any such modifications. 
Fragment L467, B449 states that though all must be shown 
their wretchedness, redemption is not for all, and fragment 
L469, B597 alleges that God has used the blindness of people 
for the benefit of the elect. The reader is reminded that 
just as Christ saved one of the two robbers who flanked him 
on the Cross, when both were apparently equally guilty, so 
he saves the elect and damns the reprobate for the same 
. 252 
crlme Pascal conveniently ignores the crucial factor 
of the redeemed thief's sincerity and humility in the face 
of the truth, quite clearly the only divine criterion for 
forgiveness and salvation. He follows Augustine in his 
claim that "omnes" must not always be interpreted as "all" 
in the general sense, that to do so is in fact heresy, for 
it must accord with the interpretations of the Church, 
bl 1 . d b' 253 E . 1 presuma y al own y Augustlne xperlence c early 
inclines Pascal to the latter view of election. 
Chevalier interprets these fragments, especially L931, 
B550, as further evidence of a move to humanism by Pasca1 254 . 
Like Krailsheimer 255 he states that Pascal would not have 
written the apology if any were disqualified from sharing 
in Christ's redemption or incapable of accepting or reject-
ing the offer of grace. 
Concoit-on un Pascal favorisant l'esp~rance chez 
des hommes vou~s, quoi qu'ils fassent, a la 
r~probation ~ternelle, et leur conseillant la 
pratique d'habitudes parfaitement vaines et 
inefficaces, qui ne serviraient quia cr~er en eux 
une illusion, avantageuse peut-etre mais fausse, 
et non pas comme il llentend, ales disposer a la 
grace?256 
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Such fragments, which do not in fact go beyond the Thomist 
position which is effectively that of Augustine, do afford 
clear evidence, however, of an unconscious assumption of 
reason as arbiter of supernatural truth. It is by the light 
of his own conscience that-he hac jud~ed the doctri~~ 
fundamentally unacceptable and expects his readers to do 
the same. Gilson states that the doctrine of Augustine was 
a metaphysics of conversion, and that what he gives us is a 
method, 
... i.e. the proper order to follow in a long series 
of efforts which we must make ourselves. As long 
as this method is treated as a system, it will 
appear lacunose and deficient on many counts .... 
All he can do is set them on the path of inquiry, 
show them the attitude they should adopt to 
discover in the divine light the truths which 
no one can see for them in their stead 257. 
This would appear to be precisely the method adopted by 
Pascal in the Pensees. 
Prayer 
The Christian religion obliges men to love God, but 
recognizing men's weakness it alone has provided a remedy in 
prayer 258 , for temptation comes to those who do not pray259. 
Elsewhere Pascal insists that prayer is a gift given only 
to the children of the promise, to remind them of the need 
for dependence upon God, the only source of grace, and to 
bl th ' th' hI' 260 E th h h ena e elr grow ln 0 lness . ven ose w 0 ave 
received the gift of faith have no certainty of election 
and must view their salvation with a mixture of fear and 
hope. 
Toute condition et m@me les martyrs ont A craindre 
par l'Ecriture. 
La peine du purgatoire la plus grande est l'incer-
titude du jugement261 . 
The fear of hell appeared to play a valuable part in 
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the Jansenist system of belief in keeping men to the path 
I 
which leads to salvation. Grace was regarded as a continu-
ous infusion and purification as a means of ensuring this. 
262 Grace may be withheld at any time to make men humble I and 
the fear of losing the infinite good is therefore mingled 
with joy in the holiness and righteousness of which they 
already enjoy some part 263 It is the continuous conscious-
ness of sinfulness and the need for dependence that dis-
tinguishes the righteous from the true sinners who mistakenly 
b l · th . ht 264 Th 1 t t th f e leve ey are rlg eous • e e ec mus ere ore 
work zealously towards salvation 265 , and, conscious always 
of the mystery of election, treat all men as having the 
. 1 b d 266 potentla to ecome save . The most that Pascal can 
effectively offer the reader therefore on the question of 
the gift of the grace of conversion and perseverance would 
seem to be "crainte" and "espoir", based upon "humilite" 
and "l'aneantissemen"t", for faith, prayer, perseverance, 
merit and final election are the arbitrary gift of a divine 
will which thus demonstrates its sovereignty. 
Pourquoi Dieu a etablie la priere? 
1. Pour communiquer a ses creatures la dignite de 
la causalite. 
2. Pour nous apprendre de qui nous tenons la vertu. 
3. Pour nous faire meriter les autres vertus par 
travail. 
Mais pour se conserver la primaute il donne la 
priere a qui il lui plait207 . 
Man must therefore stand before God as a beggar, since it is 
only by "un pouvoir efficace" that perseverance and salvation 
will be effected, and his final word can only be, "Operez 
t 1 t . t ,,268 vo re sa u avec craln e . 
Conclusion 
The theology of grace to be found in the Pensees is 
clearly that of Augustine, determined by Pascal's early teach-
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ing and association with Jansenism, endorsed by his naturally 
pessimistic temperament, and confirmed in his conversion 
experience. The mathematical perspective of his thought led 
to its codification and hardening in the doctrine of the 
three orders, intensifying the gulf between nature and grace, 
between man and an omnipotent God, which forms its basic 
premise, and limiting the sphere of reason exclusively to 
that of finite knowledge. For Pascal as for Augustine, God 
is "wholly other", having broken into the finite world only 
once, in the Incarnation, so that all communication with Him 
must be effected by the grace of Christ, the Mediator and 
Redeemer. The Augustinian view of the Atonement as consist-
ing solely in the suffering and death of Christ, makes his 
person and his Body, the Church in which it is continued, 
central to the whole work. There is no room for natural 
theology or human philosophy in Pascal's theology, for that 
cannot give man a saving knowledge of God which is to be 
found only in Scripture, and in the Tradition and sacraments 
of the Church. 
The role of the Church in the work of redemption is 
determined by this: to teach men about their wretched and 
sinful state, its cause and the remedy the Church offers, 
namely, the grace of Christ. The appropriate response would 
appear to consist in a willingness to waive any subjective 
rational judgement of the doctrinesof the Fall and Original 
Sin, in an uncritical and submissive acceptance both of 
explanation and remedy and in the adoption of a life of 
ascetic renunciation. Man can then only wait in an attitude 
of passive surrender for the gift of faith in an experience 
of the presence of God and of assurance of salvation, which 
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Pascal clearly believes must duplicate his own. By this act 
of divine intervention the will is released from concupis-
cence and the love of self, and becomes free to love God and 
come to a knowledge of the truth. That the Church in which 
this power is vested is that of traditional Augustinianism 
is made clear in fragment L954, B925, where Molinism is 
rejected as a quick way to hell. 
Just as the Church which mediates grace must be that of 
Augustinianism, so the experience of conversion must paral-
leI that of Augustine and of Pascal; for the intense experi-
ence of the numinous, the "creature-consciousness" in the 
presence of the transcendent God, the need for absolute 
surrender of the will, and the feeling of deliverance as an 
unmerited gift, are given dogmatic expression in such a 
doctrine. As Gilson observes the Augustinian doctrine is a 
methodology of conversion, and it provides the framework of 
the apology. Such an interpretation, according to Rudolph 
Otto, should serve only as the analogical expression of 
religious experience and not as theological theory, since 
it must necessarily attribute to God an absolutely fortui-
tous will and leads to the development of such concepts as 
It ' t' d· d d b't l' 269 an occu JUs lce an goo ness, an an ar 1 rary e ectlon . 
It also implies an essential sinfulness in man, and C.A. 
Campbell sees this sense of radical imperfection, expressed 
by Augustine as the tyranny of concupiscence and inevitab-
bility of sin without grace, as arising from a particular 
type of individual religious experience. 
The intrinsic, inevitable imperfection that belongs 
to man in virtue of his finite, creaturely status 
is falsely identified with the different mode of 
human imperfection which is sin; and sin accord-
ingly comes to be regarded as something intrinsic 
and inevitable in human nature 270 . 
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The Augustinian view of human nature, the conviction 
that goodness is therefore beyond the power of the human will 
except under grace, and that in conversion both knowledge and 
love of God are infused into the heart, result then from a 
particular type of religious experience which does not have 
validity for all men. The appeal of the Pensees is accord-
ingly restricted to individuals belonging to the twice-born 
category. 
Pascal's attitude to the function and competence of 
reason in the Pensees is ambivalent, to say the least, since 
in the "ordre des esprits", it constitutes man's greatness, 
by allowing him to transcend his finiteness in the very act 
of recognizing it. He believes that men should make the 
right use of reason to lead them to God. Yet, under the 
tyranny of concupiscence reason is swayed by the passions, 
imagination, illness and self-interest and can be healed 
only by grace, though he does concede that man has neverthe-
less made admirable systems of government and justice through 
its use. 
Yet Pascal himself relies heavily upon natural argument 
271 to persuade men to accept the doctrines he proposes . He 
readily concedes that these will offend natural justice and 
reason, thereby tacitly admitting the presence in man of a 
moral consciousness, yet seeks nothing from reason but the 
decision to anaesthetize this moral consciousness and blindly 
accept the Augustinia~ explanation and remedy for man's 
wretchedness. He even admits the necessity for such an inner 
assent, acknowledging that reason does, in fact, have the 
ability to make value judgements upon the content of Revela-
tion, and that if it is not satisfied religion becomes 
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ridiculous and absurd. Men would seem, therefore, already 
to possess, at least in some degree, objective standards of 
truth and justice which are "given", and for all minds. 
H. Rashdall indicates that such judgements must come from 
the intellectual part of our nature, for whilst they are 
intuitive and immediate, they cannot result from feeling 
since this would not confer upon them the necessary object-
. . t 272 lVl Y 
Pascal states that man has an inbuilt capacity for the 
experience of God which can be filled only by Him and he 
specifies this as the heart, the seat of the will, the 
intuitive capacity which in the "ordre des esprits" grasps 
basic principles of mathematics. Ruled since the Fall, 
however, by the power of concupiscence and unable to attain 
the good which is its true end, it is the source of man's 
wretchedness, which can be healed only by an infusion of 
di vine grace to incline the teart to God. Rudolph Otto argues 
that neither the "moral ought" nor the "numinous" are evolv-
bl f h f b t il' • ,,273 d a e out 0 t e nature 0 man u SUl generls ,an must 
be aroused. It would appear that Pascal has perceived the 
experience of the numinous at his conversion, a matter of 
feeling in which God is loved, as the only access to know-
ledge of God capable of satisfying the "gouffre infini". 
John Oman 274 affirms that faith is a gift of God, not 
a crude compelling sense of assurance, but conviction of 
the truth by the truth, in the whole of revelation. Pascal 
failed to recognize that the constant unrest in man results 
from his inevitable inability to measure up to the divine 
demand in the moral consciousness which is the source of 
salvation, what Paul Claudel 274 called "L'inexorable appel 
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de la voix merveilleuse", and de Lubac, "Ie lieu de la 
nativite de notre etre sumaturel,,276 and what induced Gregory 
of Nyssa to define God as "Ie cherche,,277. Von Hlige1 278 
states that the source of these unfulf"illed aspirations which 
torment men is "The Infinite, very Being as opposed to con-
tinual becoming and perishing", which dwells within him. 
Clearly the capacity for God works through the moral order 
and the moral consciousness and is a function of the intel-
lect, but as Pascal saw, a response of love is necessary if 
the will is to accept and follow the divine revelation. In 
279 Christus inEcclesia, H. Rashdall states , 
It is in, not outside, the working of Reason and 
Conscience and Will, in and through the ordinary 
social affections and the moral aspirations which 
are the necessary basis of true religious emotion, 
that we must see the workings of the Spirit of 
God .... If we are really faithful to the doctrine 
of Grace, there is no merely natural knowledge or 
merely natural goodness, and we may equally say 
on the other hand, no merely supernatural knowledge 
or goodness. 
Humility and a sincere desire for th~ truth are rightly 
named by Pascal as the prerequisites for knowledge of God, 
but these seem to imply for him surrender of the will and 
total submission to the direction of the Church, namely, the 
spiritual life of Port-Royal, an abdication of personal 
responsibility to a higher authority, rather than the recog-
nition of a claim made upon him by the voice of the moral 
consciousness. It implied for him an ascetic renunciation 
of the world, science and his family, for as Brunschvicg 
points out 280 , for the company of Port-Royal, Christianity 
was incompatible with the world, "se convertir, ce n 'est 
point passer de l'incredulite a la foi, c'est renoncer a la 
vie du monde pour vivre en Dieu". Such rigorism and the need 
for continual purification seem to be rooted in a morbid 
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self-interest, constantly fed by the fear of losing the 
grace of salvation. 
Pascal decries the pride which glories in man's self-
sufficiency and the achievements of reason, since from the 
perspective of the supernatural order they are valueless and 
cut men off from God. Yet his injunction "Ecoutez Dieu" 
surely implies a true need in man for sincerity in the face 
of truth, and the pride he deplores and attributes to con-
cupiscence, really amounts to the refusal of men to acknow-
ledge the witness of reality. True humility in the view of 
John oman 28l consists, not in a carefully manufactured self-
depreciation, but in just such a sincerity, and Pascal 
himself reflects this condition of penitence in fragment 
L923 B713. 
Pascal recognizes that such humility and the desire for 
God must be aroused in men and can never be imposed, and in 
spite of his constantly reiterated affirmations that only 
grace can turn men to God, his impatience towards those whom 
he believes wilfully reject God often seems to belie this. 
Yet the insights that a purely intellectual belief is useless 
for salvation, and that the truth must be loved, are well 
founded for the moral activity which flows from such a 
belief must have as its mainspring a will dedicated to the 
attainment of this truth as its loved goal. The "Pari" 
fragment, in fact, constitutes a challenge to men to open 
themselves to the divine self-revelation in a living experi-
ment and put their trust in it as a way to happiness and 
salvation, for experience can be the only final determinant 
of such knowledge and involves a commitment of our 
282 passional nature . His belief that participation in the 
284 
liturgy and sacraments, and devotion to charitable works 
("s'abetir"), would bring their own rewards of faith and 
h . 11 d d . . 283 d applness, seem we groun e ln experlence ,an appear 
to offer a more universally verifiable proof of conversion 
than his own assurance of election. 
Pascal's conviction that grace is a continuous infusion 
related to our dependence on God, which can, at any moment, 
be withheld to induce humility, and that election is always 
uncertain, meant that the relationship between man and God 
must always be based upon fear and hope. The elect then 
consist, as John oman 284 states, of those to whom God has a 
favourable mind, and not simply of those who have a favour-
able mind to God. The rigorism which was Pascal's response 
to the "awe" before the numinous, nevertheless reflects a 
very real need for the maintenance of a close relationship 
between the Christian and God. Pascal saw prayer as the key 
to this attitude of dependence, a remedy for man's weakness 
and defence against temptation, yet given only to the 
children of the promise. Trethowan 284 endorses the import-
ance of prayer in the Christian life, the need for an 
attitude of receptivity to God which will issue in action, 
liThe business of prayer ... is to place the mind and will 
in readiness for God's action upon it". It is what H.D. 
Lewis 286 calls "the live centre of our relation to God". 
Beneath the constrictions of the Augustinian doctrine, 
in which the religious experience of conversion of both 
Augustine and Pascal was intellectualized, lies the belief 
that true happiness results only from a willed openness and 
response to God's loving disclosure of Himself in a gracious 
relationship by which He draws and redeems men through the 
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moral life, and constantly restores a right relationship to 
Himself through his reconciling grace. K.E. Kirk expresses 
the primacy of God in this relationship, 
Worship depends not upon our own activities, but 
upon the activities which God brings to bear upon 
USi to them we are forced to react as worship-
pers .... And even if he refuse to worship, and 
turn his back upon all that he knows to be good, 
the irresistible pressure of goodness will still 
be upon him. For what we mean by "goodness" is 
the invincible grace of God's love ... 287 
... il faut aimer un etre qui so it en nous, et qui 
ne so it pas nous. Et cela est vrai d'un chacun 
de tous les hommes. Or il n'y a que l'etre 
unive~sel)qui soit tel. Le Royaume de Dieu e~t 
nous. Le bien universel est en nous, est nous-
meme et ri'est pas nous 288 . 
en 
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CHAPTER VI 
CONCLUSION 
The writings of Pascal most directly concerned with his 
theology of grace provide a comprehensive outline not only of 
the doctrine itself, but also of the morality and spirituality 
it implies, its psychological ground and the source of its 
peculiarly Pascalian expression. Although in the Ecrits sur 
la Grace it is defined by Pascal quite unequivocally as that 
of Augustine, the pure doctrine of the Catholic Church and a 
synthesis of the partial truths embodied in Molinism and 
Calvinism, much debate has focused upon the question of his 
adherence to Jansenism and the heretical import of this label 
for his theology. 
Pascal and Jansenism 
The origins of the Jansenist l movement in the discord 
between the Eastern and Western traditions of the Church on 
the question of grace after the Council of Trent, and its 
identification with the doctrine and spirituality of Port-
Royal which, under the direction of St.~Cyran became the 
focus of the revival of Augustinianism and piety in seven-
teenth century France, have already been discussed in some 
detai1 2 . As Laporte writes: 
Nul doute quant aux origines du mouvement, ni quant 
aux intentions de ses auteurs: Saint-Cyran, 
Jansenius et Arnauld. Quelques precurseurs qulon 
puisse leur assigner - .•. un Bradwardin ou, au 
IXe siecle, un Gotteschalk - il est certain que 
cette doctrine est, chez eux, directement issue 
de la meditation personnelle des oeuvres de saint 
Augustin 3 . 
It was at Port-royal, then, that Jansenism took its dual 
form: as a small group of theologians working under Arnauld; 
and also as a community under the rule of charity, practising 
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retreat from the world and embodying the morality and 
spirituality of Augustine's city of God, which it was St.-
Cyran's aim to realize in the Church 4 . The central thesis of 
the Port-Royal theology was that elaborated by Jansen in the 
Augustinus: the rejection of the rational theology of the 
Scholastics and Jesuits and a return to Revelation as sole 
authority in theology5; and the reassertion of key 
Augustinian doctrines which had been allowed to lapse, par-
ticularly those of Original Sin and Predestination. It there-
fore emphatically reaffirmed the omnipotence of God in the 
discontinuity between the natural and the supernatural; the 
depravation of the human will, perversely fixed since the Fall 
onlove of self; the insufficiency of a "sufficient" grace, 
and the need for a truly efficacious, medicinal grace to heal 
the will; the centrality of Christ's sacrifice as its sole 
source; its sufficiency for all but its efficacity only for 
the elect; the small and fixed number of those predestined 
to salvation; and the gratuitous and hidden nature of elec-
tion, so that no one can be certain of final perseverance. 
The theologians of Port-Royal particularly opposed both 
Stoic and Jesuit teaching, for in the first nature required 
no supernatural assistance in the performance of the good, 
while in the second grace merely complemented nature 6 . Jansen 
rejected the Scholastic conception of "pure nature,,7, and the 
Aristotelian view of blessedness as the completion of man's 
natural state by the development of his potentialities 8 . 
Central to the Port-Royal doctrine is the Augustinian belief 
in man's natural end as a supernatural beatitude, and in grace 
as an infallible operation in the soul effecting a participa-
tion in the life of God, a transfusion ending in the union of 
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two natures in imitation of the Incarnation of Christ, the 
"Homme-Dieu,,9 The doctrine in effect constituted not only 
the repudiation of natural theology, especially of the moral 
function of reason as guiding the will in the choice of the 
good, found in Aquinas, but also the denial of any freedom of 
will 10 in man 
The implications for the moral life of this doctrine are 
therefore clear. Supernatural good can result only from a 
conversion of the will, effected by the power of an efficacious 
grace, from love of self to love of God, in which all true 
morality consists. 
L'amour de Dieu, slil est sincere, contient en soi 
tous les commandements, non seulement le desir de 
les observer, mais la regle par ou, sans nul besoin 
de casuistique,nous saurons discerner dans les 
occasions embarrassantes, Ie sens et la mesure de 
notre devoir: ama et fac quod vis •... Ainsi tout, 
dans la conception Port-Royaliste, dogme et morale, 
se ramene bien a cette idee de l~amour qui, observe 
Arnauld dans une autre lettre bien remarquable, "fait 
l'essence et la beaute de notre Religion,,11. 
Moreover, since in every good act grace both instructs 
man in the good and performs it the mode of its acquisition 
is of vital concern for attaining salvation. For the 
Christian the only source of grace is Christ's Body, the 
Church, of which he has been made a member, and to which he 
must adhere exclusively in renunciation of the world and in 
the acceptance of his suffering. Divine Revelation and the 
Sacraments are the special channels by which grace is confer-
red in reBponse to penitence and contrition, which are not 
merely mechanical but issue in renewal of life and works of 
charity. Laporte observes that the main preoccupations at 
Port-Royal were continuous meditation upon the truths of 
Revelation "pour les faire passer 'de la t@te dans Ie coeur''', 
making them living truths, and constant purification in order 
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12 to be at all times fit for the reception of grace The 
attitude of the Christian to the Church must always, in their 
view, be one of humble submission since rebellion amounts to 
the abandonment of Christ, voluntary deprivation of effi-
cacious grace and inevitable damnation 13 . 
Pascal and Port-Royal 
Chevalier describes the conversion of Pascal and his 
family to the doctrine of Port-Royal and life of charity at 
Rouen in 1646, their introduction to the works of St.-Cyran 
and submission to the spiritual direction of Guillebert, cure 
of Rouville and, in the writer's view "sorte de janseniste 
avant la lettre"14. Pascal's second conversion in 1654 marked 
the beginning of a new era of full commitment to the Jansenist 
cause and an intimate working relationship with the theolo-
gians of Port-Royal, with whom he closely collaborated in the 
writing of the Provinciales15 . Brunschvicg16 and others note 
the continuity of his theology from his first assimilation of 
Jansenist teaching until his death, extending from his 
earliest letters to Gilberte (1648) and the Periers (1651), 
and the Preface pour Ie Traite du Vide (1647) until the 
writing of the Ecrits sur la Grace (1656) and the Pensees 
(1657-1658). Laporte demonstrates very convincingly the 
precise identification of Pascal's theology with the Jansenism 
of Port-Royal, especiallY in the Provinciales for, he 
b ", . , 1 i ,. , t l' ,17 . o serves, En verlte, tout e Jansenlsme es a ramasse , 
with the morality it implies. Although part of "la petite 
Eglise Janseniste", Pascal inevitably left the mark of his 
own individual genius upon the presentation of and defence of 
that doctrine, especiallY in the mathematical perspective of 
his thought, his psychological perception and the brilliance 
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and versatility of his style. Nevertheless, Laporte affirms, 
"c'est cette theologie Janseniste qui fait son etre,,18. 
Car assurement, nul ne pretend que Port-Royal ait 
produit le genie de Pascal .... Mais c'est A Port-
Royal que ce genie a trouve son orientation, sa 
nourriture spirituelle, ~u'il s'est en quelque 
maniere trouve lui-meme 1 . 
Authority or Heresy 
A comparison of the doctrine set down in the Ecrits sur 
la Grace with that of Augustine 20 confirms their essential 
equivalence, a view which is unconditionally supported by 
Sellier and others. 
La theologie augustinienne de la grace est le 
soleil de son oeuvre. Persuade que le plus grand 
des Peres etait infaillible en ce domaine, Pascal 
a reproduit sa pensee et jusqu'A ses termes 21 . 
It was clearly also that of Thomas Aquinas and the Catholic 
22 Church ,despite an apparent evolution in the latter away 
from Augustinianism. 'rhe introduction of a "sufficient grace", 
insistence upon God's universal salvific will, and the 
Aristotelian view of the will as freely following the choice 
of reason, did not represent in real terms true modifications 
of Augustine in the direction of Jesuit humanism. As N.P. 
Williams states of Aquinas: 
His conception of grace is metaphysically based 
upon the Aristotelian idea of God as the Unmoved 
Prime Movent" 'an idea which inevitably generates 
belief, not merely in the universal necessity of 
grace but in its strict irresistibility 23. 
Williams observes that the modus operandi of grace in 
Augustine, by way of an infallible attraction, corresponds 
with the Aristotelian view of God (with which he was probably 
acquainted) as the ultimate Being moving the universe as the 
object of his love 24 . With God as first principle of all 
human willing, providentially arranging both motivations and 
circumstances congruous to the elect to ensure their final 
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perseverance, and the "reprouves" rejecting a grace which, 
though sufficient is always incongruous, clearly no fundamen-
tal difference exists between the Augustinian and Thomist 
25 theology of grace . 
Moreover, the freedom of will in the acceptance or 
rejection of grace, which both doctrines affirm, plainly con-
sists only in its spontaneity and freedom from constraint. 
As N.P. Williams points out, the final of those circumstances 
by which election is determined - that prevailing at the 
time of death - is entirely divorced from human vOlition26 . 
There is no question therefore of resistance to efficacious 
grace in the doctrines of Augustine or Thomas, nor indeed of 
a grace common to all men. Whilst all are regarded as 
capable of redemption and Christ's sacrifice was offered for 
all, grace is actually given only to baptised Christians 
either temporarily or, in the case of the elect, until their 
f · 1 27 lna perseverance . Abercrombie insists that Jansen 
interprets Augustine to mean that God's universal salvific 
will is not universal, but he also underlines the difficulty 
experienced by Augustine in attempting to reconcile the divine 
will with Biblical texts28 . 
The "Dictionnaire de Theologie Catholique" defines 
Jansenism as "une heresie singuli~re qui a toujours voulu 
rester dans l'Eglise,,29. Yet the defence of efficacious 
grace, sanctioned by the Council of Trent30 , and the moral 
theology which it implied, has always been, in Laporte's 
31 
view "tout le programme de la Theologie de Port-Royal" , 
the sole doctrinal point at issue in the Jansenist controver-
sies which began with the condemnation of the Five Proposi tions 
of Cornet and made Jansenism a party within the Church. 
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Clearly the Five Propositions reputedly from the Augustinus, 
and upon which the orthodoxy of Port-Royal hinged, were simply 
the pretext for the condemnation of a theology not only 
regarded as innovative and a threat to the legality of the 
Jesuit position, but which set the authority of conscience 
above that of the Crown 32 . 
Tant d'acharnement, contre un ennemi si peu 
redoutable en effet, ne peut s'expliquer que par 
l'incompatibilite profonde que l'absolutisme 
sentait entre ses propres principes et les 
aspirations du jansenisme. Le jansenisme £ut 
elimine dans la mesure ou il contredisait 
l'evolution de la societe francaise, et les 
puissances qui en etaient issues 33 . 
Pascal, in fact, in the Provinciales upholds obedience to the 
sovereign and the state as divine agents in the ordering of 
human society34 It is clearly Augustinianism, and with it 
the Western Tradition of the Catholic Church, which the 
Jesuits sought to brand as heretical. 
The two fundamental notions contained in these propos-
itions, and reputedly opposed to the Catholic doctrine of 
grace, were the denial of the real and actual efficacy of 
Christ's sacrifice, and the assertion of the impossibility of 
resisting efficacious grace. Since only the first proposition 
was a text~ally accurate reproduction of Jansen and, in the 
view of many writers 35 open to a Catholic interpretation, and 
since the content of all five plainly affirmed the Augustinian 
and Thomist doctrines of efficacious grace, which could 
scarcely be condemned by the Holy See, they were finally 
damned "au sens de Jansenius", presumably also that of Calvin 
36 
and Luther . The Port-Royal denial of Papal or Conciliar 
infallibility in the interpretation of Tradition in the 
matter of IIfait" was also perceived by the Jesuits as further 
grounds for charges of heresy. Laporte considers that only 
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the negations of Papal infallibility and free will, as 
37 
ordinarily understood, appear to oppose orthodoxy . Since 
the first has never found general acceptance and the second 
is to be found in both Augustine and Thomas, lion ne voit plus 
bien ou peut se trouver la matiere d'une 'heresie'1I38. The 
"Bulle Unigenitus" which condemned many of the essential 
theses of Port-Royal, nevertheless left untouched: 
... ces verites de la Grace et de la Predestination 
gratuite que plusieurs fois, au XVIIe siecle et 
au XVIIIe, Rome a qualifiees d'inebranlables -
inconcussa tutissimaque dogmata. Mais Port-Royal 
(Pascal l'avait fait ressortir dans les 
Provinciales) n'avait jamais voulu defendre autre 
chose. Ainsi, lesquerelles de personnes apaisees, 
il apparait que les conflits d'idees etaient 
illusoires. Il n'y a plus de jansenisme, parce 
qu'au fond il n'y en a jamais eu 39 . 
Critics most anxious to label Jansenism a heresy, would 
appear to be those unwilling to acknowledge the inherently 
deterministic character of Augustine's doctrine of grace, 
and his complete failure to reconcile free will with an 
efficacious grace. Their case appears to rest solely upon 
allegations of deliberate misinterpretation by Jansen, 
especially of the Augustinian teaching on predestination and 
the irresistibility of the grace of final perseverance. 
Abercrombie 40 accuses Jansen of following Baius in twist-
ing these doctrines into a harsh Predestinarianism. In 
defence of Augustine he writes, liThe rhetorical brilliance of 
Augustine's language only facilitates this distortion to a 
man of very limited spiritual experience", refusing to acknow-
ledge that such an inference may logically and legitimately 
be drawn from such teaching. 
In similar vein de Lubac states that Jansen, using 
extracts from Augustine, perhaps out of context, built his 
whole edifice on a misinterpretation, justifying in the name 
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of Augustine the doctrine of St.-Cyran and achieving only a 
"conscientious misunderstanding,,41 of his master. He claims, 
with some justification, that the Augustinian teaching on 
Predestination and Grace, like that of St. Paul and St. John, 
, " l' , f ' 42 constltutes a retrospectlve ratlona lzatlon 0 experlence 
implying that in some way this excuses the moral difficulties 
implicit in them. Augustine's use of "insuperabiliter" and 
similar words in no way signifies a tyranny of grace in the 
view of this writer, for it merely indicates its invincibility 
in those perceived to persevere until their death43 . De Lubac 
claims, moreover, that Jansen misinterpreted Augustine when 
he failed to equate grace with charity, the action of which 
is interior to the will, and when he identified grace rather 
with the IIdelectatio victrix ll , lIan inverse concupiscence II no 
different in substance from the tyrannical attraction of the 
passions, a force apart from the will and taking its place. 
That this is mere casuistry to evade the label of determinism 
is evident when de Lubac continues. IIWhatever Arnauld might 
say ... it is clear that it is not grace which is termed 
invincible in relation to the will: it is the will itself 
44 by the working of grace II , surely a distinction without a 
difference. 
Jansen's interpretation of the "delectatio victrix ll is, 
in fact, the main focus of adverse criticism. Burnaby 
accuses Jansen, in his separation of the IIdelectatio" from 
the will, of perverting the Augustinian psychology of grace 
into a "psychological hedonism", using God for the end of 
human happiness instead of loving Him for Himself 45 
Abercrombie goes even further, stating that in Jansen the 
will "is persuaded to act well by an attraction proceeding 
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from God, which affects the will in precisely the same manner 
as the physical attraction of some immediately and carnally 
desirable created good,,46, again a sophistry to avoid the 
blatant determinism of Augustine. In thus divorcing the 
"delectatio" from intellectual illumination, Abercrombie 
claims that Jansen has made it the whole of grace, creating 
"a strife of desires" between grace and concupiscence 47 In 
Augustine, the "delectatio victrix", "charity" or "love of 
God" is the whole of grace 48 . Jansen has simply returned to 
the pre-Scholastic, Augustinian notion of the will as a 
spontaneous, rather than a deliberated, expression of love 
or attraction, in what Broome describes as the strictest 
49 possible interpretation of Augustine's thought . 
There are clearly no serious grounds for supposing that 
Pascal's theology and that of Port-Royal were not essentially 
thatof Augustine, Thomas and the Catholic Church, or that the 
"Jansenists" deserved their sectarian label in preference to 
their preferred title "Disciples de St. Augustin". 
Theology and Methodology 
A close interrelatedness of method and material is to be 
found in Pascal's writing on grace, the whole underpinned 
throughout by the basic distinction between the relative 
claims of nature and grace, reason and Revelation, but with 
each work stressing the particular aspect of the Augustinian 
theology relevant to its aim. Pascal faithfully follows the 
Augustinian method to prove each thesis, appealing to the 
facts of experience, citing the authority of Revelation and 
resorting to rational demonstration, all vehicles by which 
grace may humble will and reason, eliciting submission to 
the truth of Revelation as interpreted in the doctrine of 
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Augustine. Style is also adapted both to purpose and audience, 
bearing the stamp of Pascal's individual genius. Even the 
inconsistencies in the Augustinian doctrine, arising from the 
need to find, in the interests of orthodoxy, some place for 
the free cooperation of man in the work of redemption, are 
faithfully reproduced by Pascal together with the irrational 
arguments designed to explain them. Underlying this meticu-
lous adherence to the presuppositions and method of Augustine, 
however, can be detected unconsciously held assumptions, 
identical with those of the humanists themselves, of reason 
as arbiter of religious truth, and of the will as free, in 
the Aristotelian understanding, to follow the dictates of 
reason. 
Ecrits sur la Grace 
The aim of the Ecrits sur la Grace is the vindication of 
the Augustinian doctrine, regarded in some quarters in seven-
teenth century France as innovative and heretical, as the 
only criterion of Catholic orthodoxy, and more particularly 
of efficacious grace as the sole instrument of salvation. 
The accusations of Calvinism which threatened the Port-Royal 
position, and the popularity of Jesuit rational theology, 
emphasising the autonomy of the human will and making salva-
tion subject to the choice of reason, a position apparently 
sanctioned by the Council of Trent, when it affirmed both the 
efficacious grace of the Thomists and the freedom of the will 
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against the Reformers I required for orthodoxy the inclusion 
and reconciliation of both stances. Pascal is not concerned: 
here either with the morality implied by the Augustinian 
doctrine or with obtaining an individual commitment to it. 
Free of polemical or apologetic overtures, the work is essen-
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tially expository, an attempt to demonstrate logically that 
in the Augustinian doctrine divine omnipotence and human 
freedom are perfectly harmonized by the agency of divine 
grace, making it wholly acceptable to the "sens communI! of 
the reader on theological, moral and rational grounds. 
Pascal first of all deals with what was clearly the 
crucial issue in the debate concerning the Five Propositions, 
the relative contributions of the human and divine wills in 
determining salvation, establishing the key presupposition of 
the Augustinian doctrine, namely, the omnipotence of God. 
There is a brief appeal to the facts of experience in the 
Ecrits sur la Grace to establish that in those who are demon-
strably saved the human will freely cooperates with the 
divine will, while the bulk of mankind are clearly responsible 
for their own choice of damnation, an interpretation designed 
to save God's love and mercy. To determine which of the two 
concurrlng wills should be considered "dominante et maitresse 
de l'autre" in the elect, and to explain the apparently 
unloving and unjust abandonment of the "reprouves" by a 
merciful and loving God, Pascal presents the Augustinian 
doctrine of grace as the distilled essence of Christian 
Revelation. 
He adopts the dialectical style favoured by Arnauld to 
distance the Augustinian doctrine equally from Molinism and 
Calvinism, demonstrating that each is true in its affirma-
tions of freewill and omnipotence respectively and heretical 
only in excluding that of the opposed doctrine. As in the 
Entretien avec M. de Saci the key to the synthesis is to be 
found in the Augustinian belief in the two states of Adam and 
in Augustine's psychology of the will. The partial truths 
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affirmed in Molinism and Calvinism are simultaneously 
affirmed and God's nature is preserved by ascribing to Him 
two wills for man, applicable to his two states. The univer-
sal salvific will of God at creation can then witness to His 
love, the wholly gratuitous (though arbitrary) gift of salva-
tion to His omnipotence and mercy, and the damnation of the 
"reprouves", in view of Adam's sin, to His justice and man's 
freedom. 
Pascal, like Augustine was clearly aware of the need to 
clarify the difficulties and inconsistencies which made the 
doctrine unacceptable to the moral consciousness of many, and 
a large proportion of the work is occupied with rational 
arguments, often those of Augustine, which attempt to resolve 
these problems. The major difficulty facing Pascal in the 
Ecrits sur la Grace is the need to reconcile the basic assump-
tion of man's radical dependence upon God, for each and every 
impulse and act of goodness, with a complete autonomy of will 
and a moral accountability for damning himself and meriting 
salvation. Pascal proposes the reconciliation, with which 
Augustine rebutted accusations of Manicheism by the Pelagians, 
with his concept of the will as determined by the attraction 
of some perceived good rather than by reason and as the slave 
either of concupiscence or grace. Even under the overpowering 
domination of concupiscence the will is said to retain a 
jV 
potential freedom to follow the good. Since this potential-
ity can be actualized only by the gift of the more powerful 
attraction of divine grace, free will and divine omnipotence 
cannot logically be claimed to have been harmonized. with 
Augustine, he can only, in the final analysis, attribute the 
apparent injustice of God to reasons which are unsearchable 
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and hidden in the mystery of the 'Godhead. 
In a further attempt to salvage the divine love, Pascal 
offers several of Augusitne's rationalizations of the word 
"tous", and makes the distinction without a difference between 
IIfaire ll and "permettre" in God's damnation of the "reprouves", 
to avoid identification with the overt determinism of Calvin-
ism, betraying thereby an awareness of its close equivalence 
with Augustinianism. The passages on the "Double Delaissement 
des Justes", the interpretations of the canons of the Council 
of Trent and of the meanings inherent in the words "possibili-
te", "pouvoir" and "puissance", in the proposition on the 
possibility of the commandments, are all attempts to resolve 
the same problem but with respect to perseverance. The 
difficulty implicit in the rejection of the complete freedom 
of will implied by the free availability of the Jesuit 
"sufficient" grace, and a simultaneous affirmation of the 
reality of man's free cooperation in salvation and damnation, 
leads to illogicalities and equivocations which simply rein-
force the image of God as an unjust and arbitrary despot. 
The divinization of man by incorporation in Christ, the 
"Homme-Dieu", must inevitably imply that the human will is 
always "preparee par Ie Seigneur" and "cause secondaire" in 
all salutary acts. Grace is the reward of prayer, but prayer 
is itself a divine gift. The Augustinian view that the 
justified are abandoned by God to instil fear and humility 
in the elect, reinforcing the dependence which is the inevit-
able counterpart of omnipotence, and Pascal's insistence upon: 
the hiddenness of election, which makes conversion (or aban-
donment) possible at any time, and grace a continuous, if 
uncertain infusion, simply support this judgement. Laporte 
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lists the many oppositions, the union of which, by the agency 
of grace, makes up lila V~rit~", and concludes: 
Bref, la nature et la grace; les oeuvres et 
l'amour; l'autorit~ et la libert~; la lettre 
et l'esprit. 
Mais, dans cette suite d'oppositions, les termes 
antith~tiques ne sont pas synth~tis~s en un 
troisiemeterme qui les concilie. La conciliation 
existe sans doute au regard de Dieu: au regard 
d'un esprit tel que Ie notre, elle est un 
"mystere"51. 
While consciously adhering to the Augustinian distinction 
between the authority of Revelation and reason in the field 
of theological truth, the whole of the Ecrits sur la Grace 
witnesses to an unconscious acknowledgement by Pascal of the 
opposite thesis, for they in fact constitute an arduous 
attempt to persuade the reason of the reader, acting presum-
ably as judge of religious truth, to recognize and accept as 
authoritative the Augustinian theology of grace in spite of 
its shortcomings. He condemns the Calvinist suppression of 
the human will and its replacement by grace, together with 
God's responsibility for the introduction of evil into the 
world and for the damnation of the majority of mankind, as 
offensive to his natural concepts of love and justice and, 
by implication, those of God, acknowledging an analogical 
relation to exist between the two. Pascal in fact damns his 
own doctrine with that of Calvin, for neither his appeal to 
an "occult" justice in God, nor the transfer of responsibility 
for the introduction of evil to Adam, in any way absolves 
God. 
The Ecrits sur la Grace are clearly the passionate 
defence of a particular view of God and of grace based wholly 
upon non-rational grounds, namely, the numinous quality of 
Pascal's conversion experience and his pessimistic assessment 
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of human nature, and therefore rationally indefensible. 
Pascal follows Augustine in citing extensively the authority 
of Scripture, the Councils and the Fathers to validate his 
arguments, but here the interpretative role of reason is 
plainly that of selecting texts, canons or passages from the 
Fathers (particularly Augustine himself and his disciples) 
whose theology is determined by a similar view of man and 
God. Similarly linguistic and textual analysis, which 
favours his particular religious bias, verbal equivocation 
masking the true meanings of statements, and the circumlocu-
tions of the "Double Delaissement des Justes", are deliberate 
attempts to allay the moral scruples of the reader, recognized 
l'd52 as va l • In adopting the method for the logical proof of 
propositions set down in De l'EsErit Geometrigue in the 
fourth Ecrit, the resultant demonstration cannot be held to 
constitute an unbiased interpretation of the Council's inten-
tions, for its deliverances clearly catered to the needs of 
a strong "once-born" Scotist faction in its affirmation of 
free will. 
It is abundantly clear that not only Pascal but Augustine 
before him completely disregarded his own explicit distinc-
tion, both in the use of rational argument to establish the 
truth of doctrine, and in his appeal to the "sens commun" as 
judge of its truth and moral acceptability. 
Lettres Provinciales 
Pascal's ambivalent attitude to the relative claims of 
Revelation and reason in the Ecrits sur la Grace, is even 
more evident in the Provinciales, where the whole work con-
stitutes an appeal to the moral consciousness of French 
society to judge the authority of the relative doctrines in 
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the light of the morality they prescribe. The emphasis in 
this work is therefore upon affirming grace as sole authority 
in moral theology both to understand the law of Christ in 
Revelation and to practise it, and upon exposing the manifest 
inadequacy of Jesuit rational moral theology which, in 
Pascal's view, openly threatened the integrity of the Church 
and the stability of the State. 
Augustinian presuppositions particularly relevant to the 
aim of the work are his concepts of: the will as the slave 
of grace or of concupiscence; Christ and His Body the Church 
as the only source of redemption and true morality; and 
humanity as divided into two opposed groups under the rule of 
Charity or of the Devil, all reflecting the fundamental 
opposition between nature and grace. The first condition of 
the moral life is the healing of concupiscent wills which, in 
view of the Fall, must always perform acts (even apparently 
virtuous ones) dictated by self-interest, with reason 
rationalizing the choice. Grace must restore pre-Fall 
equilibrium by drawing the will from love of worldly attrac-
tions to its true goal, God, in the love of Whom, true 
morality consists. 
Moreover, the life of charity can be lived only within 
the communion of the Church which mediates the grace of con-
version and perseverance in its sacraments and teaching. 
Pascal makes it very clear in the Provinciales that the 
spiritual and moral discipline practised by the nuns and 
solitaires of Port-Royal exemplified that life. The true 
Christian follows the guidance of conscience enlightened by 
grace through prayer, meditation upon Scripture, spiritual 
direction and the purification of body and life which makes 
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its reception possible. Since, as Pascal underlines in his 
correspondence S3 , the Christian life consists in a gradual 
separation from worldly attachments and incorporation into 
the life of God completed only at death, an attitude of 
detachment from the world is obligatory, of "use" rather than 
"enjoyment" of worldly goods and ties, as mere images of 
their truly "real ll supernatural counterparts and as the means 
by which the Christian can rise to God and enjoy eternal 
beatitude. 
The voluntary acceptance of all events, suffering, 
mortification, poverty and charity is regarded as indispens-
able evidence of a will united with that of Christ. Grace 
and the moral life are therefore conditional upon hatred of 
the world and a willed adherence to Christ, especially in the 
Eucharist where absolution is devoid of grace without the 
desire for union with God or the sincere penitence which 
issues in renewal of life. For Pascal, as for Augustine, the 
limits of human reason in the moral sphere are the fulfilment 
of the law and natural virtue. To attain to supernatural 
beatitude, however, reason must submit to the higher authority 
of Revelation. 
The polemical nature of the Provinciales, and the public 
for whom it was destined, determined both form and literary 
style but the method remains that of Augustine, namely an 
appeal to the reader to accept the Augustinian doctrine as 
valid in the light of experiential evidence, of proofs from 
Christian Revelation and of rational demonstration. Satire, 
from gentle irony to ridicule, is the instrument by which 
Pascal both entertains the reader and acquaints him with the 
facts of the moral laxity condoned by Jesuit rational moral 
316 
theology. Citations from Scripture and the Fathers neces-
sarily occupy an important place in the work, countering 
those from Jesuit probabilists. It is brilliant and witty 
argumentation however, much in dialogue form, upon which 
Pascal most heavily relies to draw from a public, whose 
acquaintance with Catholic theology is minimal, a favourable 
judgement on theological and moral problems simply in the 
light of the "sens commun". 
For Pascal a rational moral theology such as that of 
the Jesuits constituted a denial of the doctrines of the Fall 
and Original Sin, and of the need for a Redeemer, based as 
it was upon a freely available "sufficient" grace subject to 
the choice of human reason and making the "moi ll the axis of 
existence. The good no longer consisted in a participation 
in the life of God but in a natural beatitude, and the goal 
of existence is not God but the realization of self. 
Aristotle had replaced Plato, and the natural had banished 
the supernatural to the realm of the miraculous. 
The bulk of the work, then, from Pascal's attack on 
lIactual grace ll in the fourth letter, is occupied with the 
presentation of his case: the systematic exposure of the 
hypocrisy, pride, ambition, slander and physical excess which 
the adoption of such a moral theology condones and even 
encourages. Such a naturalism, Pascal insists, is the 
reversal of Christian morality with love of God replaced by 
a natural ethic, the Church by the world, and involves over-
turning the Augustinian concept of "use" and lIenjoyment li 
since a will separated from God must necessarily be ruled by 
concupiscence. Reason justifies this worldly morality 
through Probabilism, which Pascal is at pains to expose as 
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simply rationalizations of the choices of corrupt wills, 
tailored to the needs of the individual "amour-propre ll 
enslaved to "gloire", "honneur" and "ambition ll • The sacra-
ments, and especially the Eucharist, particularly venerated 
by Port-Royal, have been degraded by mechanistic observance 
and easy piety, dispensing, in Pascal's view, with the grace 
of Christ, love of God and the law of the Gospel, and so 
effecting a moral regression beyond the natural law. 
Theological discussion is minimal in the Provinciales, 
and although Pascal cites the authority of Revelation for 
verification of his doctrinal stance in the early letters, 
to discredit the Jesuit "sufficient" grace, it is on the 
grounds of their dishonesty in forming an unholy alliance 
with the Thomists that he damns the Jesuits in the eyes of 
the reader. As in the Ecrits sur la Grace Pascal is driven 
by accusations of Calvinism from counter-attacking Jesuits 
to exonerate the Augustinian doctrine from the stain of 
heresy. The eighteenth letter is devoted to proving ortho-
doxy by presenting the Augustinian doctrine as a synthesis 
of Thomist and Molinist teaching, in line with the continu-
ing Tradition of the Church up to the time of Alvarez, 
upholding both efficacious grace and the freedom of will 
affirmed by the Council of Trent, and perhaps serving as 
inspiration for the later writing of the Ecrits sur la Grace. 
Between the fourteenth and eighteenth letters, a pro-
gression can be detected towards identification with the 
teaching and orthodoxy of Thomism in numerous references to 
the authority of Thomas, and in declarations of the 
sufficiency of Christ's sacrifice for all. This modification, 
perhaps inspired by the Jesuit-Thomist coalition, represented 
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no more than a token concession, as in Thomism itself, to 
the humanist temper of the times and similar charges of 
heresy. There would seem to be no grounds for believing that 
Pascal in any way modified the teaching of Augustine in the 
Provinciales, with whom, in any case, both Arnauld and 
Nicole held Thomas to be in full accord54 . This is borne 
out by Pascal's reiteration, in the same letter, of the 
basic distinction be·tween Revelation and reason stated much 
earlier in the Traite du Vide, in defence of the Port-Royal 
challenge to Papal infallibility in the interpretation of 
fact in Tradition. The differentiation of truth into three 
distinct and heterogenous orders in this letter represents 
the full development of the Augustinian distinction which 
will play an important role in the Pensees. 
Yet the whole of the Provinciales constitutes a denial 
of the claim that only faith is the judge "des choses surna-
turelles et revelees,,55. It is the "sens communI! of a 
worldly seventeenth century society, in Pascal's view outside 
the rule of charity, from whom a judgement is sought upon 
the authenticity of the Jansenist and Jesuit doctrines, by 
appraisal of their moral theology and the moral lives of 
their adherents. The criteria in the light of which this 
judgement is made are, moreover, themselves the products of 
human reason, namely, the natural concepts of truth and 
justice which Pascal clearly believes have an objective 
validity which he has declared impossible without grace. 
Moreover, in following Augustine and appealing to the 
evidence of experience for verification of his doctrine, 
Pascal would seem to contravene his own methodology, apply-
ing instead the scientific method for the proof of an 
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hypothesis to the field of religious truth. 
Whilst true morality is possible only to grace according 
to Pascal, he nevertheless assumes in the Jesuits and their 
nominal adherents a natural ability, not only to evaluate 
and judge their own moral theology as the product of con-
cupiscence because of the laxity it encourages, but also to 
renounce such an attachment to worldly values and return to 
a morality founded upon the law of the Gospel and love of God, 
simply by the right use of reason and the free choice of the 
will. This ambivalence is perhaps most evident in his 
criticism of the mechanical observance of the sacraments. 
An attitude of humility and sincerity is demanded of the 
worldly as the absolute prerequisite for the reception of 
the grace of absolution, but love of God, true contrition 
and the desire for a change of life are themselves said to 
be the work of prevenient grace. 
The ambiguity surrounding Pascal's use of the word 
"conscience" - at times the seat of divine inspiration, at 
others clearly the "sens commun" or human reason - would 
seem to reflect the equivocal attitude of Pascal himself 
to the claims of nature and grace. The sense of outrage 
which pervades the Provinciales is, in fact, clearly 
directed at the Jesuits' deliberate refusal to follow the 
deliverances of reason, humbly to acknowledge the law of 
the Gospel as a higher morality and to prescribe and 
practise it themselves. The only inference to be drawn from 
Pascal's attack upon the Jesuits is that it is indeed 
possible to sin against the light and refuse the gift of 
grace. A truly moral life is clearly possible, in Pascal's 
view, by making God the axis of existence by the adoption of 
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an attitude of sincere and humble attention to the voice of 
God in reason and Revelation through which He witnesses to 
reality, and by a willed acceptance of its direction. 
The clearly rational basis of Pascal's moral theology, 
added to his alignment of Jansenism with Thomism, and to his 
affirmations that he is not of Port-Royal, would seem to 
endorse the opinion of those who perceive an evolution away 
from Jansenism in the Provinciales in the direction of 
humanism. As in the Ecrits sur la Grace, Pascal's assumption 
of the authority of the human moral consciousness as rightful 
judge of Revelation must be regarded as entirely unconsciously 
held. Augustine's fundamental distinction between nature and 
grace underpins both method and matter throughout the work. 
For Pascal, as for Augustine, human behaviour witnesses to 
wills ruled by concupiscence, to the inadequacy and unrelia-
bility of reason and to the need for men to submit to the 
authority of Revelation in order to live a truly moral life. 
The eighteenth Provinciale, written in the closest possible 
cooperation with the theologians of Port-Royal, of whom 
Pascal was designated "secr~taire", is a denial of any such 
t ' 56 h'l h' dh t th A t" th separa lon , w 1 e lS a erence 0 e ugus lnlan eory 
of the two delectations in this letter, interpreted in the 
most strictly determinist sense, refutes any suggestion of 
f ' 57 a move away rom Jansenlsm . 
Pens~es 
The theology of Port-Royal similarly furnished the 
inspiration, method and basic presuppositions of the Pens~es. 
The aim of the Apology, as the Entretien avec M. de Saci 
indicates, was clearly to present Christian Revelation, i.e. 
the Augustinian theology of grace, as the only path to last-
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ing truth and happiness. The individuals at whom the apology 
is directed are both Christians accommodated by the rational 
theology of the Jesuits and libertines following Stoic, 
Epicurean or Sceptic philosophies. Pascal's undertaking of 
the work was plainly founded upon the Augustinian view of the 
Church as the Mystical Body of Christ whose function it was 
to merit and mediate his grace in conversion, in its sacra-
ments, in its teaching of Revelation and in the life of 
charity. As God's agent Pascal will make the worldly aware 
of their state, the result of concupiscence and self-love 
which blind them, persuading them to hate these obstacles to 
the Sovereign Good. In Revelation he will offer both explana-
tion and a Redeemer, followed by proofs to convince the mind. 
The surrender of reason to the authority of Revelation and 
of the will to the discipline of the Church are the goal of 
the apologetic work, and, in those for whom they serve as a 
channel of grace, the means of election. 
Central to method and theology are the fundamental 
Augustinian presuppositions of the omnipotence and trans-
cendence of God and relative weakness and sinfulness of man, 
the primacy of faith over reason, grace over nature, and the 
qualitative difference and consequent discontinuity between 
the supernatural and natural spheres. Pascal's own conversion 
clearly validated this disproportion for him and, like 
Augustine's, it provided a blueprint for the apology. Under-
pinning the method is the Augustinian concept of the will, as 
the chief determinant of belief, ruled by concupiscence or 
grace with reason rationalizing its choice. De l'Art de, 
Persuader demonstrates that for a change of belief the will 
must be persuaded to abandon its present love, the self, and 
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with it human reason, and turn to God as revealed in Script-
ure. Pascal therefore seeks to touch the heart, the seat of 
the will and reason, the capacity in man for the reception 
of "given" natural principles and supernatural knowledge and 
love of God, the "gouffre infini" which can be filled only 
by an infinite object. 
Sur la conversion du Pecheur and the Memorial show that 
neither reason nor human effort can of themselves provide 
religious certainty, or the assurance of election. What is 
needed is the total surrender of both reason and will to 
the grace of Christ. The action of grace is perceived, as in 
Augustine, as first bringing self-awareness and humility, 
precipitating the search for God, revealed as the immutable 
good in Scripture. Submission of will and reason to the 
divine revelation is rewarded by a further illumination, an 
intuitive apprehension of God recognized as transcendent and 
eliciting a renunciation of the world and surrender to the 
spiritual direction of the Church in the life of charity. 
Exposition of doctrine is again minimal in the Pensees, 
for Pascal's intention, as in the Provinciales, was to make 
it "aimable" to a worldly and indifferent society by whom 
its harsher aspects would not be favourably received. As in 
the Provinciales, there is discernible in the Pensees also, 
when Pascal affirms the sufficiency of Christ's sacrifice 
for all, a marked softening of the stance he had taken in the 
Ecrits sur la Grace. 
The fragments in the section "Misere de I'Homme" appeal 
to the facts of the human condition to point up the incon-
stancy and misery of man's lot in an attempt to shock the 
reader out of the illusion of happiness and force him to face 
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up to the reality of his state. Since the apology is aimed 
at concupiscent wills, the appeal is to self-interest and is 
based on that of the traditional ethics of Augustine and 
Aquinas, namely, the desire for happiness, universal to all 
men. In this first part of the work, Pascal follows the 
dialectical method of the Entretien avec M. de Saci, and 
employs the Platonic imagery of Augustine to emphasize the 
transience and worthlessness of this life in relation to the 
next, the unreliability of the senses and reason, deceived 
by imagination, illness and self-interest, and the inability 
of men to find either absolutes or happiness, all of which 
drives them to seek diversion. Pascal develops the conclu-
sions reached in De l'Esprit Geometrique on the question of 
the infinities in order to underline the gulf between reason 
and the infinite object to which man aspires, in an effort 
.to evoke the awe in the face of omnipotence which will humble 
his pride. The capacity for the infinite in man, the "gouffre 
infini", can be filled only by God. 
Pascal presents the Christian religion, or, more 
precisely, the Augustinian doctrine of Original Sin, as 
explaining the dichotomy of man's nature and offering a 
remedy for his unhappiness. He goes beyond Augustine in his 
rejection of natural theology, refusing to see any evidence 
of God in nature, in the workings of conscience or in phil-
osophies, which fail to take account of the duality of man, 
of the supernatural end for which he was created and of his 
corruption since the Fall which has left his will focused 
on self. The sovereign good which will satisfy man is 
attainable only by incorporation with Christ who united in 
himself the weakness of man and the power of God. The 
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absolute necessity for grace to effect a conversion to the 
supernatural order of charity places the person of Christ 
and the Augustinian view of the Atonement at the centre of 
the Pensees. Christ, by his death and suffering, and 
through the sufferings of his Body the Church, represents 
the sole source of the grace of redemption. However incom-
prehensible it may appear to the human mind therefore, 
reason ought humbly to submit to the doctrine of Original 
Sin, as it does to the infinities in mathematics, as a "given" 
principle. The theme of the "Dieu cache" underscores the 
"otherness" and omnipotence of God, the arbitrariness and 
uncertainty of election, and the role of Revelation as the 
instrument of election, for only those illumined by grace 
will understand its meaning. 
The Augustinian method provides the framework of the 
"Pari" fragment in which Pascal offers an avenue of salvation 
through the will or "automate". The doctrine of the three 
orders, in its definitive form, sets out the limits of 
reason, its absolute inability to prove God or know His 
nature or man's destiny after death, and demonstrates the 
relative worthlessness of finite pleasures in the perspective 
of a possible eternity of happiness. The anxiety and self-
interest Pascal seeks to arouse are again designed to with-
draw the will, and with it reason, from love of self. Then 
through adherence to Christ in "l'abetissement", acknow-
ledged as a "given ll principle on the analogy of first prin-
ciples in mathematics, a habit of belief is established. 
Unless God simultaneously bestows the gift of grace however, 
neither submission-of will or abdication of-reason will bring 
the intuitive certaintY. which is the goal of the apology_ 
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Laporte very convincingly rebuts the opinion of Chevalier 
and others that Pascal moved away from the determinism of 
Jansen towards a humanism which implies a universal salvific 
will in God and a freedom of will in man to dispose himself 
for, and cooperate with, divine grace. Yet, in the Pens6es, 
as elsewhere, Pascal's inconsistent attitude to the scope of 
reason and human freedom supports the claim that he did assume 
in man a free will and moral consciousness with all that these 
imply for conversion. The Pens6es, in fact, confirm the con-
clusion of the Provinciales: that both Laporte and Chevalier 
correctly interpret the theology of Pascal as both determinist 
and humanist, for the apology very clearly re~lects opposed 
convictions held at different levels of consciousness. At 
the conscious level of thinking, method and presuppositions 
are not only meticulously in accord with those of Augustine, 
but are hardened by the mathematical mode of their expression. 
The appeal throughout is tailored to,concupiscent wills, while 
the unreliability of reason dominated by 'the passions, the 
wor.thlessness of human values in the light of the divine, the 
unbridgeable gulf between nature and a Hidden god, all make 
grace absolutely indispensable for conversion. Unconscious 
assumptions, however, of reason or the moral consciousness 
recognizing objectively valid concepts of truth and justice, 
and of a human will which can not only recognize but choose 
to pursue the sovereign good, conflict with such Augustinian 
presuppositions, giving rise to numerous inconsistencies. 
Pascal's ambivalence is evident in his presentation 
since, as in the Provinciales, with the aim and audience in 
mind, he keeps exposition of doctrine to a minimum and 
balances its determinism by fostering an optimistic attitude 
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to salvation, stressing the sufficiency of Christ's sacrifice, 
and universality of God's antecedent will, defeated only by 
the wickedness of men. Pascal assumes that reason, though 
blinded by the passions, can transcend its finitude as it 
evaluates the human condition and judges that it ought to 
accept Revelation and seek God. He unconsciously underlines 
the unique role of reason as arbiter of religious truth when 
he states: that the inner assent of reason must validate 
religious truth; that no contradiction must exist between 
faith and reason; and that the truth men seek must be valid 
for all men and that Revelation can be accepted only on these 
terms. 
Pascal acknowledges the doctrine of Original Sin as 
offensive to his ordinary sense of justice, thereby recogniz-
ing it as a valid criterion for the evaluation of divine 
justice to which it is plainly analogically related. His 
dubious advice to ignore the voice of conscience on the 
grounds of self-interest merely points up the need for its 
sanction of revealed truth. Yet, in the section "Misere de 
l'Homme", he labours the Augustinian view that ordinary 
justice amounts only to custom, and is so unreliable that it 
cannot be used to measure divine justice, while in the "Pari" 
fragment mere human justice is annihilated in the presence of 
the divine, so great is the disproportion between them. The 
Augustinian view of the Atonement made redemption available 
only through the Church; and the humility and purity of heart 
which Pascal lists as the prerequisites of conversion, 
require a surrender of reason and will in total submission to 
the authority and direction of the Church. Pascal's preoccu-
pation with mortality, with the need for continuous submission 
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and dependence, with the hiddenness of predestination, with 
the need to induce an attitude of fear and hope in the 
Christian, together with his obvious dread of separation 
from the Body of Christ, all suggest that the fear of hell 
and need for certainty may well have been responsible for 
the surrender of his own reason to the authority of Revela-
tion as interpreted by Augustine. He states quite categoric-
ally that God deliberately made the doctrine unintelligible 
to obtain just such a blind submission. Yet, as in the 
Provinciales, where he defends the autonomy of conscience, 
he insists that humility is not merely superstitious observ-
ance but also an inward recognition and acceptance of the 
Gospel as making the highest possible claim upon the indi-
vidual, above that made by a religious Order, or by the 
State, as the foundation of the moral life. 
Pascal's impatience with those who refuse to make this 
renunciation testifies here, as in the Provinciales, to his 
belief in a freedom in man to resist the action of grace in 
the divine self-revelation as noted by Chevalier. Only grace 
can turn the will to God, but fragment L740, B583 implies an 
ability in man to reject the truth, while fragment L427, 
B194 constitutes a tirade against those who fail to follow 
the "sens commun" and who dare to "faire le brave contre 
Dieu ll • Similarly, the method employed by Pascal in the 
"Pari" fragment is not only that prescribed for physics in 
the Traite du Vide 58, as Chevalier suggests, but seems valid 
psychologically since only when the vital commitment of the 
will has been made can the truth of religion be tested in 
experience. The doctrine of Original Sin is clearly unaccept-
able on rational grounds, and reason cannot demonstrate that 
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the truth should be loved and accepted for itself. Love of 
God can only be awakened through the acceptance and practical 
application of His moral law in a firm disposition of the 
will. As Don Cupitt writes: 
Once we are in a moral world and have values, 
then we have a standpoint and criteria and can 
talk about giving reasons. But we cannot have 
reasons for our basic values, for it is the job 
of our values to give us reasons, and not the 
other way round 59 . 
The inconsistencies and irrationalities in Pascal's 
works on grace witness, then, to unconsciously held assump-
tions which directly contradict those of the Augustinian 
doctrine. The simultaneous assumption of such irreconcil-
able premises in the interpretation of philosophical 
doctrines is noted in the writings of Maurice Blondel who 
argues for its general application. 
C'est qu'il y a, en tout systeme veritablement 
organise, deux elements vitalement unis qui se 
determinent mutuellement et dont l'un informe 
l'autre comme un principe original de synthese 
et dlanimation: dlune part un ensemble de 
conceptions susceptibles d'expressions analy-
tiques et qui semblent communicables d'un esprit 
a un autre esprit par des procedes discursifs 
comme une matiere qulon se passerait de main en 
main; d'un autre cote une attitude de tout 
l'etre spirituel, une disposition a la fois 
congenitale et acquise qui constitue la per sonne 
profonde du philosophe, sa nature dlesprit, sa 
vision et sa volonte de la vie, son inspiration 
principale et son aspiration finale, ce qui n'a 
pas besoin d'etre llobjet d'une reflexion pour 
etre Ie ressort meme de sa methode, l'aliment 
transBubstanti~teur. de sa doctrine, l'enjeu 
supreme de sa recherche' .... Mais Ie decisif 
element d'une doctrine clest celui qui traduit 
Ie secret ignore du coeur ... clest cette tendance 
spirituelle qui determine Ie sens des elements 
intellectuels plus qu'elle n'est modifiee par 
60 eux, 
The Rational and the Non-Rational 
The inconsistencies in Pascal's theology of grace can 
be seen to arise then frbm two sources: conflicts within the 
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Augustinian doctrine which gives inadequate conceptual 
expression to the non-rational insights of the conversion 
experience; and contradictions between assumptions held by 
Pascal at the rational and unconscious levels. 
The experimental method recommended by Pascal in 
III'abetissement" can furnish perceptions which are true only 
for the individual, for, as Cupitt notes, "religious meanings 
will not have the same kind of neutral and public precision 
. t' f' ." 61 as sClen 1 lC meanlngs It is clearly Augustine's fail-
ure to recognize the individual and mutually exclusive 
nature of the intuitions of his own conversion experience, 
weaving them instead into a highly complex theological 
system, which is responsible for the contradictions and 
irrationalities inherent in that system. The most striking 
of these arise from the affirmation of the dual character of 
the numen in the doctrine of Predestination, i.e. in God's 
omnipotence and justice on the one hand and in His love and 
mercy on the other hand. Both are non-rational intuitions 
of the election experience; the "felt" apprehension of God 
as sole and absolute cause, of all human willing and merit 
as worthless, and of grace as the wholly gratuitous expres-
sion of divine love and mercy. 
Similarly the elaborate reconciliation of free will 
and efficacious grace explained by the Augustinian psychology 
of the will, whose freedom clearly consists solely in its 
spontaneity, springs, as otto explains 62 , from a felt sub-
mergence and annihilation over against the numen, "here the 
futility of one's own choice, there the will that ordains 
all and determines all". Predestination in this sense is 
the perception of the qualitative difference between the 
330 
human and divine which found conceptual expression in the 
Platonism of Augustine. The attribution of God's abandon-
ment of the "reprouves" to an "occult II justice enhances this 
gulf between natural and supernatural values so that God is 
lI ex-lex "63, making his will arbitrary and fortuitous and 
destroying his moral goodness. 
As N.P. Williams 64 writes, the fully developed 
Augustinian doctrine of the Fall "proclaims itself to be the 
product of Augustine's own personality and of the unique cir-
cumstances of his life", "an ex post facto 'rationalization' 
. 65 
of a peculiarly vehement type of emotional experience" , 
characteristic of the pessimistic, twice-born temperament. 
Whilst, as C.A. campbel1 66 points out, for many people who 
accept responsibility for moral failure, the facts of 
experience do not support the view that grace is vital for 
the performance of the good, the same "facts" clearly 
validated the Augustinian doctrine for Pascal. "Creature-
consciousness", the feeling of worthlessness and dependence 
before the felt omnipotence, transcendence and mercy of God, 
indubitably furnishes the non-rational ground for the funda-
mental distinction which underpins the whole doctrine: 
between nature and grace, between reason and Relevation, 
between the world and the Church, between natural concepts 
and divine concepts. That distinction is given full expres-
sion in the doctrine of the three orders. As N.P. Williams 
writes, 
... the hypothesis of a "Fall" is essentially an 
inference from the facts of human weakness and 
sin, considered in the light of the infinite 
holiness of God 67 . 
This is the basis of its appeal in the view of C.A. 
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68 Campbell , and the primacy of this apprehension for 
Augustine and Pascal is evident in the Ecrits sur la Grace 
where Pascal establishes, as the basic premise of his 
theology of grace with all else subordinated to it, the 
omnipotence of God as principle of all human willing, and 
the prevenience of divine grace as the sole condition of 
conversion, perseverance and final election. 
Evelyn underhil1 69 observes that in the conversion 
experience union is usually felt to be with Christ, by 
incorporation with whom, Otto believes, the sinner is felt 
to be cleansed and made fit for the divine presence. 
Rashdal1 70 states that it was Augustine's anxiety to preserve 
the omnipotence of God which determined his view of the 
Atonement as a vicarious punishment effected solely by 
Christ's death and suffering. The centrality of Christ in 
the theology of Augustine and Pascal, and, by extension, 
that of the Church and the Eucharist, are clearly explicable 
on these terms. Bremond deplores this exclusive function of 
Christ in the Jansenist theology of Pascal, an opinion 
echoed by Mersch. 
Ie "Jesus-Christ" de Pascal, au lieu d'aplanir 
etd'elargir toutes les voies possibles qui 
menent aDieu, nous est au contra ire presente 
comme un voile, un ecran, si j'ose dire, 
entre Dieu et nous. Pascal exalte Ie "mediateur", 
mais il cache, il exile Dieu7l . 
The theme of the "Dieu cache", unattainable except by his 
own self-revelation, would seem to give substance to this 
claim. 
The intuitive experience of union with God in Christ 
sanctioned for Augustine the ecclesiastical structure of the 
Church as the Mystical Body, sole mediator between man and 
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God, outside of which is no salvation or true virtue. 
Belief in the atoning work of Christ in Scripture and in 
the sacraments of the Church, crowned by a similar experience 
of certitude, must therefore be, for the religious tempera-
ment like Pascal, the only condition of true conversion 72 . 
Moreover, the desire for permanent union with Christ 
requires an ascetic rejection of worldly attachments and 
pleasures, leading to purity of life and obedience, which 
will purge the Christian of all that stands between him and 
the saving grace of Christ. 
Pascal's second conversion, recorded in the Memorial, 
plainly provided compelling non-rational grounds for the 
uncritical acceptance of the Augustinian doctrine and the 
authority of the Church 73 . Allport observes that the 
immature religious sentiment is characterized by just such 
"a defensive ruling out of disturbing eVidence,,74, founded 
as it is upon the self-centred need for certainty and 
escape from loneliness. A.V.G. Allen goes so far as to 
designate Pascal's religion "thorough-going agnosticism" 
since, with no trace in nature of a God who is withdrawn 
from .his world, "his faith rests on a precarious foundation 
which·the intellect _refuses· to examine,,75. 
In "The Natural and the Supernatural", John Oman 
suggests that if the sense of the holy does not evolve from 
an emotional response of awe to one of reverence for the 
content of its revelation, "from sensation as feeling to 
its disappearance in information", it does not confer the 
true freedom of absolute independence but merely the 
quietitude inherent in the acceptance of an authoritarian 
rule. 
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The sense of the holy may be enslaving, not 
emancipating, and may impose an abject, not an 
independent, mind .... As reverence, the sense of 
the holy is the humility which is the fountain-
head of all right and courageous independence in 
seeking truth, and truth only: as awe it is a 
timid and even shuddering fear of all enlighten-
ment .... Something similar to it as awe, as the 
shuddering of the creature before the overwhelming 
and basilisk-like fascination of fearsome mystery, 
we may feel in any venture upon a wider and higher 
environment, and is not to be escaped any more in 
religion than in any high adventure. It is the 
first impression and a necessary beginning. But, 
as it is there for us to overcome in the physical 
sphere, so in the spiritual, where it is the high 
challenge to the spirit to win its freedom in 
independence of all that dismays. When this is 
won, it is the supreme emancipation from all 
meaner fears; and only as it is thus the liberty 
of the children of God is it truly human and 
perfectly divine 76 . 
Oman insists that such an abdication from freedom in the 
face of the numinous is the sole disaster, "no one is a 
truly religious person till he realises the utter loneliness 
of his spirit in it and desires to hear nothing but what it 
. th . 1 d t t k d l' " 77 says 1n 1S a oneness, an no 0 see e 1verance... • 
Allport 78 defines the characteristics of such a mature 
religion as: a critical attitude towards the content of 
doctrine; a felt freedom for the good; and the conviction 
that as belief is tentative it must be tested by experience 
and that belief must always issue in moral action. The 
inconsistencies in Pascal's writing on grace reveal the 
presence of assumptions corresponding closely to these: 
of reason as arbiter of Tradition and of conscience as 
independent of the authority of the Church; of reason as 
moral consciousness recognizing human values as objectively 
valid for all; of a freedom of will in man to follow the 
law of the Gospel and thus test the validity of belief; 
and of belief as not only intellectual but as giving 
334 
direction to the moral life, all assumptions unconsciously 
negating the fundamental Augustinian presupposition. In 
Reason and Authority, R.R. Orr describes the evolution of 
the religious sentiment of William Chillingworth who, like 
Augustine and Pascal, sought deliverance from uncertainty in 
the inerrancy of the Catholic tradition, as an "infallible 
79 Guide in the Way to Heaven" . Unlike Pascal, Chillingworth 
won emancipation from fear in recantation and in an accept-
ance of intellectual freedom and doubt which demanded the 
rational scrutiny of doctrine as a necessary condition of 
belief. In the seventeenth century Chillingworth established 
the relation between reason and Revelation which Allport and 
Oman consider the mark of the mature religious sentiment. 
He concluded first that faith cannot bring certainty, and 
secondly, "that a faith which is critical rather than 
credulous accords with the principle of moral responsbility, 
whereas one which abdicates reason, and accepts the fiat 
of authority, has no intrinsic merit at all,,80. 
William James specifies two types of conversion: the 
volitional and gradual type or "the type by self-surrender", 
perceived as instantaneous but in fact the result of 
"unconscious" cerebration. These two types are the respect-
ive characteristics of the "once-born" and "twice-born" 
religious temperaments. Expressed conceptually in Aris-
81 totelian or Platonic terms , each is intellectualized in 
the doctrines of the Eastern and Western traditions of the 
Christian Church. The difference is therefore attributable: 
only to a psychological peculiarity which makes rational or 
, lId' 82 non-ratlona e ements pre omlnate Pascal's "night of 
fire" places him firmly in the Western Tradition, but his 
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unconscious assumptions of reason, as judge of supernatural 
truth and morality, and of a true freedom of will, approxi-
mate more closely with those of the Eastern Fathers for 
whom salvation did not result from the impersonal operation 
of grace upon the will. In their view, "Christ as the 
invisible teacher of humanity, whose presence in the world, 
in the reason and conscience of man, is the power by which 
men are delivered from sin and brought into the liberty of 
the children of God ... " 83 . 
Each tradition clearly furnishes valuable insights 
from human experience into the nature and operation of 
divine grace. Both however are subject to distortion 
insofar as the mystical element in the one, or the purely 
ethical and rational aspect in the other, is exaggerated 
with a consequent overriding emphasis upon grace and pre-
destination on the one hand, or reason and self-determina-
tion on the other hand 84 . In the Provinciales Pascal casti-
gates, in the humanism of seventeenth century Jesuits, the 
extreme of rational theology, where, stripped of all 
spirituality, religion becomes mere superstition and 
hypocrisy, a cold business operation offering salvation on 
easy terms and destroying the concept of grace as the love 
of God. 
Equally harmful for grace as love is the predominance 
of non-rational elements in Augustinianism where the basic 
premise of God's omnipotence makes grace an arbitrarily 
bestowed, efficacious and irresistible power in irrecon-
cilable opposition to the moral responsibility of the 
individua1 85 . The Augustinian doctrine not only sanctioned 
the incorporation of divine omnipotence in the authoritarian 
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structure of the Church, as sole mediator of grace and 
guardian of Revelation which must be accepted as infallible 
authority86, but, more seriously, in the view of N.P. 
Williams it discriminated between "natural ll virtues of 
pagans and those of baptised believers which were the 
87 
effect of grace . The fundamental immorality of Augustine's 
conception of grace can be seen to arise therefore from a 
faulty interpretation of his conversion experience, as a 
mystical transformation of the soul, rather than as a con-
scious insight into the nature of God which effects a change 
of life 88 . Similarly, as Otto points out, reason is a 
"principle of judgement and [of] acknowledgement" of a priori 
cognitions "given" in divine revelation. Without revelation, 
as Pascal demonstrates in the Provinciales, reason cannot 
produce such cognitions independently89. Augustinians, 
Pelagians and semi-Pelagians have all, in the view of Oman, 
started out on the wrong road, the first assigning too much 
to grace and the others too much to man 90 . If Augustine had 
91 
revised his view of the divine omnipotence, as Burnaby 
observed, allowing the possibility of refusal, the concept 
of grace as a loving relationship would still have accommo-
dated many of his insights into the nature of its working. 
Grace Manifested as Love 92 
The criterion for measuring the relative rank of 
1 · . d . 93 . th d t h' h re 19lons, accor 1ng to Otto ,1S e egree 0 w 1C 
rational and non-rational elements are harmoniously combined. 
A concept of grace in which omnipotence and freedom are 
reconciled clearly demands, not a reversal, but a revision 
of the Augustinian distinction between the natural and the 
supernatural. The experience of the holy cannot be reduced 
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simply to a show of power that inspires an emotional 
response of awe. It must also be seen to include a revela-
tion of absolute value which seeks to introduce the 
individual to the supernatural environment in which God 
manifests knowledge of Himself 94 . The faculty for its 
reception, and by which it is judged, is plainly reason 95 . 
This witness of reality to itself, Oman 96 states, is the 
only authority, not just in science, as Pascal affirmed in 
the Traite du Vide, but also in religion, an assumption 
which underpins the appeal made both in the Pensees and in 
the Provinciales. The obligation of the moral conscious-
ness to sanction religious belief and to determine the 
actions which accord with it, and the assumption that even 
the authority of the Church should submit to investigation, 
are implicit in the form of the Provinciales and in the 
Jansenist insistence upon the autonomy of conscience 
guided only by grace. 
In religion, then, as in science, the individual is 
alone in the face of reality and this independence, Oman 
observes, is the form of freedom. 
We are free only as, in independence, we choose 
truth and beauty and goodness as at once our 
most real world and our genuine selves. On such 
freedom all worth in either our world or our-
selves depends 97 . 
Grace, manifested as love, in a personal relationship seeks 
to guide self-determined and independent individuals into 
true freedom, which, as Augustine saw, is emancipation from 
self and deliverance from a world of comparative values 
into a world of values which are eternal and which comprise 
th 1 f h 't 98 e ru e 0 c arl-y . Moreover, on this view, grace does 
take the form of an attraction or "delectatio" calling 
338 
forth a response from the wil1 99 , but not infallibly, for 
the holy as supernatural value, is only seen to be "worth", 
in Oman's sense, when it is freely accepted and reverenced 
the goal of the moral life lOO • as 
Oman affirms that bnly if grace acts thus, as an appeal 
to conscience, following the circuitous and patient route of 
persuasion and education, can freedom remain a reality and 
God be seen as love, since evil can then be regarded, not 
as the inevitable and ineradicable result of original sin, 
but as the obverse of human freedom101 . F.D. Maurice 
suggests just such a reinterpretaiton of the Fall story, 
with the expUlsion from Paradise seen as a blessing, as 
the beginning of man's freedom rather than of his corrup-
tion, and as the means by which God, through this perpetual 
witness in the human conscience, seeks to recreate the 
d " . 102 1V1ne 1mage . In this way the irreconcilable conflict 
between man and God is overcome by God's indirect dealing 
with us. Salvation is neither God's work nor ours, but 
rather His giving and our achieving through the only mani-
festation of omnipotence which honours the independence of 
human reason. The submission and dependence, which in 
Pascal are the response to a very real fear of abandonment 
by God, are replaced by the maintenance of an attitude of 
sincerity in the face of reality and of humble dependence 
upon its witness in conscience, so that our moral indepen-
dence is the condition of dependence upon God103 • 
The "gouffre infini", or capacity in man for the 
reception of supernatural truth, "man's strange propensity 
1 h . f' " 104 . 11th t f to see( 1S own per ect10n , 1S C ear y e sea 0 
absolute values or the moral ideal in which he perceives 
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their realization to consist. Reason has a dual function, 
as Pascal unconsciously assumes, both as judge of super-
natural truth and absolute value, and as moral consciousness 
described by Allport as lithe indicator of the agreement 
between our conduct and our values", and lithe knife-edge 
that all our values press upon us when we are acting, or 
105 have acted, contrary to these values" . The cultural 
relativity of conscience is underlined by Pascal in the 
Pensees, yet, as Oman observes, conscience does not itself 
claim to be infallible but insists simply that its judge-
ments be regarded as infallible106 , for without absolutes 
of conscience nothing is sacred and there is no real 
morality or progress. The moral law, therefore, though a 
goal set before us in freedom, has its absolutes of value 
and authority107. Just as Augustine perceived that to 
become the slave of righteousness, by the power of grace, 
implies a gradual recreation, so, according to Oman, we do 
not receive salvation but are only becoming free, with the 
goal demanding an ever higher response to the challenge of 
108 the holy . 
The world and human experience, as Pascal and Augustine 
rightly claimed, represent the vehicle of the evolving spirit 
and the instrument of salvation109 . But, if grace is love, 
that representation is not effected simply through an 
illumination of the natural by a "Dieu cache" visible only 
to the elect. The ministry of Christ himself was preem-
inently secular110 , and it is only within the context of 
personal relationships and possessions that the moral goal, 
deliverance from self, can be realized. 
~he problem of the world, as of ourselves, is 
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that it is both to be denied and possessed ... in 
this world, we have no abiding possession, but 
are strangers and pilgrims on the earth; yet 
there is no final freedom unless this fleeting 
world is in some way possessed by finding in 
evanescence deliverance from the slavery of 
the material into spiritual possessions which 
have the promise of being eternal lll . 
The supernatural then is the reality of the natural, cannot 
be embodied apart from it, and is inseparable from it l12 . 
Augustine's theory of "use" and lIenjoyment" of the world 
is valid, therefore, insofar as it is applicable to all 
men . 
... if, in loyalty to the absolute requirement of the 
sacred, in courageous freedom following its 
guidance and trusting its power, we stand on our 
feet and allow experience to speak to us, and if 
we seek clearly to distinguish its true and 
abiding reality from its material and passing 
forms, and to use the world as the corruptible 
which may have in it the purpose of the eternal, 
and thus to face experience in all its possible 
reach, we can hope to find what justly claims 
absolute value because it is our true environment 
in which we find our true selves l13 . 
Redemption is thus effected by the action of grace 
reconciling men to the world, not by asceticism, self-
annihilation and withdrawal, but by self-denial and service 
in the pursuit of a moral goal which is already eternal 
life and not a down payment on blessedness in the next. 
The condition of enlightenment and progress is that laid 
down in the Traite du Vide for science, namely, the 
absolute freedom and objectivity of reason in the face of 
experience and of all authorities past or present; for 
like natural truth, moral absolutes, though binding, must 
always be regarded as relative and provisional. Revelation 
in Scripture and Tradition must clearly be dealt with 
freely in this way, as a foundation upon which to build, 
rather than as final truth and as the object of idolatryl14. 
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If redemption is thus effected through grace as love 
by way of reconciliation there can be no place for any sub-
stitutionary or expiatory theory of the Atonement, which 
makes the blood of Christ a crude legal device by which 
God releases the elect from slavery to sin and infuses in 
the soul love for Himself. As Oman points out, "love can 
neither be directly given nor directly required. It can 
only be indirectly evoked by giving us ground for the faith 
that God is love. But, in that case, it is the consequence, 
t th d ., f . l' t' " 115 no e con ltlon 0 reconcl la lon . Justification 
cannot, then, consist in the imputation of the merit of 
Christ, for clearly guilt cannot be transferred so that 
another instead becomes blameworthy. The only deliverance 
from hypocrisy and sin, as Pascal insisted in the 
Provinciales, is through sincerity and repentance which is 
the condition and consequence of forgiveness. Grace there-
for saves from sin by the transformation it initiates in 
the nature of the sinner, and the Cross can be seen as the 
final seal on God's commitment to the salvation of mankind. 
Hastings Rashdall argues that the Atonement theory of 
Peter Abelard sums up what is common to all theories in the 
Christian Tradition, for it is stripped not only of the 
Ransom theory but also of the notion of an inherited guilt 
which required Christ's death and suffering for a neo-
Platonic "universal" humanity. "The voluntary death of the 
innocent Son of God on man's behalf moves the sinner to 
gratitude and answering love - and so to consciousness of 
sin, 116 repentance, amendment" Abelard not only recognized 
-the immorality of whatever makes forgiveness arbitrary, but 
also appreciated that forgiveness can only consist in a 
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moral transformation which removes the demand for punishment. 
Deriving from the early Greek Fathers, this theory appeals 
both to reason and the moral consciousness, for it interprets 
.the death of Christ as no longer isolated from his inca rna-
tion, life and teaching, but as the final act of a life 
which fully expressed God's loving relation to man, intended 
to call forth an answering love and consequent regeneration 
of life. 
When we see in the death of Christ the most 
striking expression and symbol of the spirit 
which dominated His whole life, our recognition 
of the divine love which shines forth in that 
death ceases to be dependent upon our accepting 
any of those always difficult and sometimes 
repulsive theories of substitutive or expiative 
or objective efficacy which were once connected 
with it l17 . 
Such a view of grace as the atoning love of God neces-
sarily implies the rejection of the Augustinian conception 
of the Church as the Mystical Body of Christ, the fellow-
ship of baptized Christians to whom God has shown particular 
favour by the special gift of his grace. Admission can no 
longer depend upon unqualified submission to Tradition and 
the waiving of intellectual scrutinyl18 The sacraments 
and other avenues of grace cannot be regarded as vehicles by 
which the divine omnipotence arbitrarily seizes the will of 
the chosen few l19 , a view which informs the expectation 
and raison d'etre of the Pensees. Nor can the Church 
sanction an attitude of fatalistic indifference to the world 
and secular experience, supposedly devoid of divine self-
revelation except insofar as it manifests God to the elect 
so that their actions can be ordered to the enjoyment of 
bliss in the next life. The centrality of Christ can no 
longer imply a redemption effected solely by his death; nor 
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can his passion be limited to the means whereby the elect 
are united in a mystical absorption through the voluntary 
f ff ' d t' . t' 120 acceptance 0 su erlng an asce lC renunCla lon . 
Grace as love precludes both arbitrariness and irresist-
ibility in God's relationship with man, which must 
necessarily take the form of a personal appeal to morally 
independent beings, the response to which must be won and 
never compelled. The only means of grace in such a com-
munion must be the witness of the truth to the moral 
consciousness of the individual, with admission to that 
communion restricted only by the refusal to respond121 . 
Revelation and the sacraments can be the instruments of 
omnipotence only insofar as they reveal the truth to indi-
vidual minds and are seen as symbols of God's self-
revelation in the whole of life and human experience. The 
Church cannot constitute an exclusive body divorced from 
the secular world, material possessions or human relation-
ships, in the context of which alone the eternal order can 
be entered into and of which it is the true reality. The 
life, death and example of Christ must remain the central 
revelation of God's love, and redemption must consist not 
in a making good, but in an ethical evolution into freedom 
from self by the insight of reason into the truth of the 
divine revelation past and present, in moral independence 
and consecration of will. 
While Pascal's theology of grace can rightly be 
regarded as lila geniale mise en oeuvre d'un enseignement 
traditionnel,~22, it cannot nevertheless, for that reason, 
be regarded as the full expression of Christian religious 
consciousness. Like that of Augustine it speaks only for 
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the minor but none-theless fanatical and vociferous "twice-
born" sector of Christendom, and its psychological ground 
is plainly to be found in the particular idiosyncrasies of 
this specific religious type. The partial determinism of 
temperament which must colour all belief, was manifested in 
them as a felt bondage of will and a consequent need for 
deliverance which could be resolved only by a dramatic con-
. 123 
verSlon Allport remarks, "the degree and type of 
freedom a man has depends in part upon what he believes .... 
A person believing he is free uses what equipment he has 
more flexibly and successfully than does the person who is 
convinced he dwells in chains"l24. 
The non-rational intuitions of divine omnipotence and 
human powerlessness determine the conscious presuppositions 
of their theology of grace - the discontinuity between God 
and man, grace and nature, Revelation and reason; an 
arbitrary predestination and an irresistible grace - which 
to a rational and ethical "once-born" Christian, who has 
experienced no such constraint upon the will, are incompre-
hensible and immoral. This essentially faulty and immature 
rationalization in dogmatic form of a particular individual 
experience of grace nevertheless sanctioned an authoritarian 
structure which continues to provide certainty and refuge 
for like-minded individuals. Allen rightly observes of 
Augustinianism and the Papacy, "So far as both yet linger 
in the modern world, it is an evidence that there are those 
who still need, or think they need, a religion based upon 
external authority, or a morality whose sanction is fear of 
the consequences of sin in the future world" l25 . 
In the final analysis, however, as Pascal demonstrated 
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so brilliantly in the Provinciales, only the moral fruits 
which issue from belief can determine its true nature. 
The divine can mean no single quality, it must 
mean a group of qualities, by being champions of 
which in alternation, different men may all find 
worthy missions. Each attitude being a syllable 
in human nature's total message, it takes the 
whole of us to spell the meaning out completely 126. 
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